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INTRODUCTION
“Essays on Political Economy” explores the connections between politics and eco-
nomics in several different contexts. By politics, or more precisely the political game, I
mean the social procedures through which collective decisions are made. By economics I
mean the economic game once collective decisions have already been selected. Of partic-
ular interest are the preferences about collective decisions among agents induced by the
economic game. Some of the political institutions for selecting public policies can be eas-
ily changed and, hence, should be treated themselves as endogenous collective decisions.
Others are very robust. I will refer to the later group as the political structure of society.
Similarly, parts of the rules of the economic game do not significantly depend on collective
decisions. I will denote them, the economic structure of society. The underlying premise
of the thesis is simple. Collective decisions are endogenous outcomes that depend on the
form and intensity of social conflict. In turn, the economic and political structure of soci-
ety shapes the form and intensity of social conflict. The main objective is to improve the
understanding of the deep economic and political determinants of collective decisions.
In political economy more than in any other field, it is arbitrary to draw a line between
endogenous and exogenous variables. In an effort to minimize this issue, the essays of this
thesis rely on formal game theoretic models. Thus, the distinction between endogenous and
exogenous variables in each model is always clear and simple to detect. The equilibrium of
the model connects the endogenous collective decisions with the exogenous economic and
political structure. Sometimes I also go beyond the positive equilibrium-comparative statics
analysis and I perform a normative cost-benefit analysis with respect to the exogenous
political structure. For such cases, the political structure is interpreted as a long run norm
such as a constitution, and the implicit assumption is that the norm is selected to maximize
some welfare criteria.
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This thesis is integrated by five essays divided in three sections, each covering a different
topic. Section I titled “Economic Structure, Political Power and Institutions”,
investigates how the economic and political structure of society (e.g., factor endowments
and political competition) shapes its institutions and public policies (e.g., the political
regime and trade policy). The mechanism explored is the following. The economic and
political structure determines the type and intensity of social conflict; social conflict shapes
economic and political institutions; finally, political institutions determine public policies.
The section is integrated by two chapters that illustrate this approach.
Chapter 1 titled “Factor Endowments, Democracy and Trade Policy Diver-
gence” studies the economic and political determinants of trade policy employing a prob-
abilistic model of electoral competition. The most relevant result of the model is that in
natural resource abundant economies specialized in natural-resource intensive exports, or
in industrial economies that export manufactures, trade policy is likely to be stable and
close to free trade; while in natural resource abundant economies with an important do-
mestic industry that competes with imports, trade policy is likely to be more protectionist
and unstable.
There are several novel features in this essay. First, it is important to stress that the
essay does not try to address why some industries receive more protection than others
within a given country, an issue that has been extensively studied. On the contrary, the
focus is on explaining why trade policy is on average more protectionist and/or unstable
in some countries, two critical issues for economic development that have received almost
no attention in the literature on the political economy of trade policy.
Second, the model generates novel and interesting testable hypothesis about the rela-
tionship between factor endowments, the terms of trade and the average level and volatility
of trade policy. Indeed, the model provides an explanation for historical changes in trade
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policy. For example, it explains why during the nineteenth century U.S. trade policy was
on average relatively protectionist and unstable but the country moved toward free trade
during the twentieth century.
Third, the chapter makes a double methodological contribution. On the one hand,
it brings a new theoretical tool to the analysis of the political economy of trade policy
(stochastic electoral models with candidate valences). On the other hand, it shows the
importance of combining a political model with a structural model of the economy. Indeed,
in this model political competition opens the door to divergence and volatility in public
policies, but the structure of the economy determines how likely it is that equilibrium
policies change over time.
Chapter 2 titled “Autocracy, Democracy and Trade Policy” studies the con-
nections between political transitions and changes in trade policy employing a politico-
economic model in which the political regime, trade policy and a redistribution scheme
based on income taxation are endogenous outcomes. In the model there are three so-
cioeconomic groups: two elite groups (e.g., industrialists and landlords) and one non-elite
group (e.g., workers). The critical point is that income taxation induces a rich-poor/elite-
workers political cleavage, while trade policy may induce intra-elite conflict. The most
relevant results of the model are the following. First, in the absence of intra-elite conflict,
political transitions are associated with changes in trade policy. Specifically, coups (de-
mocratizations) tend to open up the economy if and only if both elite groups are pro-free
trade (protectionist). Second, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, autocracies could avoid
democratization engineering a credible change in trade policy (a reallocation of political
power toward the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers). Third,
in the presence of intra-elite conflict, the non-elite group might not be willing to defend
democracy and coups tend to maintain trade policy.
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In the literature about political transitions trade policy is usually taken as an exogenous
variable. In the literature on the political economy of trade policy the political regime is
usually taken as an exogenous variable. This essay contributes to both literatures making
the political regime and trade policy endogenous. On the substantive front, the model
generates novel testable predictions on: (i) under what circumstances political transitions
should be associated with changes in trade policy; and (ii) when there should be changes
in trade policy without a political transition. The model provides an explanation for im-
portant historical cases. For example, it explains why there was a critical change in trade
policy in the nineteenth century in the U.K. (the repeal of Corn Laws) before democrati-
zation, while the posterior democratization process did not bring any substantial change
in trade policy. It explains why coups in Latin-America did not change the inward import
substitution policies until popular demands became very radicals in the 1970s.
On the theoretical front, the essay shows the importance of intra-elite conflict (in gen-
eral, any policy dimension that potentially divides the elite) for political transitions. In-
deed, it is due to intra-elite conflict, that autocracies could placate a popular uprising with
a reallocation of political power inside the regime. Analogously, it is also due to intra-elite
conflict that the non-elite group could prefer a coup controlled by one elite group rather
than a democracy that is forced to make substantial concessions to the other elite group.
Section II titled “The Political Economy of the Media Industry” investigates
mass media institutions. In one sense the media that a society has is the outcome of
a political game. However, it also possible to study how a society should organize and
regulate its media industry given these political constraints. The essay in this section
explores the positive as well as the normative side of media institutions, with a focus on
the later.
Chapter 3 titled “Optimal Regulation of the Media Industry” presents a simple
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politico-economic model of the media industry in which more competition makes media
capture more difficult. Then, a constitutional stage is considered and the optimal regulation
of the industry is deduced. The essay shows that the normative conclusions we obtain when
we disregard the political process dramatically differ from the ones we obtain when we take
into account political restrictions. Even if the media operates under increasing returns to
scale, a media monopoly is not justified. As media productivity is above some threshold,
the optimal regulation is either to encourage entry with subsidies or to impose just a
moderate entry limitation. It is worthwhile to pay the extra costs associated with several
media companies obtaining and reporting the same news because competition avoids media
capture and the corresponding dissipation of resources in the political system.
Another interesting contribution of this essay is to combine in a single model the two
most relevant sources of media capture. Some models of media capture emphasize the role
of politicians and assume a population with homogenous preferences, while other models
emphasize the role of special interests groups with a privilege access to the media and
assume a population with heterogeneous preferences. An extension of the baseline model
in chapter 3 combines both sources. Moreover, the normative analysis of this extended
model brings novel results. Special interests groups have an ambiguous effect on aggregate
welfare. They push the media to misinform about particular policies that affect their
interests but at the same time they make media capture by the politicians more difficult.
Thus, introducing restrictions to the involvement of some groups in the media industry (for
example restrictions to the formation of conglomerates) could be a good idea for a society
that has other ways to control the dissipation of resources in the political system but it
will be a very bad idea for a society that relies on the media to check politicians.
Section III titled “Commitment and Political Institutions” investigates how
commitment devices can help support better social outcomes. An important idea developed
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in this section is that political institutions that implement commitment devices are not
exogenous but rather endogenous outcomes of the political process. Another crucial idea is
that sometimes a reallocation of political power is required before society takes advantage
of commitment opportunities. The section is integrated by two chapters. Chapter 4 focuses
on the credibility of fiscal rules in the context of political budget cycles. Chapter 5 explores
how commitment problems undermine the validity of the Political Coase Theorem.
Chapter 4 titled “Making Rules Credible: Divided Government and Political
Budget Cycles” develops a politico-economic model in order to study the institutional
arrangements behind political budget cycles (PBCs). In particular, since borrowing is a
necessary condition for aggregate PBCs, the essay explores the role of fiscal rules that
limit public debt. The main result of the model is that divided government can make fiscal
rules credible, while commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect
compliance with the budget law. However, if divided government affects efficiency, voters
must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.
Standard models of PBCs implicitly or explicitly assume that the executive has full
discretion over fiscal policy. However, in most of the countries the budget is the outcome
of a bargaining that involves the executive power as well as the parliament. In standard
models, aggregate PBCs can be completely eradicated with a simple ex-ante fiscal rule
that limit public debt. However, an ex-ante fiscal rule is not credible because the executive
always has an incentive to deviate from it in an electoral period. The essay contributes to
the theoretical literature on aggregate PBCs introducing in the model a legislative branch
and a fiscal rule that limit public debt. The model also helps explain why PBCs are stronger
in developing countries and in new democracies, usually characterized by weak legislative
checks and balances, unified government, and imperfect compliance with the budget law.
From the narrow perspective of the PBCs literature, the essay has very interesting
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conclusions. Legislative checks and balances are probably the best way to moderate PBCs.
But, in order to be effective, the executive must be forced to comply with the budget
law and voters must select divided government. Complain with the budget law could
be improved through institutional innovations, such as the U.S. Congress Budget Office,
that increase the ability of the parliament to control the execution of the budget. Divided
government; however, is an endogenous outcome of the political process. Indeed, the model
shows that voters could prefer a unified government because the efficiency costs of a divided
government are larger than the cost of PBCs. Thus, the normative message of the essay is:
do not blindly try to eliminate PBCs, empower the parliament and/or limit the discretional
powers of the executive and voters will have the chance to decide if it is worthy to eliminate
PBCs.
The essay also has consequences beyond PBCs. First, it is critical to consider the
institutional arrangements that make any rule credible. Second, it is possible that the
institutional arrangements that work as commitment devices are not exogenous but rather
endogenous outcomes of the political process. Third, the crucial issue is that commitment
devices are available, which changes the focus from the rule itself to the political process
that allows empowering the agents that can enforce the rule.
Chapter 5 titled “The Political Coase Theorem: Experimental Evidence”
tests whether commitment problems undermine the validity of the Political Coase Theorem
(PCT) using data from a laboratory experiment. The results support the key theoretical
prediction that social outcomes should improve as commitment opportunities expand. Fur-
thermore, a significant proportion of subjects understood that sometimes a reallocation of
political power was required in order to take advantage of those opportunities. However, at
low levels of commitment there is more cooperation than strictly predicted by the model
while the opposite is true at high levels of commitment, and only large improvements
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in commitment opportunities have a significant effect on the social surplus, while small
changes do not.
The findings in chapter 5 confirm that commitment problems are one of the key trans-
action costs in political transactions and, hence, one of the major barriers to efficient
political institutions. Since only large improvements in commitment opportunities have a
significant effect on the social surplus, the essay also suggests a reconsideration of the old
debate between gradual versus radical reforms.
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SECTION I
FACTOR ENDOWMENTS, POLITICAL POWER AND INSTITUTIONS
9
Chapter 1: Factor Endowments, Democracy and Trade Policy Divergence1
Abstract
This essay develops a stochastic model of electoral competition in order to study the
economic and political determinants of trade policy. Ideal policies of the different socioeco-
nomic groups in society (landlords, industrialists, labor and skilled workers) are explicitly
derived from a small open economy model. Then those ideal policies (trade policy and
local public goods) are used to model the individual probabilistic voting behavior of the
members of each of these socioeconomic groups. The model sheds light on how differences
in the comparative advantages of countries explain trade policy divergence between coun-
tries as well as trade policy instability within countries. Specifically, in natural resource
(land) abundant economies with very little capital, or in economies that specialize in the
production of manufactures, parties tend to converge to the same policy platform, and
trade policy is likely to be stable and relatively close to free trade. In contrast, in a natu-
ral resource abundant economy with an important domestic industry that competes with
imports, parties tend to diverge, and trade policy is likely to be more protectionist and
unstable.
1.1 Introduction
Many developing countries adopted trade protectionist measures during the second
part of the twentieth century. Most of these countries, if not all of them, did not have
a comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector and they did not industrialize in
1This essay is a joint work with Sebastian Galiani and Norman Schofield. A version of the essay is
accepted for publication in the Journal of Public Economic Theory.
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a sustainable way as a result. Instead, they had a comparative advantage within the
primary sector. In contrast, countries with comparative advantage in the manufacturing
sector tended to remain much more open to trade. Additionally, the countries that adopted
import substitution policies tended to show substantial volatility over time in their trade
policies. In this paper we develop a stochastic model of electoral competition to study the
economic and political determinants of trade policy. Our goal is to provide an explanation
of the variability of trade policy both across countries and within a country over time,
rather than across industrial sectors.
Many models of political choice emphasize political convergence to an electoral mean
or median. Although extremely useful to study important questions in the field of political
economy, such models appear to be of limited use in explaining the oscillations that can
occur as a result of divergent political choices by parties. Schofield (2007) suggests, how-
ever, that political parties will not converge if there is sufficient difference in the valences
of political leaders, where the valence of a candidate captures all the characteristics of
the candidate and the party that affect voting decisions and are not related with policy
platforms. Furthermore, in this version of the stochastic model, there is convergence or
divergence depending on pure political factors, such as the difference in the valances of
the candidates, as well as on the distribution of voters policy preferences, which ultimately
depends on structural characteristics of the economy.
We model a small open economy with two tradable goods, each of which is produced
using a sector specific factor (land and capital) and a third factor (e.g., labor) which
is mobile between these tradable sectors. There is also one non-tradable good, which
is produced using a specific factor (skilled labor). The political model has an elected
government with the mandate to fix an ad valorem import tax rate. The tax revenue
is used to provide two local public goods. One public good is targeted at the specific
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factors of production while the other is targeted at the mobile factor of production. We
use this general equilibrium model to derive the ideal policies of the different socioeconomic
groups in society (landlords, industrialists, workers and service workers). We then use those
derived ideal policies to model the individual probabilistic voting behavior of the members
of each of these socioeconomic groups. The combined model is thus based on micro-political
economy foundations of citizens preferences. We believe this paper is the first to employ
this methodology in order to study how differences in the factor endowments of countries
explain trade policy divergence between countries as well as trade policy instability within
countries.
Just as in Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996) we consider two interconnected sources
of political influence: electoral competition and interest groups. In their study of the politi-
cal economy of protection Grossman and Helpman proposed a model of protection in which
economic interests organize along sectoral lines, so that interest groups form to represent
industries. Their model predicts a cross-sectional structure of protection, depending on
political and economic characteristics, and provides an excellent model of within country
cross-section variability of trade policy. In contrast, we focus on the variability of trade
policy both across countries and within a country over time, rather than across sectors.
Our work is related to the analysis of Rogowski (1987, 1989) on the effects of interna-
tional trade on political alignments (see also Baldwin, 1989). Rogowski (1987) elaborates
a lucid explanation of political cleavages, as well as changes in those cleavages over time as
a consequence of exogenous shocks in the risk and cost of foreign trade. Rogowski (1987)
classifies economies according to their factor endowments of capital, land and labor, and
uses his classification to deduce two main types of political cleavages: a class cleavage and a
urban-rural cleavage. The model that we present includes non-tradable goods and this al-
lows for a richer characterization of political alignments. In particular, in natural resource
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(land) abundant economies, without the inclusion of non-tradable goods, landlords favor
free trade, and industrialists and workers are protectionist, inducing a urban-rural cleavage.
However, once non-tradable goods are introduced in the model, distributive conflict among
urban groups will also be present. Industrialists and unskilled workers may favor protec-
tionist policies while skilled workers favor free trade policies (see Galiani, Heymann, and
Magud, 2009). Furthermore, we show that the presence of a distributive conflict between
urban groups can have interesting political effects in the determination of trade policy.
Employing our international trade model we construct a taxonomy to classify different
economies given their economic structures:
1. Specialized natural resource-rich economies. This set comprises countries that are
highly abundant in the factor specific to the less labor-intensive tradable industry
(land). They specialize in the production of primary goods.
2. Diversified natural resource-rich economies. They comprise countries that are mod-
erately abundant in the factor specific to the less labor intensive tradable industry
(land), but they display an important activity in the production of the two tradable
goods.
3. Industrial economies. They comprise countries relatively scarcely endowed with nat-
ural resources that are either relatively abundant in the factor specific to the more
labor-intensive tradeable industry (capital) or are highly endowed with the mobile
factor of production (labor).
We show that in a specialized natural resource abundant economy, or in an industrial
economy, political parties tend to converge to the same policy platform and, hence, trade
policy is likely to be stable and relatively close to free trade. In contrast, in a natural
resource abundant economy with an important domestic industry which competes with
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imports, parties tend to diverge and, hence, trade policy is likely to be more protectionist
and unstable.2 The intuition behind this result is that in a diversified natural resource-rich
economy the underlying trade policy constituencies are more balanced and therefore it is
more likely that the party with the lowest valence will find optimal to leave the electoral
center and propose a platform that targets some specific socioeconomic groups rather than
stay at the center and obtain a vote share proportional to the difference in electoral valences.
In summary, we first link the trade policy preferences of each group in society with the
country’s underlying economic structure. We then show that when there exists a strong
political constituency in favor of free trade, a stable liberal trade policy regime emerges.
On the other hand, when the underlying trade policy constituencies are more balanced,
political parties may diverge in their policy platforms, and the resulting political outcome
may be unstable in the sense that very different policy regimes can arise depending on
which party wins the election. Finally, we also show that when policy platforms diverge
the economic structure influences the pattern of divergence. In particular, in specialized
natural resource-rich and industrial economies, parties tend to propose very similar trade
policies, but they differ in their budget allocation proposal. Thus, distributional conflict
mainly occurs in the budget allocation, which, in our model, does not affect the efficiency
of the economy. On the other hand, in diversified natural resource-rich economies parties
tend to diverge in both dimensions. Thus, party rotation induces significant changes in the
efficiency of the economy since each party implements a different trade policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents our simple general
equilibrium model of a small open economy. We find and characterize the competitive
2This is consistent with the empirical evidence in O’Rourke and Taylor (2006) who show that, in the
late nineteenth century, democratization led to more liberal trade policies in countries where workers stood
to gain from free trade. Using more recent evidence, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) show that individuals in
sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage tend to be more protectionist than individuals in sectors
with a revealed comparative advantage. They also show that individuals in non-tradable sectors tend to be
the most pro-trade of all workers.
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equilibrium of the model, as well as the ideal policies of each group of agents. In section
1.3 we introduce the stochastic spatial electoral model with exogenous valence, and we
use it to study the political economy of trade policy. Section 1.3 presents the conditions
for convergence to a weighted political mean. In section 1.3.2 we emphasize that political
convergence depends both on political parameters, such as heterogeneity of political per-
ceptions, and on economic structure, namely the electoral covariance matrix of economic
preferences. In section 1.3.3 we show how the structure of the economy affects policy
choices, in particular the equilibrium trade policy. In section 1.4 we extend the model to
incorporate interest groups. In section 1.5 we discuss some historical examples drawn from
the United States and Argentina. Finally, section 1.6 offers brief concluding remarks.
1.2 The Economy
In this section we develop a static model of a small open economy and characterize
the ideal policies of the different groups in society. Consider an augmented Ricardo-Viner
specific factor model of an open economy with two tradable goods, labeled X and Y , and
a non-tradable good, labeled N . Good X (Y ) is produced employing a factor specific to
industryX (Y ), denoted FX (FY ), and labor, denoted L, which can move between tradable
industries without friction. Let LX (LY ) be the amount of L employed in industry X (Y ).
3
Production functions are assumed to be Cobb Douglas with different factor intensities:
QX = AX (FX)
αX (LX)
1−αX ,
QY = AY (FY )
αY (LY )
1−αY .
We assume, without lost of generality, that αX > αY . The non-tradable good is produced
3It is not difficult to extend the model to any finite number of tradable goods, each produced with
a specific factor and factor L. However, the political equilibrium would be more complicated and the
fundamental message of our analysis would remain the same.
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employing labor specific to industry N , denoted FN , with the linear production function:
QN = ANFN .
Here Qs (s = X,Y,N) is the total output of good s. The aggregate vector endowment of
factors is e =
(
F¯X , F¯Y , F¯N , L¯
)
.
We focus on the functional distribution of income. Therefore, we only consider four
socioeconomic groups associated with the resources they control: for example, natural
resources, capital, labor and skilled labor. The society we have in mind is one composed
by landlords, industrialists (owning sector specific capital), workers (mobile factor between
tradable industries) and service workers. We identify the later with skilled workers.4 A
household of type k owns k¯nk units of factor k, and zero units of all other factors, where
nk represents the fraction of the population belonging to group k. All individuals have
the same utility function, which is Cobb Douglas in private goods and separable in a local
public good:
ui,k
(
ci,kX , c
i,k
Y , c
i,k
N , Gk
)
=
(
ci,kX
)βX (
ci,kY
)βY (
ci,kN
)βN
+H (Gk) .
Here ci,ks is the consumption of the private good s = X,Y,N by individual i of type k
(0 < βs < 1, with βX + βY + βN = 1); Gk is the consumption of a local public good by
the households of type k, and H is an strictly increasing and strictly concave sub-utility
function. These local public goods are just a convenient way of handling transfers in kind
to different groups in society.5 In particular, in the rest of the paper we assume that the
4This is clearly a simplification. The service sector tends to comprise both unskilled workers, such
as domestic workers, and highly skilled workers, such as financial sector workers, medical doctors, etc.
Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we are abstracting from modeling the unskilled segment of the service
sector. Nevertheless, including this sub-sector in the model would not change the qualitative results of our
analysis.
5This formulation has one methodological advantage over an alternative setup with lump sum transfers.
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government provides two local public goods: one that benefits specific factors, denoted
GF , and the other that benefits the mobile factor, denoted GL. These are associated,
respectively, with the upper and middle-class groups and the low-income group.
In order to avoid distorting the private good markets merely due to the public sector
utilization of private goods as its inputs of production we assume that the government also
has a Cobb Douglas production function with the same coefficients of the utility function.6
Even though we do not need this assumption to obtain our results, it simplifies the analysis
below.
Finally, we assume that the economy is small in the sense that it cannot affect the
international prices of tradable goods p∗ = (p∗X , p
∗
Y ). Since the government can tax exports
and impose import tariffs, domestic prices may differ from international prices. Let p =
(pX , pY , pN ) be the vector of domestic good prices, CPI = (pX)
βX (pY )
βY (pN )
βN the
consumer price index and w = (wFX , wFY , wFN , wL) the vector of factor prices, where wk
is the rental rate of factor k. Due to Lerner’s theorem export taxes are equivalent to import
tariffs. Thus, without lost of generality, we assume that the government only impose import
taxes at the rate τ ≥ 0.
In the appendix 1.1 we summarize three results that characterize the competitive equi-
librium of this open economy. These results suggest the following taxonomy of economic
structures. Let Ψ =
AY (F¯Y )
αY (L¯)(
αX−αY )
AX(F¯X)
αX be the degree of comparative advantage in indus-
try Y :
1. Specialized natural resource-rich economies: Ψ = 0;
As we shown in lemma 1, with a mild condition in H , each socioeconomic group ideal trade policy is interior.
6Formally, the government production function is given by QG = AG (C
g
X)
βX (CgY )
βY (CgN )
βN ,
where Cgs is the amount of good s = X,Y,N used as inputs by the public sector, and AG =[
(βX)
βX (βY )
βY (βN )
βN
]−1
. This specification does not imply that the presence of the public sector does
not change the competitive equilibrium of the economy, neither that it does not affect welfare. It merely
implies that the public sector, as it is our desire, only affects the economy through tax collection and the
assignment of the local public goods.
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2. Diversified natural resource-rich economies:
(
αY
1−αY
)αY (1−αX
αX
)αX
Ω
(
p∗X
p∗Y
)
< Ψ <
Ω
p∗X
p∗Y
;
3. Industrial economies: Ω
p∗X
p∗Y
< Ψ ≤ (1 + τ¯aut)Ωp
∗
X
p∗Y
;
where Ω is a constant that depends on αX , αY , βX and βY and τ¯aut is the import tax
tariff that sends the economy to autarky.7
Many economies can be accommodated within this taxonomy. Economies highly en-
dowed with natural resources (relative to capital and labor), such as, for example, Argentina
before the 1930 crisis, or most OPEC countries, can be regarded as having a type 1 eco-
nomic structure. However, Argentina, after the War World II, is better classified as having
a type 2 economic structure (see Galiani and Somaini, 2010). Actually, several economies
well endowed with natural resources and which adopted import substitution policies moved
from a type 1 to a type 2 economic structure. Many backward economies, such as those of
Africa, can also be seen to have a type 2 economic structure, even though they might not
have an important industrial sector. In this case, the agricultural sector acts as the sector
intensive in the use of labor (L), while the exporting sector exploits the endowment of a
specific natural resource (e.g., diamonds in Bostwana). Finally, type 3 economies consist
of two types. First are those that are highly endowed with capital (relative to natural
resources and labor) such as all developed countries. Second are those highly endowed
with labor (L) that export labor intensive manufactured goods such as it is the case of
China today.8 Note, however, that this taxonomy is a static one. An economy with a
given endowment vector e could be classified, for example, either under the category 1 or
7Formally, Ω = (βY )
αY (1−αX )
1−αX
(βX )
αX (1−αY )
1−αY
[βY (1− αY ) + βX (1− αX)]
αX−αY .We also assume that: αX ≥
max
{
βX(1−2αY )
βX(1−2αY )+βY (1−αY )
,
(βY +βN )αY
βY +βNαY
}
. However, this is not a very restrictive assumption, since industry
X is relatively intensive in the specific factor FX .
8Note that in the case of developed economies highly abundant in capital, all our results will still hold
even if it were the case that the workers in the tradable exporting sector are skilled and can move without
friction between this industry and the (skilled) service sector.
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2 depending on, among other things, the international relative price of the tradable goods
(see Galiani and Somaini, 2010). Additionally, the vector endowment e could evolve over
time.
The relevance of this taxonomy will become clear as soon as we derive the ideal policies
of each socioeconomic group. In order to do so, we now define the policy space and the
indirect utility function of each group.
Real government revenue is given by
R (τ)
CPI (τ)
=
τp∗l [Cl (τ)−Ql (τ)]
CPI (τ)
, (1)
where Ql (τ) and Cl (τ) measure, respectively, the equilibrium production and consumption
of the imported good. R(τ)CPI(τ) has the typical inverted U shape with zeros at τ = 0 and
τ = τaut and a maximum at τmax given by
1− τmax
τmax
= η(Cl−Ql),pl − βNηpN ,pl − βl, (2)
where η indicates elasticity. In equilibrium, government production equals government real
revenue. Suppose, however, that a fraction of the public goods vanishes in the process of
distributing it, possibly due to corruption or any other form of rent dissipation prevalent
in the operation of the public sector. Then,
GL = A (γ)
R (τ)
CPI (τ)
, GF = A (1− γ) R (τ)
CPI (τ)
, (3)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of government revenue allocated to the provision of GL
(1 − γ is the fraction allocated to GF ), and A (.) is an strictly increasing and strictly
concave function such that: A (x) ≤ x, A (0) = 0, and A′ (1) = 0.9
9The methodological advantage of this formulation is, as we shown in lemma 1, that the ideal budget
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From equations (1) and (3) we see that public decisions are restricted to a two dimen-
sional space: the government must set the import tax rate and the fraction of revenue
assigned to the provision of each local public good. Thus, the policy space of an economy
with endowment vector e and international prices p∗ is given by
Z = {z = (τ, γ) : 0 ≤ τ ≤ τaut, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1} ⊂ ℜ2+. (4)
Here τ is the tax rate on imports and γ is the fraction of government revenue allocated
to the provision of GL. Clearly, Z is a convex and compact subset of the semi-positive
quadrant ℜ2+.
Since preferences over private and public goods are separable and preferences over
bundles of private goods are represented by a Cobb Douglas utility function, the indirect
utility function of each individual is given by his real income (using the consumer price
index as deflator) plus the utility derived from the consumption of the local public good.
Formally, the indirect utility function of an individual belonging to group k =
(FX , FY , FN , L) is given by
vk (τ, γ) =
wk (τ)
CPI (τ)
k¯
nk
+H
(
A (γk)
R (τ)
CPI (τ)
)
(5)
where γL = γ and γk = 1− γ for k = FX , FY , FN .
For each group in society, its ideal policy is the point in the policy space Z that
maximizes its indirect utility function (5).
Lemma 1.1: Ideal Policies. Let zk =
(
τk, γk
)
denote the ideal policy for an individ-
ual from group k. Then γL = 1 and γk = 0 for k = FX , FY , FN . Moreover, assume that
limG→0H
′ (G) = ∞ and max
{
wFX F¯X
nFX
,
wFY F¯Y
nFY
}
≥ wFN F¯NnFN ≥
wLL¯
nL
. Then, for economies
allocation of each socioeconomic group is interior.
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characterized by structure 1, τFX < τFN < τL < τmax. For economies characterized by
structure 2, τFX < τFN < τmax < τ
L < τFY . For economies characterized by structure 3,
τFY < τFN < τL < τmax < τ
FX . Proof : see appendix 1.1. 
The ideal policy for each socioeconomic group is the key economic input of the political
game that we develop in the next section. Note, in particular, how these ideal policies vary
with different economic structures. In an specialized natural rich economy (structure 1),
there is no protectionist demand, and in an industrial economy (structure 3), the only pro-
tectionist group is the one that owns the factor specific to the import competing industry.
However, in a diversified natural resource rich economy, there are two protectionist groups,
those owning FY or L, while the groups owning FX or FN lose from protection.
1.3 The Polity
In this section we introduce the stochastic spatial model of electoral competition. We
begin with a formal definition of the stochastic spatial model as a game in normal form. We
define and discuss an equilibrium concept for this game, and study the conditions under
which parties converge to a weighted electoral mean. We then use the model to study the
political determination of trade policies using the bliss points derived in lemma 1.1.
1.3.1 The Stochastic Spatial Model with Exogenous Valence
The timing of events is as follows (Person and Tabellini, 2000):
1. Party leaders simultaneously announce their electoral platforms.
2. Each voter receives a private signal about candidates’ valence.
3. Elections are held.
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4. The elected candidate implements the announced platform.
Let P = {1, ..., p} be the set of all political parties. Each party j ∈ P selects a platform
zj = (τj, γj) from the policy space Z. We let Z = ×j∈P Z. A profile of party platforms
is denoted z ∈ Z. When necessary we use the notation z−j to represent the profile of
platforms of all parties except party j. The preferences of party j ∈ P is given by its
expected vote share function Sj : Z→ [0, 1] :
Sj (z) =
∑
k∈V
nkρ
k
j (z) . (6)
Here ρkj (z) is the probability that a voter in group k votes for party j, while V =
{FX , FY , FN , L} is the set of all groups of voters, and nk is the proportion of the pop-
ulation in group k.
The utility associated with a given voter in group k when party j implements platform
zj is given by
vk (zj) = v
k
pol (zj) + λj + ε
k
j
= −φkτ
(
τj − τk
)2
− φkγ
(
γj − γk
)2
+ λj + ε
k
j , (7)
where (a) zk =
(
τk, γk
) ∈ Z is the ideal policy for the voters in group k; (b) φkτ > 0
(φkγ > 0) measures the importance that voters in group k assign to the import tax rate
(the local public good); and (c) λj + ε
k
j is the private signal received by a voter in group k
about party j′s valence. We shall assume that the expected value of this signal is λj , and
is common to all groups, and the error vector εk = (εk1 , .., ε
k
p) has a cumulative stochastic
distribution denoted F k. We assume that F k is the Type 1 extreme value distribution,
which is the same for all k.
Given a profile of platforms z ∈ Z, let vk (z) = (vk (z1) , ..., vk (zp)). Candidates do not
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know the private signal received by each individual voter, but the probability distribution
of these signals in each group of the electorate is common knowledge. Let F k be the
cumulative distribution function of
(
εk1 , ..., ε
k
p
)
. Then the probability that a voter in group
k selects party j is given by
ρkj (z) = Pr
[
vk (zj) > v
k (zl) for all l 6= j
]
. (8)
Finally, we order parties according to their expected valence: λp ≥ ... ≥ λ1.
Definition 1.1: The stochastic spatial model with exogenous valence is the game in
normal form Γexo = 〈P,Z,S〉, where:
1. Players: P = {1, ..., p} is the set of political parties.
2. Set of strategies: Z is the policy space defined in section 2 and Z =×j∈P Z is the
space of all strategy profiles.
3. Utility functions: Sj : Z → [0, 1] is the expected vote share function of party
j ∈ P deduced from (7) and (8) and S = ×j∈PSj .
We solve this game by finding its local Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.2: A strict (weak) local Nash equilibrium of the stochastic spatial model
Γexo = 〈P,Z,S〉 is a vector of party positions z∗ such that for each party j ∈ P , there
exists an ǫ-neighborhood Bǫ(z
∗
j ) ⊂ Z of z∗j such that
Sj
(
z∗j , z
∗
−j
)
> (≥) Sj
(
z′j, z
∗
−j
)
for all z′j ∈ Bǫ(z∗j )−
{
z∗j
}
.
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Remark 1.1: A local Nash equilibrium is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE) if
we can substitute Z for Bǫ(z
∗
j ) in the above definition.
Remark 1.2: It is usual in general equilibrium theory to use first order conditions,
based on calculus techniques, to determine the nature of the critical equilibrium. Because
production sets and consumer preferred sets are usually assumed to be convex, the Brower’s
fixed point theorem can then be used to assert that the critical equilibrium is a Walrasian
equilibrium. However, in political models, the critical equilibrium may be characterized
by positive eigenvalues for the Hessian of one of the political parties. As a consequence
the utility function (expected vote share function) of such a party fails pseudo-concavity.
Therefore, none of the usual fixed point arguments can be used to assert existence of a
”global” pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE). For this reason we use the concept of a
”critical Nash equilibrium” (CNE), namely a vector of strategies which satisfies the first
order condition for a local maximum of the utility functions of the parties. Standard
arguments based on the index, together with transversality arguments can be used to
show that a CNE will exist and that, generically, it will be isolated.10 A ”Local Nash
Equilibrium” (LNE) satisfies the first order condition, together with the second order
condition that the Hessians of all parties are negative (semi-) definite at the CNE. Clearly,
the set of LNE will contain the PNE, so once the LNE are determined, then simulation
can be used to determine if one of them is a PNE.
Let (φτ , φγ) =
∑
k∈V
nk
(
φkτ , φ
k
γ
)
be the average importance that voters give to the
tax rate and the local public goods, respectively. Then, define the weighted mean of the
10As we show below, the weighted electoral mean is a CNE. A more general proof of existence of CNE
can also be obtained using the Fan (1961) theorem, as in Schofield (1984).
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electoral ideal policies, or weighted electoral mean zm = (τm, γm) by
(τm, γm) =
∑
k∈V
nk
(
φkτ
φτ
τk,
φkγ
φγ
γk
)
. (9)
Note that zm is just a weighted average of the ideal policies of each group, where the
weights take into account the fraction of voters in each group (nk) and the importance
that each group gives to each policy dimension relative to the average importance in the
population (φkτ/φτ and φ
k
γ/φγ).
11 We call zm = ×j∈P zm ∈ Z the joint weighted electoral
mean of the stochastic spatial model.
Under the assumption of a Type 1 extreme value distribution, the probability that a
voter in group k votes for party j at a profile z ∈ Z can be shown to be:
ρkj (z) =
[
1 +
∑
l 6=j
exp
(
vkpol. (zl)− vkpol. (zj) + λl − λj
)]−1
.
The objective of party j is to maximize its expected vote share Sj (z) =
∑
k∈V
nkρ
k
j (z).
Since Sj (z) is continuously differentiable we can use calculus to solve this problem. The
first order necessary condition for the maximization of Sj (z) is given by:
DSj (z) = −2
∑
k∈V
nkρ
k
j (z)
(
1− ρkj (z)
) φkτ (τj − τk)
φkγ
(
γj − γk
)
 = 0, (10)
If all candidates adopt the same policy position, so z0 = ×j∈P z0, say, then ρkj (z0) is
independent of k and may be written ρj (z0). Assuming that ρj (z0) 6= 0, the first order
condition becomes (τj, γj) = (τm, γm) for all j. Therefore, if each party proposes zm =
(τm, γm), the first order condition of all parties is satisfied. We say that the joint weighted
11If for all groups φkτ = φτ and φ
k
γ = φγ , then zm = (τm, γm) =
∑
k
nk
(
τk, γk
)
is a weighted average of
the ideal points of each group of voters, where the weights are the sizes of the groups.
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electoral mean zm satisfies the first order condition of a LNE.
The second order sufficient (necessary) condition for an equilibrium at z is that the ma-
trix D2Sj (z) evaluated at z be negative definite (semi-definite). Earlier results in Schofield
(2007) can be generalized to show that
D2Sj (z) = 2
∑
k∈V
nkρ
k
j (z)
(
1− ρkj (z)
) [
2
(
1− 2ρkj (z)
)
WkBkzjW
k −Wk
]
, (11)
where
Wk =
 φkτ 0
0 φkγ
 , Bkzj =
 (τj − τk)2 (τj − τk) (γj − γk)(
τj − τk
) (
γj − γk
) (
γj − γk
)2
 .
Definition 1.3: Considering the model Γexo = 〈P,Z,S〉 when F k is the Type 1 extreme
value distribution for all k, we define:
1. The probability ρj (zm) that a voter in group k votes for party j at the profile zm is
ρj (zm) =
[
1 +
∑
l 6=j
exp (λl − λj)
]−1
(Note that ρj (zm) only depends on the valence
terms, and not on the party platforms.)
2. The coefficient Aj of party j is Aj = 2 (1− 2ρj (zm)).
3. The matrix
∑
k∈V
nk
(
WkBkzmW
k
)
is termed the weighted electoral variance-
covariance matrix about the joint electoral mean, zm.
4. The characteristic matrix of party j at zm is Hj (zm) =∑
k∈V
nk
(
AjW
kBkzmW
k −Wk).
5. The matrix Φ is 2 by 2 diagonal with elements φτ and φγ in the main diagonal.
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6. The convergence coefficients of the model are:
c (Γexo.) = A1
∑
k∈V
nkTr
(
Φ−1WkBkzmW
k
)
,
d (Γexo.) =
A1
∑
k∈V
nkTr
(
WkBkzmW
k
)
Tr (Φ)
.
Here Tr(M) means the trace of the matrix M.
A result in Schofield (2007) can be generalized to the case here, of multiple groups in
the economy, to show that the Hessian, D2Sj (zm) of party j at zm can be expressed in
terms of the characteristic matrix. Thus
D2Sj (zm) = 2ρj (zm) (1− ρj (zm))Hj (zm) .
The following proposition establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the joint
weighted electoral mean to be an equilibrium of the electoral game.
Proposition 1.1: Assume that F k is the Type 1 extreme value distribution for all k.
The condition c (Γexo) < 1 is sufficient for the joint weighted electoral mean, zm, to be a
strict local Nash equilibrium of the stochastic spatial model Γexo = 〈P,Z,S〉. The condition
d (Γexo) ≤ 1 is necessary for zm to be a local Nash equilibrium. Proof : see appendix 1.2.

If the sufficient convergence condition holds, then the equilibrium prediction of the
outcome of the electoral game is the weighted electoral mean of the ideal points zm =
(τm, γm). There can be two or more parties and the expected vote share of each party may
differ, but the policy outcome will not be affected, since all parties implement zm. Thus,
different policies can only be the consequence of differences in the economic and political
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parameters that determine zm. On the other hand, if the necessary convergence condition
fails, then different policies have a positive probability of being implemented either because
there is a non-convergent PNE in which parties propose different policies or because there
is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (due to Glicksberg (1952) a mixed strategy Nash
equilibria will always exist). Furthermore, simulations of a number of these models not
only confirm but also strengthen these results. For instance, although it does not follow
directly from Proposition 1, when c (Γexo) < 1, simulations show that zm is not only an
LNE but also the unique PNE; and when d (Γexo) > 1, simulations confirm that zm is not
an LNE and in many cases it is also possible to compute a non-convergent LNE.12
The intuition behind proposition 1.1 can be better understood in a situation with only
two parties. Suppose that the expected valence of party 2 is higher than the expected
valence of party 1, i.e. λ2 > λ1. Then, if both parties propose the same platform zm, only
voters with a valence shock that compensates the expected valence difference prefer to
vote party 1. Moreover, given that both parties propose the same platform, the expected
vote share of party 1 decreases as the expected valence difference increases. This effect
can be interpreted as the cost for party 1 of adopting the platform proposed by party 2
(the term A1 in the convergence coefficients captures this effect). Party 1 can avoid this
cost by proposing a different platform. However, this is also a costly move, particularly
if the variance of the voters ideal policies is very low, which implies that departing from
the weighted electoral mean causes a significant drop in the expected vote share (the term∑
k∈V
nkTr
(
Φ−1WkBkzmW
k
)
in the convergence coefficients captures this effect). Propo-
sition 1.1 establishes that if the first effect dominates the second one, then in equilibrium,
parties converge to the weighted electoral mean.
12In such cases the lowest valence party tends to be located, in equilibrium, on the eigenvector of its
characteristic matrix. In one case it was shown that there did exist a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
generated by a limit cycle of the underlying gradient field.
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Note also how the parameters of the electoral game affect the convergence coefficients.
Again, assume a two party system. Since A1 = 2 (1− 2ρ1 (zm)), if λ2 ≈ λ1, then ρ1 (zm) ≈
1
2 and A1 ≈ 0, so the convergence coefficients ≈ 0.Thus in a two party system, if λ2 ≈
λ1, then the model predicts policy convergence. On the other hand, in a fragmented
polity, with many parties, then some parties will have low valence, thus ρ1 (zm) can be
very small, implying that A1 ≈ 2. In particular, if the electoral covariance matrix has
sufficiently large terms (i.e.
∑
k∈V
nkTr
(
Φ−1WkBkzmW
k
)
is relatively high) then one
expects policy divergence. Moreover, empirical analysis of electoral games in a number of
countries support these results.13
1.3.2 Trade Policy under Convergence
We now study how the economic structure affects zm and the convergence coefficients.
We first consider the situation in which the sufficient condition for convergence holds. Then
Proposition 1.1 implies that the outcome of the electoral game is the weighted electoral
mean zm = (τm, γm). We now characterize zm for the three economic structures identified
in section 1.2. From Lemma 1.1 , it is always the case that γk = 0 for k = FX , FY , FN and
γL = 1 regardless of the economic structure. Furthermore, γm = nLφ
L
γ /φγ .
14 Thus, ceteris
paribus, the higher the fraction of workers in the tradable industries in the population
(nL), and the more sensitive they are to changes in the provision of the local public good,
measured by (φLγ /φγ), the higher the fraction of the government revenue expended in GL
in equilibrium.
Conversely, the ideal import tax rate for each group varies across the different economic
structures. From lemma 1.1, we know that for a structure 1 economy, τFN < τmax and
13For example, electoral models for recent elections in the U.S. and U.K. found that c (Γexo) ≤ 1 (see
Schofield et al., 2011a,b). Electoral models for countries with many small and low valence parties found
that d (Γexo) > 1 (see Schofield et al., 2011a for Israel and Schofield et al., 2011c for Turkey.)
14If φkγ = φγ for all k, then γm =
nL
1−nL
.
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τL < τmax, while for a structure 2 economy we have τ
FN < τmax < τ
L. Therefore, the
electoral equilibrium τm would be lower in an economy with structure 1 than in one with
structure 2. Moreover, it is likely that the magnitude of this difference would be large. To
see this note that, in a specialized natural resource-abundant economy, all socioeconomic
groups have an ideal import tax rate below τmax. However, in a diversified natural resource
rich economy, workers in the tradable industries have an ideal import tax rate above τmax,
so it can even be the case that in equilibrium τm > τmax. For example, the workers in the
tradable industries may be an important fraction of the population as well as being highly
responsive to trade policies.
An economy with structure 3 is analogous to an economy with structure 1, since all
socioeconomic groups have an ideal import tax rate below τmax, except for the owners of
factor FX . Hence, unless the owners of factor FX are much more responsive to trade policy
changes than the rest of the voters, τm is strictly less than τmax. In fact it can be very
low. For example, the negative impact of the import tax on real wages in the tradable
industries can be large. Therefore, τm is also lower for an economy with structure 3 than
for an economy with structure 2.
Finally, note that irrespective of the economic structure, ceteris paribus, the higher
the fraction of service workers in the population (nFN ), or the more sensitive they are to
changes in the import tax rate, measured by (φFNτ /φγ), the lower the equilibrium τm is.
This is particularly relevant for economies with structure 2. Thus, it is not the case that
natural resource abundant economies will necessary have protectionist political equilibria
as postulated in Rogowski (1987, 1989).
In summary, if the economy is either specialized in the production of the less labor
intensive tradable industry (structure 1), or either abundant in the factor specific to the
more labor intensive tradable industry or in labor (structure 3), the electoral equilibrium is
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likely to be relatively closer to free trade. In this case, the great majority of the population
loses with the adoption of protectionist policies. However, if the economy resembles the
characteristics of the economic structure 2, society is split into two groups: owners of factor
FX and service workers who favor a relatively free trade policy, while owners of factor FY
and workers L in the tradable industries prefer a more protectionist policy. The equilibrium
tax rate is higher in this third case than in the first two cases, and so is the level of distortion
in the economy. The development of the non-tradable sector plays a key role in political
cleavages, however. The reason is that service workers push the political equilibrium toward
the ideal position of the relative abundant factor in the economy. Therefore, they act as a
moderating force against the protectionist tendency.
1.3.3 Economic Structure and Divergence
As we showed in the previous section, given that the convergence condition holds, we
can then explain how trade policy at a given time depends on the prevalent economic struc-
ture. Now, we investigate the convergence conditions under the three different economic
structures derived in section 1.2 and study how different economic structures affect the
stability of trade policy.
First of all, however, we need to define what we mean by stability of a policy in our
model. We interpret convergence of political parties to the same political platform as
stability of policies. Indeed, if in equilibrium all political parties converge to the same
platform, although there can be uncertainty about which party wins the election, there
is complete certainty about the policy outcome. If, instead, in equilibrium the political
parties do not converge to the same platform, then there are different policies with positive
probability of being implemented. This means that we could observe different policies in
a given economy over time. In this sense, an economic structure that induces political
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convergence is one that gives rise to stable policy outcomes. These will change smoothly in
response to shocks to the distribution of political power, the international terms of trade or
technology. An economic structure that induces political divergence is one that generates
a more volatile environment, where we can observe (possibly large) changes in policies even
without any change in the economic or political fundamentals.
Proposition 1.1 shows that a sufficient condition for convergence to zm is c (Γexo) < 1,
while a necessary condition is d (Γexo) ≤ 1. These convergence coefficients, c (Γexo) and
d (Γexo) , depend on the stochastic distribution of the valence signals as well as the distri-
bution of the ideal policies in the population. We now compare the convergent coefficients
for different economic structures. Since the key difference among economic structures is
the ideal trade policy for the workers of the tradable industries, we consider d (Γexo) as
a function of τL, keeping constant all the other variables that determine it. Note that
d (Γexo) is a quadratic and symmetric function and has a minimum at the value of τ
L that
satisfies the following equation
∂d (Γexo)
∂τL
= 2A1nLφ
L
τ
[
−φLτ (τm − τL) +
(
1
φτ
)∑
k∈V
nk
(
φkτ
)2 (
τm − τk
)]
= 0.
The second term in the squared brackets is very small in absolute value (in fact, it equals
zero if φkτ is the same for all groups). Hence,
∂d(Γexo)
∂τL
depends primarily on τm − τL. If
the economy has structure 3, then τFX < τFN < τL < τmax < τ
FY , which implies that
unless nFX >> nFY ,
(
τm − τL
)
is positive but very small. Therefore, for an economy with
structure 3, ∂d(Γexo)
∂τL
≈ 0 and hence d (Γexo) is very close to its minimum. This is also the
case for economies with structure 1. On the other hand, for an economy with structure
2, τFX < τFN < τmax < τ
L < τFY , which implies that unless nFX << nFY ,
(
τm − τL
)
is
negative and large in absolute value, we have that d (Γexo) is far from its minimum. Since
∂c(Γexo)
∂τL
= ∂d(Γexo)
∂τL
/φτ , the same argument also apply to the coefficient c (Γexo).
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Thus, convergence coefficients tend to be larger than their minimum values for diversi-
fied natural resource-rich economies (structure 2) but very close to their minimum values for
specialized natural resource-rich economies (structure 1) and industrial economies (struc-
ture 2). If the convergence coefficients for a particular polity are large, then we can say,
informally, that the likelihood of convergence is lower. This allows us to infer that policy
stability is more likely in economies with structures 1 or 3 than in economies with structure
2.
The above argument has focused on the dependence of the convergence coefficients on
the weighted electoral variance-covariance matrix. As we noted above, the convergence
coefficients also depend on the parameters of the electoral game. In particular, in a two
party system, if λ2 ≈ λ1 then the model predicts policy convergence. On the other hand,
in a fragmented polity, with many parties, then some must have low valence, and with a
large enough covariance matrix, one can expect policy divergence.
Thus, political divergence is a consequence of both political and economic forces. Policy
divergence is a pure political issue related to electoral competition. Voters have different
perceptions of the average quality of the political parties, and these are independent of the
platform they propose. These perceptions affect voting probabilities in such a way that
candidates or party leaders need not locate at the center of the policy space. However, dif-
ferences in valences alone are not enough to induce political divergence. As proposition 1.1
clearly shows, the convergence coefficients depend on the electoral variance-covariance ma-
trix. If the trace of this matrix is large, then convergence is less likely. Politics makes policy
divergence possible, but economic forces are needed to induce it, since it is heterogeneity
in policy preferences that fundamentally determines the convergence coefficients.
1.4 Extension: Parties and Organizations
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In this section we extend the stochastic spatial model of electoral competition presented
in section 1.3 by including organizations that try to influence political outcomes through
campaign contributions. We formally define this extension as a two stage dynamic game
and define an equilibrium concept for this dynamic game. We then study the convergence
conditions and characterize the equilibrium outcome of the political game when there
is no convergence. There are three motivations for introducing organizations into the
basic political model developed in section 1.3. First, without their inclusion, when the
convergence conditions do not hold, we can say little about the electoral outcome beyond
the fact that there is divergence. Second, even in the best democracies, the political
power of groups differs from the power conveyed merely by share of the group in the total
population. Third, with the introduction of organizations parties can behave as if they had
policy preferences. Furthermore, organizations can be seen as a formal way to endogenously
generate parties with policy preferences.
1.4.1 The Stochastic Spatial Model with Exogenous and Endogenous Valence
We now assume that there exist political organizations other than political parties.
These organizations are independent, with their own agenda, but may be linked to parties
in various ways. An example is that of unions, which try to influence political outcomes
through campaign contributions. Contributions are valuable for politicians because they
can be used to increase the electorate’s perceived quality of a candidate or to discredit
political rivals. Thus, valence becomes an endogenous variable that depends on campaign
contributions. Grossman and Helpman (1996) consider two distinct motives for interest
groups: ”Contributors with an electoral motive intend to promote the electoral prospects of
preferred candidates. Those with an influence motive aim to influence the politicians’ policy
pronouncements.”15 In the proposition presented below we consider a case that captures
15See Schofield (2006) and Schofield and Miller (2007) for a model that captures both motives.
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only the electoral motive, but not the influence motive. Except for the introduction of
these organizations, the stochastic spatial model remains fundamentally the same as the
model with exogenous valence presented in the previous section.
The timing of the events is as follows:
1. Organizations simultaneously announce their campaign contribution functions, spec-
ifying the contributions they will make in response to the party electoral platforms.
2. Political parties simultaneously announce their electoral platforms.
3. Organizations observe these platforms and simultaneously implement their campaign
contributions.
4. Each voter receives a private signal about candidates’ quality.
5. Elections are held.
6. The elected party implements the announced platform.
Suppose that each group of voters has an organization that can make contributions
to political campaigns, and assume that due to institutional constraints, political parties
cannot transfer money or resources to organizations, so contributions must be nonnegative.
Let ck : Z → ×j∈Pℜ+ = C denote a contribution function made by organization k, and
let C∗denote the space of all feasible contribution functions. Let C∗=×k∈V C∗. A profile
of contribution functions is denoted by c∗ = ×k∈V ck. When necessary we use the notation
c∗−k to denote the profile of contribution functions of all organizations except organization
k.
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The utility of a voter belonging to group k when party j implements platform zj is now
vk (zj , c) = v
k
pol (zj) + λj + ε
k
j + µj (c) ,
= −φkτ
(
τj − τk
)2 − φkγ (γj − γk)2 + λj + εkj + µj (c) . (12)
The last term is the endogenous valence function µj : C→ ℜ+, which captures the impact
of contributions on valence values.16
As before, the probability that a voter from group k votes for party j is given by:
ρkj (z, c) = Pr
[
vk (zj , c) > v
k (zl, c) for all l 6= j
]
. (13)
We assume that each organization has a leader, who collects contributions from its
members and uses them to support political parties in their electoral campaigns. Each
leader receives a ”payment” that depends linearly on the policy preferences of the mem-
bers of the organization, and must pay the cost of collecting the contributions among
its members. Following Persson and Tabellini (2000) we assume that these costs are a
quadratic function in the per member contribution since the free rider problem in collec-
tive action is more severe in large groups. The leader maximizes his expected payment net
of the costs of collecting contributions. Thus, the preference of leader k is given by the
function Lk : Z×C→ ℜ
Lk (z, c) =
∑
j∈P
Sj (z, c)
(
ak,jv
k
pol. (zj) + bk,j
)
−
∑
j∈P
1
2
(
ck,j
nk
)2
. (14)
Here ck,j denotes the contribution made by organization k to party j. We assume that
ak,j ≥ 0 and bk,j ≥ 0. This specification is flexible enough to capture very different
16We usually assume that µj depends only on the contributions made to party j, but in principle, µj
could also be lowered by contributions made to other parties.
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situations. If group k does not have an organization then we set ak,j = bk,j = 0 for all
j ∈ P . If the leader of organization k has party preferences for party j then ak,j > ak,l
and/or bk,j > bk,l.
17 If leader k is twice more effective collecting contributions than leader
h, then ak,j = 2ah,j and bk,j = 2bh,j. For the purposes of this paper the crucial distinction
is between partisan organizations and non-partisan organizations. Since each organization
”represents” the interest of a socioeconomic group, if each organization is attached to a
party (i.e. the leader has a strong predilection for a particular party), then the party must
indirectly adopt the policy preferences of this organization as the party preferences, at least
to some extent.18
Definition 1.4: The stochastic spatial model with exogenous and endogenous valence
is the two stage dynamic game Γend = 〈P, V,Z,C,S,L〉, where:
1. Players: P = {1, ..., p} is the set of all political parties, and V = {FX , FY , FN , L}
is the set of all groups of voters, which is also the set of all organization leaders.
2. Utility functions:
(a) Sj : Z × C → [0, 1] is the expected vote share function of party j ∈ P , obtained
from (12) and (13). Let
S = ×j∈PSj : Z×C→ ×j∈P [0, 1] .
(b) Lk : Z × C → ℜ is the utility function of leader k ∈ V given by (14). LetL =
×k∈V Lk : Z ×C → ×j∈Vℜ.
17Schofield (2007) considers a reduced form version of the organization contribution game, in which µj is
assumed a C2, concave function with a maximum at the ideal point of the organizations that support party
j . For the two candidates case (14) provides microfoundations for µj . The key is to assume organizations
with partisan preferences.
18Roemer (2001) argues that ”there is not, in general, free entry of representatives of classes into parties.”
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3. Sequence of play: First all organization leaders announce their campaign contri-
bution functions. The parties then respond and simultaneously select platforms from
the policy space Z. Then, organization leaders observe the profile of platforms and
simultaneously implement their campaign contributions. Voters receive their signals
and the election is held.
As Grossman and Helpman (1996) note, there are two equilibrium notions appropriate
to this game. One involves a commitment mechanism on the activists, having the effect that
their offers, intended to influence the party leaders, are credible. Reputation, for example
in a repeated play game, may suffice. Under the other, once the party leaders have made
their policy pronouncements, then without a commitment device, only the electoral effect
will be relevant (because of the preferences of the activists for one party over another).19
In both cases, the solution concept is local subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.5: A strict (weak) local subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the stochastic
spatial model Γend. = 〈P, V,Z,C,S,L,〉 is a profile of party positions z∗ ∈ Z and a profile
of contribution functions c∗ ∈ C∗ such that:
1. For each political party j ∈ P there exists an ǫ-neighborhood Bǫ(z∗j ) ⊂ Z around z∗j
such that
Sj (z
∗, c∗ (z∗)) > (≥) Sj
(
(z˜j , z
∗
−j), c
∗(z˜j , z
∗
−j)
)
for all z˜j ∈ Bǫ(z∗j )−
{
z∗j
}
.
19Schofield (2006) avoids some of these difficulties by using a reduced form of the activist functions. The
solution to this reduced form game is identical to one where the party leaders themselves have induced
policy preferences, but still maximize vote shares. (See the policy preference models by Duggan and Fey,
2005 and Peress, 2010).
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2.a Under commitment. For each leader k ∈ V there is no feasible contribution function
c′k ∈ C∗ such that
Lk
(
z′, c′k
(
z′
)
, c∗−k
(
z′
))
> Lk (z
∗, c∗ (z∗))
where z′ is such that for all j ∈ P there exists an ǫ-neighborhood Bǫ(z′j) ⊂ Z around
z′j such that
Sj
(
z′, c′k
(
z′
)
, c∗−k
(
z′
))
> (≥) Sj
(
(zˆj , z
′
−j), c
′
k
(
zˆj , z
′
−j
)
, c∗−k(zˆj , z
′
−j)
)
for all zˆj ∈ Bǫ(zˆj)− {zˆj} .
2.b Under no commitment. For each leader k ∈ V and each profile of party positions z
there is no feasible contribution function c′k ∈ C such that
Lk
(
z, c′k (z) , c
∗
−k (z)
)
> Lk (z, c
∗ (z)) .
Remark 1.3: If Bǫ(z
∗
j ) = Bǫ(z
′
j) = Z and we consider only the weak inequality, then
the definition above is just the usual one for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1.4: A general proof of existence of Nash equilibrium, and hence subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium, can be obtained using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem applied to
the function space C∗ if we assume that the vote share functions are pseudo-concave and
C∗ consists of equicontinuous functions (Pugh, 2002).
Let ωk be a measure of the power of organization k. Let
(
φ¯kτ , φ¯
k
γ
)
=
(
1 + ωk
) (
φkτ , φ
k
γ
)
be a power adjusted measure of the importance that group k gives to each policy dimen-
sion, and
(
φ¯τ , φ¯γ
)
=
∑
h∈V
nk
(
φ¯kτ , φ¯
k
γ
)
the corresponding population averages. Define the
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adjusted weighted mean of the ideal policies z¯m = (τ¯m, γ¯m) by:
(τ¯m, γ¯m) =
∑
k∈V
nk
(
φ¯kτ
φ¯τ
τk,
φ¯kγ
φ¯γ
γk
)
. (15)
Note that z¯m is an adjusted version of the weighted mean zm defined in section 3.1 (in fact
if ωk = ω for all k, then z¯m = zm). The difference is that now better organized groups
have a larger weight. Denote z¯m = ×j∈P z¯m the joint adjusted weighted electoral mean of
the stochastic spatial model.
As we noted above, there are two motives for organizations to provide contributions: an
influence motive and an electoral motive. Once the parties have made their policy choices,
then the electoral motive persists, but the influence motive does not. Unless there is a
commitment mechanism, activists need only consider the electoral motive in determining
the contribution vector. So, let us assume that there is no commitment mechanism. For
purposes of exposition, suppose that there are only two parties and that the endogenous
valence functions are linear in the contributions and the same for both parties, so that
µj = µ
∑
k∈V
ck,j.
In the appendix 1.2 we show that, under these assumptions, the first order necessary
condition for the maximization of Sj (z) is given by:
DSj (z) = −2
∑
k∈V
nkρ
k
j (z)
(
1− ρkj (z)
) φkτ (τj − τk)− µ2 ∂C
∗
j−l(z)
∂τj
φkγ
(
γj − γk
)− µ2 ∂C∗j−l(z)∂γj
 = 0. (16)
Here ρkj (z) =
[
1 + exp
(
vkpol. (zl)− vkpol. (zj)− µC∗j−l (z) + λl − λj
)]−1
and C∗j−l (z) =∑
k∈V
(
c∗k,j (z)− c∗k,l (z)
)
is the difference in contributions received by part j when the
platforms are z. In the appendix 1.2 we also prove that the second order sufficient (nec-
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essary) condition is that the matrix D2Sj (z) evaluated at a profile that satisfies the first
order condition be negative definite (semi-definite)
D2Sj (z) = 2
∑
k∈V
nkρ
k
j (z)
(
1− ρkj (z)
) [
2
(
1− 2ρkj (z)
)
WkBkz˜jW
k − W˜k
]
, (17)
where z˜j = zj − µ
2
(
Wk
)−1
DC∗j−l (z) ,W˜
k =Wk − µ
2
D2C∗j−l (z)
and Wk =
 φkτ 0
0 φkγ
 ; Bkz˜j =
 (τ˜j − τk)2 (γ˜j − γk) (τ˜j − τk)(
γ˜j − γk
) (
τ˜j − τk
) (
γ˜j − γk
)2
 .
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium platforms in this no commit-
ment and two parties case.
Proposition 1.2: Consider the no commitment stochastic spatial model Γend. =
〈P, V,Z,C,S,L〉,with exogenous and endogenous valence. Suppose that there are only two
parties, F k is the extreme value distribution for all k, and the utility functions Lk are all
concave functions of ck. Suppose further that µj = µ
∑
k∈V
ck,j. There are two cases to
consider:
1. Suppose that the leaders of the organizations do not have partisan preferences, but
they may vary in their influence ability, that is ak,j = ak and bk,j = bk for all j = 1, 2.
Then ωk = µ¯2nkak for all k, where µ¯ = µρ1 (z¯m) (1− ρ1 (z¯m)). The joint adjusted
weighted electoral mean z¯m is the unique profile that simultaneously satisfies the first
order condition (16) with both parties proposing the same platform. A sufficient
(necessary) condition for z¯m to induce a strict (weak) local subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is that the Hessian matrices, D2Sj (z¯m), of both parties evaluated at z¯m,
be negative definite (semi-definite).
2. On the other hand, assume that the leaders of the organizations have strong partisan
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preferences, in the following sense: There is a partition {V1, V2} of V such that for
all k ∈ V1, ak,1 > ak,2 and bk,1 > bk,2, while for all k ∈ V2, ak,2 > ak,1 and bk,2 > bk,1.
Then, a profile z∗ that satisfies the first order condition requires that each party be
located between the electoral joint mean and the ideal policies of the organizations
that support the party. A sufficient (necessary) condition for this profile to induce
a strict (weak) local subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that the Hessian matrices,
D2Sj (z
∗), of both parties evaluated at z∗, be negative definite (semi-definite).
Proof : see appendix 1.2. 
Note, from the second part of this proposition, that the equilibrium position of each
party must involve a balance between the centripetal attraction of the electoral center and
the centrifugal force of contributions.
1.4.2 Trade Policy under Convergence
In section 1.3.2 we studied the determination of trade policy under the assumptions
that political competition is purely electoral and parties’ platforms converge. The idea
behind this model is a situation in which the electoral franchise is extended to the whole
population and groups do not have any extra power to influence policy besides elections.
In general, this would not be an accurate representation for at least some countries and
some periods of history. Introducing organizations other than political parties allows us to
capture an additional source of political power created by how willing each group of voters
is to provide contributions to support their preferred policies.
Consider a situation with only two parties, in which all activist leaders do not have
partisan preferences, and the Hessian matrices of both parties evaluated at z¯m are negative
definite. Then Proposition 1.2 (case 1) implies that the political equilibrium outcome is
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given by the adjusted weighted electoral mean z¯m = (τ¯m, γ¯m) . This means that the more
organized a group is, as measured by ωk, the higher impact the group has on the equilib-
rium outcome. Therefore, organizations can either moderate or reinforce the conclusions
from the model without organizations. For instance, a land rich economy (with structure 1)
can be even closer to free trade if the landowner elite has relatively more lobby power than
workers and the nascent industrial capitalists. Alternatively, the landed elite in a moder-
ately land abundant economy, but with a relatively important manufacturing industry (as
in an economy with structure 2), can oppose the protectionist propensity of capitalists and
workers, using its lobby power. It will be able to do this until the capitalists and workers
build their own organizations and lobby power.
Thus the model suggests a very rich structure of institutional and economic path depen-
dence. For example, a powerful landowner elite can maintain the economy very close to free
trade, discouraging the growth of the secondary sector, and hence avoiding the emergence
of a major protectionist force formed by capitalists and workers. It is also possible that
an exogenous decrease in the international terms of trade leads to a sufficient growth in
the secondary sector, which turns workers in the tradable sector into a protectionist force.
The lobby power of landowners and service workers can offset this protectionist impulse
for some time. Eventually capitalists and ”tradable” workers counterbalance this force by
building their own lobby power and creating a more protectionist equilibrium.
Once the economy is in a protectionist equilibrium, landlords and service workers may
try to respond by defranchising workers in the tradable sector and suppressing their or-
ganizations. Eventually workers in tradable industries will switch to become supporters
of free trade. Hence, it is very natural to imagine exogenous and endogenous switches
between structures 1 and 2. It is much more complicated to picture this kind of switch in
a capital abundant economy, since all groups, except landlords, prefer either free trade or
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a very moderate protectionism.
In summary, if the introduction of organizations increases the power of the owners of
the factor specific to the exporting industry and/or service workers, then the equilibrium
trade policy comes closer to free trade. If instead it increases the power of the owners of
the factor specific to the industry that competes with the imports or of its workers, then
the equilibrium trade policy becomes more protectionist.
1.4.3 Economic Structure, Political Power and Convergence
The way activists influence the convergence coefficients is subtle. Again, assume that
there are only two parties and activist leaders do not have partisan preferences (case 1 in
proposition 1.2), then it is possible that convergence is more or less likely with activists
than without them. The reason is that the endogenous components of valence have an
ambiguous effect on the Hessian matrices of both parties evaluated at z¯m. On the other
hand, if activist leaders have partisan preferences (case 2 in proposition 1.2), campaign
contributions constitute an unambiguous centrifugal force, inducing each party to trade off
the electoral mean and the ideal position of the organizations that support the party.
1.4.4 Trade Policy under Divergence
Consider a situation with two political parties. Party 1 receives contributions from
organizations k = FX , FY , FN while party 2 receives contributions from organization L. Let
z∗j = (τ
∗
j , γ
∗
j ) be the equilibrium platform of party j = 1, 2. Regardless of the structure of
the economy, in equilibrium, party 1 offers a lower fraction of government revenue allocated
to GF than the electoral mean, and party 2 offers a higher fraction of government revenue
allocated to GL than the electoral mean. That is γ
∗
2 > γm > γ
∗
1 (proposition 1.2, case
2). The reason is fairly intuitive. When party 1 is choosing a platform, then in order to
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maximize campaign contributions it must balance a centrifugal force that pushes it to the
electoral center γm, and a centripetal force that pushes it to γ
k = 0, the ideal policy of the
organizations that support the party.
The same logic applies to party 2 with γL = 1. The importance of each of these forces
varies with the political parameters. All else equal, the more effective activists leaders
are and the more effective contributions are, the more intense is the centripetal force, and
thus the further apart γ∗2 and γ
∗
1 will be. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, the higher is the
exogenous valence of a party, the closer it is to the electoral mean.
The structure of the economy has, however, an important effect on τ∗j . If the economy
has either structure 1 or 3, the ideal import tax rate for workers in the tradable industries τL
tends to be very close to the electoral mean τm. If the influence ability of the organizations
k = FX , FY , FN does not vary too much, it is also the case that the weighted ideal import
tax rate of these groups is also very close to τm. Therefore, τ
∗
1 ≈ τ∗2 ≈ τm, and parties’
platforms do not have a significant variation in terms of the proposed trade policy. On the
other hand, if the economy has structure 2, and the fraction of the owners of factor FY in
the population is not very high, then τL > τm, which implies that τ
∗
2 > τm. Moreover, if
the influence ability of organizations k = FX , FY , FN does not vary too much, it is also the
case that the weighted ideal import tax rate of these groups must be lower than τm, which
implies that τ∗1 < τm. Therefore, τ
∗
2 > τm > τ
∗
1 , and parties’ platform differ significantly
in terms of the proposed trade policy. Recall also that τm is higher for an economy with
structure 2 than for an economy with structures 1 or 3. Hence, party 2 offers a highly
protectionist policy, while party 1 proposes a relatively moderate one.
In Summary, for an economy with structures 1 or 3, both parties tend to propose very
similar and moderate trade policies, while sharply differing in their budget proposals. Party
1 offers a higher level of GF and party 2 offers instead a higher level of GL. Political conflict
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is mainly about the budget allocation dimension. On the other hand, for an economy with
structure 2, parties tend to differ in both dimensions. Party 1 offers a moderate trade
policy and a higher level of GF , while party 2 offers a highly protectionist trade policy
and a higher level of GL. There is political conflict in both dimensions of policy. Finally,
note that for an economy with structures 1 and 3, the efficiency of the economy does not
significantly vary when there is a change in the party that wins the election, since both
parties propose similar trade policies. Distributional conflict mainly occurs in the budget
allocation, which, in our model, does not affect the efficiency of the economy. However, for
an economy with structure 2, party rotation induces significant changes in the efficiency of
the economy since each party implements a very different trade policy.
1.5 Historical Cases
The results on convergence and divergence can be used to explain historical patterns
in trade policy. We now exemplify our model with the cases of the United States and
Argentina, because they offer two interesting, albeit very different illustrations of our model.
While the United States is a case in which the economic structure changed from a diversified
natural resource rich economy to an industrial economy, Argentina is a case in which the
economic structure changed from a specialized natural resource rich economy to a diversified
natural resource rich economy. As a consequence, trade policies in these two countries
followed the basic patterns predicted by our model. Thus, these case studies indicate how
the economic structure affects the stability and degree of trade protectionism.
1.5.1 The United States
In the 1790s import tariffs in the U.S. were not very high and the main purpose of
them was to finance the government rather than to protect domestic industries. In the
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period from 1790 to 1820 tariffs were increased, but mainly to obtain more revenue and
to finance the War of 1812 (see Irwin, 2003). Early industrialization in the U.S. and the
demand of raw materials from the industrialization of the U.K. radically changed this
situation in the 1820s. The North produced manufactures that competed with British
imports and favored protectionist measures. The South exported cotton and preferred
free trade. From 1820 to 1830 tariffs were significantly raised with the crucial purpose of
protecting domestic industries from foreign competition. The North obtained the necessary
votes in Congress to increase tariffs, by offering the West financial resources for internal
improvements. However, from 1830 to the Civil War, tariffs were decreased. This time the
West voted with the South. Two circumstances contributed to this switch. First, President
Andrew Jackson vetoed the internal improvements bills, which undermined the North-West
coalition. Second, the West began exporting grain, making them more supportive of free
trade. As a result, the Compromise Tariff of 1833 established a progressive reduction
of tariffs that undid almost all the increase that took place during the 1820s (see Irwin,
2006a).
During the Civil War, the Tariff Acts of 1862 and 1864 were proposed as means to raise
capital for the effort against the south. It is likely this was not the only reason. Indeed,
Lincoln’s economic advisor, Henry Carey argued in his book of 1896, that the “American
system” involving tariffs, was the only way to maintain equality, in contrast to the free
trade British system of imperialism. After the Civil War, the Republicans became even
more closely associated with pro-capital protectionism, while the Democrats, associated
with the agrarian interest in the South and the West, called for a reduction of import
duties. In 1887, President Cleveland, a Democrat, made tariffs the key focus of his State
of the Union Address, arguing that duties should be reduced, or even abolished, for raw
materials. In the 1888 presidential election, Harrison, a Republican, was elected, and the
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Republicans obtained majorities in both the Senate and the House. They immediately
began to work on a new bill to raise tariffs. In fact, in 1890, the Congress, dominated by
Republicans, passed the McKinley tariff Act, which significantly increased the average duty.
However, in 1890 midterm election the Republican party suffered a defeat and McKinley,
the author and main defender of the 1890 tariff Act, lost his seat. In the 1892 presidential
election, the Democrats took control of the Presidency, the Senate and the House and in
1894 they passed the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, which lowered tariffs again undoing some of
the changes introduced by the McKinley Act. The conflict between protectionist interests
of the north-east and the agrarian interests of the west and south came to a head in the
presidential contest of 1896 between the Republican William McKinley and the Democrat
William Jennings Bryan, which was won by McKinley with 51% of the popular vote but
60% of the electoral college. McKinley, who was known as the Napoleon of Protection,
while he was president, stated in an speech to the Republican Party: ”Under free trade
the trader is the master and the producer the slave. Protection is but the law of nature,
the law of self-preservation, of self-development, of securing the highest and best destiny
of the race of man.”20
In terms of our model, during the nineteenth century the U.S. was a diversified natural
resource rich economy with a comparative advantage in the primary sector, but with an
important and growing manufacturing sector that competed with imports. We believe that
this period illustrates a divergent political equilibrium, in which trade policy is unstable.
Either a party with a protectionist platform (the Republicans) or a party with a free trade
platform (the Democrats) could win the elections.
In the twentieth century, the economic structure of the U.S. suffered an extraordinary
change. As Irwin (2006b) has put it:
20William McKinley speech, Oct. 4, 1892 in Boston, MA:William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.
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At the end of the nineteenth century, though, the pattern of U.S. trade
changed dramatically. For most of the century, the United States had a strong
comparative advantage in agricultural goods and exported mainly raw cotton,
grains, and meat products in exchange for imports of manufactured goods. But
in the mid-1890s, America’s exports of manufactures began to surge. Manu-
factured goods jumped from 20 percent of U.S. exports in 1890 to 35 percent
by 1900 and nearly 50 percent by 1913. In about two decades, the United
States reversed a century-old trade pattern and became a large net exporter of
manufactured goods.
This reversal in the comparative advantage in the U.S. had a crucial effect on its
political equilibrium. Once the U.S. became an industrial economy, industrial capitalists
and workers gradually converted to free trade and the country moved to a convergent
equilibrium with low tariffs. Moreover, except in very extraordinary circumstances, like
the Great Depression, tariffs ceased to be an important source of political conflict and was
no longer a key issue for political polarization and party differentiation.
1.5.2 Argentina
We now consider the case of Argentina. This country is relatively well endowed with
highly productive land, and its comparative advantage has always been in the production
of primary goods.21 Up to the 1930s, Argentina was well integrated to the world economy,
while some protectionism naturally developed during the world recession of the 1930s.
After World War II, in 1946, workers voted en masse in a presidential election22, and the
country closed itself off in large degree from world markets until the mid-1970s. Since then,
21See Brambilla, Galiani and Porto (2010).
22See Canto´n (1968).
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though the country tended to reintegrate with the world economy, trade policies have been
highly volatile.23
At the beginning of the 20th century Argentina’s factor endowment resembled what
we denoted here as a specialized natural resource-rich economy. However, during the
interwar period; trade opportunities and the terms of trade worsened and these triggered
an industrialization process. This accelerated with the world depression during the 1930s
and the Second World War. As a result, Argentina started the second half of the 20th
century with a very different economic configuration. Industrialization had developed
apace, bringing about what we have called a diversified natural resource-rich economy
(see Galiani and Somaini, 2010). These new economic conditions also changed the political
equilibrium; urban workers employed in the manufacturing sector and industrialists were
the major social actors and they demanded a deepening of the industrialization process.
This took the economy close to autarky.
Indeed, the pre 1930 Argentine society remained, on the whole, flexible, and social
mobility was about as high as in other countries of recent settlement. The majority of the
elite, although wealthy and powerful, were attached to a liberal ideology until at least the
1920s, as witnessed by the educational system (see Galiani et. al., 2008). It is likely that a
few more decades of an expanding world economy would have induced an acceleration in the
growth of urban leadership. This could have reconciled the aspirations of urban workers,
entrepreneurs, and rural masses with a gradual decline in rural exportable commodities.
Yet such a balancing act, even under prosperous conditions, was difficult in Argentina. The
main problem that arose was that policies which were best from the viewpoint of economic
efficiency (e.g., free, or nearly free trade) generated an income distribution favorable to the
owners of the relatively most abundant factor of production (land). This strengthened the
23Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2005) argue that this uncertainty about trade policy significantly hampered
capital accumulation during this period.
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position of the traditional elite. In Argentina, contrary to what occurred in the United
States or Britain, by the end of Second World War, what was efficient was not popular
(Diaz Alejandro, 1970). Once workers voted on a large scale for the first time in 1946,
an urban-rural cleavage developed under the leadership of Peron. This coalition not only
shifted trade policy but it also significantly modified the distribution of public expenditures
towards the low-income class. In the 21st century, although Argentina still has a diversified
natural resource-rich economic structure, the rise of the service economy has debilitated
the supremacy of the ‘populist’ coalition and its policy can no longer be viewed in terms
of an urban-rural cleavage.
1.6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have explored the political and economic consequences of the theoreti-
cal model of political economy that we developed. We have focused our attention on three
main issues. First, we have assumed that the sufficient conditions for policy convergence
are satisfied and we have characterized the equilibrium outcome. We have stressed the role
of the economic structure in the determination of the political equilibrium.
Second, we have studied how likely it is that an economic structure induces policy
convergence. Here the emphasis has been on policy stability, rather than on comparing
the equilibrium levels of protection induced by different economic and political structures.
This is a question that has not been emphasized in the traditional literature of the political
economy of international trade. However, we think it is a relevant issue because high
volatility and sudden changes in trade policies have been considered important impediments
to growth in many developing countries.
Third, we have considered and interpreted the political equilibrium under divergence.
In particular, we have shown that there can exist a political equilibrium in which there
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is a positive probability of a ”populist” outcome with a high level of protection and more
public goods for unskilled workers. In addition there can exist a ”middle class” outcome
with a relatively lower level of protection and more public goods for specific factors. We
interpret this result to mean that, in equilibrium, society can switch from one of these
outcomes to the other.
Finally, globalization has recently been a powerful force in bringing about economic
convergence across many countries (see O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999). When there was
a backlash against globalization after the 1930 crisis, the result was economic divergence.
For many developing countries, this backlash lasted for almost 50 years. Today, there is a
persistent fear of a repeat of the past, that the current economic crisis will again induce a
backlash against world market integration. Though this is possible, our analysis suggest
that the risk of it is less likely than it was eighty years ago. The main reason is the
growth of the service economy through the world. As we have shown, the development
of the non-tradeable sector in the economy plays a key role in political alignments, since
the skilled service workers push the political equilibrium toward the ideal position of the
relative abundant factor in the economy. Therefore, they act as a moderating force against
the protectionist tendency.
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Appendix 1.1: The Economy
In this appendix we characterize the competitive equilibrium of the economic model.
The final goal is to prove Lemma 1.1 in section 1.2.
Let Q¯X (Q¯Y ) be the maximum output of industry X (Y ) given the aggregate endow-
ment e, so Q¯X = AX
(
F¯X
)αX (L¯)1−αX , Q¯Y = AY (F¯Y )αY (L¯)1−αY . Let ls be the fraction
of factor L employed in industry s = X,Y . From profit maximization in industries X and
Y , we obtain the equilibrium allocation of labor between the tradable industries
(1− αX) pXQ¯X (lY )αY = (1− αY ) pY Q¯Y (1− lY )αX . (18)
Under the Cobb Douglas utility assumption, expenditure shares are constant, so pXCXβX =
pY CY
βY
= pNCNβN , where Cs is the aggregate consumption of good s = X,Y,N . Since we
do not allow international factor mobility the trade balance must be balanced, that is
p∗X (QX − CX)+p∗Y (QY − CY ) = 0. From these two expressions, we obtain the equilibrium
price of the non-tradable good
pN =
 βN
βX
p∗X
pX
+ βY
p∗Y
pY
[p∗XQ¯X (1− lY )1−αX + p∗Y Q¯Y (lY )1−αY
Q¯N
]
. (19)
It is not difficult to see that there exists a unique lY that solves equation (18).
24 Once lY is
determined, equation (19) determines a unique pN . Hence, given a vector of international
prices p∗, a vector of factor endowments e, and an import tax rate τ , equations (18) and
(19) determine a unique equilibrium. Denote by lY (τ) and pN (τ) the functions that give
24Rearranging terms in equation (18) we have:
(lY )
αY
(1− lY )
αX
=
(1− αY ) pY Q¯Y
(1− αX) pXQ¯X
The right hand side of this expression is a positive constant while the left hand side is an strictly increasing
function of lY , with limlY→0 = 0 and limlY→1 =∞.
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the equilibrium values of lY and pN for each τ , given p
∗ and e. A direct application of
the implicit function theorem implies that these functions are continuously differentiable.
Analogously, let wk (τ) denotes the equilibrium nominal rental price of factor k, and define
the equilibrium consumer price index as the following geometric average of the prices of
consumption goods CPI (τ) = (pX)
βX (pY )
βY (pN )
βN . Then, the real rental price of factor
k is wk/CPI. We are interested in characterizing how rental factor prices change when the
import tax rate changes, which may depend on the comparative advantage of the economy.
Result 1.1 (Comparative Advantage): Define the economy degree of comparative
advantage in industry Y by Ψ =
AY (F¯Y )
αY (L¯)(
αX−αY )
AX(F¯X)
αX . Then, the economy has a com-
parative advantage in industry X (respectively Y ) if and only if Ψ < Ω
p∗X
p∗
Y
(respectively
Ψ > Ω
p∗X
p∗Y
), where Ω = (βY )
αY (1−αX)
1−αX
(βX)
αX (1−αY )
1−αY
[βY (1− αY ) + βX (1− αX)]αX−αY . Proof: see
extended appendix in Galiani et. al. (2011). 
Next, we focus on the rental factor prices. We begin with specific factors.
Result 1.2 (Specific-Factors Rental Prices): Let τaut be the tax rate on imports
that pushes the economy into autarky. The real rental factor prices of the factor specific to
the exporting industry and the non-tradable industry are decreasing in the import tax rate
for all τ ∈ [0, τaut]; while the real rental factor price of the factor specific to the import
competing industry is increasing in the import tax rate for all τ ∈ [0, τaut]. Proof: see
extended appendix in Galiani et. al. (2011). 
Next, we consider the mobile factor.
Result 1.3 (Mobile-Factor Rental Price): Suppose that the economy has a com-
parative advantage in the less labor intensive industry X, that is Ψ < Ω
p∗X
p∗Y
. Then,
if Ψ = 0, the real wage is decreasing in the import tax rate for all τ ≥ 0, while if
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Ψ >
(
αY
1−αY
)αY ( 1−αX
αX
)αX
Ω
(
p∗X
p∗Y
)
, the real wage is increasing in the import tax rate for
all τ ∈ [0, τaut]. On the other hand, suppose that the economy has a comparative advantage
in the more labor intensive industry Y , that is Ψ > Ω
p∗X
p∗Y
. Then, if the following two
conditions hold, the real wage is decreasing in the import tax rate for all τ ∈ [0, τaut]:
1. αX ≥ max
{
βX(1−2αY )
βX(1−2αY )+βY (1−αY )
, (βY +βN )αYβY +βNαY
}
2. Ω
p∗X
p∗Y
< Ψ ≤ (1 + τ¯aut.)Ωp
∗
X
p∗Y
, where τ¯aut =
1
2
[√(
1 + βYβX
)2
+ 4βYβX −
(
1 + βYβX
)]
.
Proof: see extended appendix in Galiani et. al. (2011). 
Results 1.2 and 1.3 are very useful to prove lemma 1.1, which is our final goal in this
appendix.
Proof of Lemma 1.1: Since vk (τ, γ) is a continuous function and the policy space
Z is a compact set, a global maximum
(
τk, γk
)
exists. Since vk (τ, γ) is strictly increasing
in γ for k = L and strictly decreasing in γ for k = FX , FY , FN we have γ
k = 0 for
k = FX , FY , FN , and γ
L = 1. The ideal import tax rate τk must be interior because for
τ = 0 and τ = τaut government revenue is zero and H
′ (0)→∞. Therefore, the derivative
of vk (τ, γ) with respect to τ evaluated at
(
τk, γk
)
must be equal to zero, or which is
equivalent, τk must satisfies:
ηwk/CPI,τ
wkk¯
nk
+RH ′
(
R
CPI
)
ηR/CPI,τ = 0
Consider an economy with structure 1. It is not difficult to verify from the proves of re-
sults 2 and 3 that ηwFX /CPI,pY
< ηwFN /CPI,pY
< ηwL/CPI,pY < 0. Since H
′ (0) → ∞
and
wFX F¯X
nFX
≥ wFN F¯NnFN ≥
wLL¯
nL
, the previous expression implies that τFX < τFN <
τL < τmax. For an economy with structure 2, again it is not difficult to verify
that ηwFY /CPI,pY
> ηwL/CPI,pY > 0, and ηwFX /CPI,pY
< ηwFN /CPI,pY
< 0. Since
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H ′ (0) → ∞ and max
{
wFX F¯X
nFX
,
wFY F¯Y
nFY
}
≥ wFN F¯NnFN ≥
wLL¯
nL
, the previous expression im-
plies that τFX < τFN < τmax < τ
L < τFY . Finally, for an economy with structure 3,
we have ηwFY /CPI,pX
< ηwFN /CPI,pX
< ηwL/CPI,pX < 0 and ηwFX /CPI,pX
> 0. Since
H ′ (0) → ∞ and max
{
wFX F¯X
nFX
,
wFY F¯Y
nFY
}
≥ wFN F¯NnFN ≥
wLL¯
nL
, the previous expression implies
that τFY < τFN < τL < τmax < τ
FX . 
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Appendix 1.2: The Polity
In this appendix we prove propositions 1.1 and 1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.1: As we have already shown, the joint weighted elec-
toral mean zm satisfies the first order condition for a local equilibrium for all parties
(10). Hence, in order to verify that zm is a strict local Nash equilibrium, we only need
to check whether the Hessian matrix of each party evaluated at zm is negative defi-
nite. To prove that c (Γexo.) < 1, it is sufficient for D
2Sj (zm) to be negative definite
for all j ∈ P . We proceed as follows: We have defined the characteristic matrix as
Hj (zm) =
∑
k∈V
nk
(
AjW
kBkzmW
k −Wk). Then, the Hessian matrix of party j evalu-
ated at zm is given by:
D2Sj (zm) = 2ρj (zm) (1− ρj (zm))Hj (zm) .
Since 2ρj (zm) (1− ρj (zm)) is a positive constant, D2Sj (zm) is negative definite (semi-
definite) if and only if Hj (zm) is negative definite (semi-definite). The trace of Hj (zm) is
given by
Tr (Hj (zm)) =
∑
k∈V
nkTr
(
AjW
kBkzmW
k −Wk
)
= Aj
∑
k∈V
nkTr
(
WkBkzmW
k
)
−
∑
k∈V
nkTr
(
Wk
)
=
[
Aj
A1
d (Γexo)− 1
]∑
k∈V
nk
(
φkτ + φ
k
γ
)
Since parties are ordered according to their valences A1 ≥ ... ≥ Aj ≥ ... ≥ Ap, this
implies
Tr (H1 (zm)) ≥ ... ≥ Tr (Hj (zm)) ≥ ... ≥ Tr (Hp (zm)) .
Therefore, if d (Γexo) < 1, then Tr(Hj (zm)) < 0 for all j ∈ P .
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The determinant of Hj (zm) is given by
det (Hj (zm)) = (Aj)
2
∑
k∈V
nk
(
WkBkzmW
k
)
11
∑
k∈V
nk
(
WkBkzmW
k
)
22
− (Aj)2
[∑
k∈V
(
WkBkzmW
k
)
21
]2
+
(∑
k∈V
nkφ
k
τ
)(∑
k∈V
nkφ
k
γ
)[
1− Aj
A1
c (Γexo)
]
By the triangle inequality, the sum of the first two terms in this expression for
det (Hj (zm))must be non-negative. Moreover, A1 ≥ ... ≥ Aj ≥ ... ≥ Ap implies
[
1− Ap
A1
c (Γexo)
]
≥ ... ≥
[
1− Aj
A1
c (Γexo)
]
≥ ... ≥ [1− c (Γexo)] .
Therefore, if c (Γexo) < 1, then det (Hj (zm)) > 0 for all j ∈ P .
Since d (Γexo) < c (Γexo), then c (Γexo) < 1 implies that Tr(Hj (zm)) < 0, and
det (Hj (zm)) > 0 for all j ∈ P . Thus c (Γexo) < 1 is a sufficient condition for D2Sj (zm)
to be negative definite for all j ∈ P.This completes the proof of sufficiency
For the necessary part, assume that zm is a weak local Nash equilibrium. Then the
Hessian matrix of each party evaluated at zm must be negative semi-definite. This implies
det
(
D2Sj (zm)
) ≥ 0 and Tr(D2Sj (zm)) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ P . This is true if and only if
det
(
H2j (zm)
)
≥ 0 and Tr
(
H2j (zm)
)
≤ 0 for all j ∈ P . Tr(H1 (zm)) ≤ 0 if and only if
d (Γexo) ≤ 1. If d (Γexo) > 1, then Tr(H1 (zm)) must be strictly positive, and so one of
the eigenvalues of H1 (zm) must be strictly positive, violating the weak Nash equilibrium
condition. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1.2: Let us suppose that there are only two parties and that
the endogenous valence functions are linear in the contributions and the same for both
parties, so that µj = µ
∑
k∈V
ck,j. Then, the probability that a voter in group k votes for
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party j rather than for party l 6= j, for j = 1, 2, is:
ρkj (z, c) =
[
1 + exp
(
vkpol (zl)− vkpol (zj) + λl − λj + µ
∑
k∈V
(ck,j − ck,l)
)]−1
.
Since we are assuming that there is no commitment mechanism, in order to determine
optimal contributions after the platform profile z = (z1, z2) is announced, each organization
leader maximizes (14) taking z = (z1, z2) as given. The first order solution of this problem
is25:
ck,j = µ¯ (z, c)max
{
0, (nk)
2
[
ak,jv
k
pol (zj) + bk,j − ak,lvkpol (zl)− bk,l
]}
. (20)
In this case µ¯ (z, c) = µ
∑
h∈V
nhρ
h
1 (z, c)
(
1− ρh1 (z, c)
)
. Thus (20) implies that if
ak,jv
k
pol (zj) + bk,j 6= ak,lvkpol. (zl) + bk,l then each leader contributes at most to one party.
If ak,jv
k
pol (zj) + bk,j = ak,lv
k
pol. (zl) + bk,l, then the leader does not contribute to any party.
Adding up the first order conditions of all leaders we obtain the following expression:
∑
k∈V
(ck,j − ck,l)
µ¯ (z, c)
=
∑
k∈V
(nk)
2
[
ak,jv
k
pol (zj) + bk,j − ak,lvkpol (zl)− bk,l
]
. (21)
Since, given z, µ¯ (z, c) only depends on
∑
k∈V
(ck,j − ck,l), this expression implicitly gives
the equilibrium value of
∑
k∈V
(ck,j − ck,l) as a function of z and other parameters. Then,
(20) determines the equilibrium contribution functions. Let c∗k : Z → ℜp+ be the no
commitment equilibrium contribution function of organization k, and let c∗ = ×k∈V c∗k.
Define
C∗j−l (z) =
∑
k∈V
(
c∗k,j (z)− c∗k,l (z)
)
.
Parties determine their optimal policy positions with respect to such a profile of no-
25The first order condition gives a unique maximum since, given z, we can make Lk an strictly concave
function of ck. The reason is that we can always find values of ak,j and bk,j small enough such that the
quadratic cost of collecting the contributions prevails and Lk becomes an strictly concave function of ck.
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commitment contribution functions. The problem for party j is to maximize Sj (z) =
Sj (z, c
∗ (z)). Since Sj (z) only involves C
∗
j−l (z) and C
∗
j−l is a differentiable function of z,
Sj is also a differentiable function of z. Hence we can again use calculus to solve each party
problem.
The first order necessary condition for party j is given by
DSj (z) = −2
∑
k∈V
nkρ
k
j (z)
(
1− ρkj (z)
) φkτ (τj − τk)− µ2 ∂C
∗
j−l(z)
∂τj
φkγ
(
γj − γk
)− µ2 ∂C∗j−l(z)∂γj
 = 0.
Here ρkj (z) =
[
1 + exp
(
vkpol (zl)− vkpol (zj)− µ
(
C∗j−l (z)
)
+ λl − λj
)]−1
. This is expres-
sion (16) in the section 4.
The second order sufficient (necessary) condition is that the matrix D2Sj (z) evaluated
at a profile that satisfies the first order condition be negative definite (semi-definite), where
D2Sj (z) = 2
∑
k∈V
nkρ
k
j (z)
(
1− ρkj (z)
) [
2
(
1− 2ρkj (z)
)
WkBkz˜jW
k − W˜k
]
,
where z˜j = zj − µ
2
(
Wk
)−1
DC∗j−l (z) ,W˜
k =Wk − µ
2
D2C∗j−l (z)
and Wk =
 φkτ 0
0 φkγ
 ; Bkz˜j =
 (τ˜j − τk)2 (γ˜j − γk) (τ˜j − τk)(
γ˜j − γk
) (
τ˜j − τk
) (
γ˜j − γk
)2
 .
This is expression (17) in section 4.
Part 1 (Non Partisan Organizations): Suppose the organizations are non par-
tisan and that the influence ability of each organization is the same for both parties.
Then, from (21) is not difficult to verify that if we consider a profile z such that
z1 = z2 = (τ, γ) then: (i) C
∗
j (z) = C
∗
l (z) = 0, (ii) ρ1 (z) = [1 + exp (λ2 − λ1)]−1,
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and (iii) µ2DC
∗
j−l (z) = ρ1 (z) (1− ρ1 (z))
∑
k∈V
(nk)
2 ak
 φkτ (τ − τk)
φkγ
(
γ − γk)
. Introducing
(i)-(iii) into the first order condition (16), and rearranging terms we obtain a system of
equations, whose unique solution is the profile z¯m. Therefore, z¯m is the unique profile
that simultaneously satisfies the first order condition and predicts parties convergence. A
sufficient (necessary) condition for z¯m to induce a strict (weak) local maximum for each
party is that the Hessian matrices of both parties evaluated at z¯m, denoted D
2Sj (z¯m), be
negative definite (semi-definite). Finally, if z¯m induces a strict (weak) local maximum for
both parties, then z¯m is a strict (weak) local Nash equilibrium of the game Γend. Hence,
the parties platforms z¯m and the contribution functions c
∗
k,j (z) form a strict (weak) lo-
cal sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium, which completes the proof of the first part of the
proposition.
Part 2 (Partisan Organizations): Now, suppose that each organization is attached
to only one specific party. Rearranging terms in the first order condition (16) we obtain a
system of equations:
τj =
∑
k∈V
 ρkj (z)
(
1− ρkj (z)
)
nkφ
k
τ∑
h∈V
ρhj (z)
(
1− ρhj (z)
)
nhφhτ
 τk + µ
2
∂C∗j−l (z)
∂τj
, (22)
γj =
∑
k∈V
 ρkj (z)
(
1− ρkj (z)
)
nkφ
k
γ∑
h∈V
ρhj (z)
(
1− ρhj (z)
)
nhφhγ
 γk + µ
2
∂C∗j−l (z)
∂γj
, (23)
We now show that z1 = z2 cannot be a solution of this system. Assume for a moment
that z1 = z2 = (τ, γ) is a solution of the system of balance equations, then from (21)
µ
2DC
∗
j−l (z) = ρ1 (z) (1− ρ1 (z))
∑
k∈V
(nk)
2 ak,j
 φkτ (τ − τk)
φkγ
(
γ − γk)
. Hence DC∗j−l (z) 6=
DC∗l−j (z), which due to (22) and (23) implies that τ1 6= τ2 and γ1 6= γ2, which is a
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contradiction. Therefore there is no profile that at the same time satisfies z1 = z2 and
the first order condition (16). From the balance conditions (22)-(23) we observe that the
equilibrium position of each party, denoted z∗j , must be a trade off between the centrifugal
force of electoral center, captured by the first terms of the right hand side of (22) and (23),
and the centripetal force of contributions, captured by the second terms of the right hand
side of (22) and (23). Following the same arguments of the first part of the proof a sufficient
(necessary) condition for this profile to induce a strict (weak) local sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium is that the Hessian matrices of both parties evaluated at this profile D2Sj (z
∗)
be negative definite (semi-definite). 
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Chapter 2: Autocracy, Democracy and Trade Policy26
Abstract
This essay develops a political economy model in order study the role of intra-elite
conflict in the simultaneous determination of the political regime, trade policy and a re-
distribution scheme based on income taxation. There are three socioeconomic groups: two
elite factions and the workers), whose preferences over trade policy and income taxation
are derived from a simple open economy model. The critical point is that income taxation
induces a rich-poor/elite-workers political cleavage, while trade policy opens the door to
intra-elite conflict. In this model, when there is no intra?elite conflict, changes in trade
policy are associated with political transitions. Coups (democratizations) open up the
economy if and only if both elite factions are pro-free trade (protectionist). However, in
the presence of intra-elite conflict, autocracies respond to popular revolts by changing trade
policy and reallocating political power within the elite (toward the elite faction with the
same trade policy preference as the workers) rather than offering democratization. The
change in trade policy is credible because the elite faction with the same trade policy
preference as the workers controls the autocracy. Moreover, in the presence of intra-elite
conflict, coups tend to maintain the trade policy, unless popular demands are extremely
radical and/or the elite faction with the same trade policy preference as the workers is
exceptionally weak.
2.1 Introduction
26This essay is a joint work with Sebastian Galiani and it is under revision in the Journal of International
Economics.
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The question as to what factors determine the institutional framework of collective
decision-making is central to political science and political economy and has received con-
siderable attention in the literature (see, in addition to more modern works, the classic con-
tributions of Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966; Luebbert, 1991; Rustow, 1970; Linz and Stepan,
1978; O’Donnell, 1973; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Dahl, 1971; and Olson, 1993). In
a very important recent work, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) make a significant
contribution to this literature by developing an economic model of autocracy and democ-
racy in which the income-distribution conflict, mediated by different political institutions,
emerges as the main determinant of the political regime.
The kinds of elite-controlled political transitions from autocracy to democracy and from
democracy to military regimes studied by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) are central to
our understanding of the process of development. In fact, many of those transitions occur
in conjunction with radical changes in economic policies dealing with such issues as trade
barriers. This should not, after all, be surprising, since trade policy is a key determinant
of income distribution (see, for example, Stolper and Samuelson, 1941).27
An illustrative example is found in the history of Argentina in the twentieth century
(see Galiani and Somaini, 2010). At the beginning of that century, Argentina’s factor
endowment resembled that of a specialized, natural-resource-rich economy. Both the elite
and the general populace supported free trade. However, during the inter-war period, trade
opportunities were scarce and the terms of trade worsened, which triggered an industrial-
ization process that then gathered momentum during the Great Depression of the 1930s
and the Second World War. As a result, Argentina embarked on the second half of the
twentieth century with a very different economic configuration. In addition, after workers
27Trade policy has been portrayed as an important determinant of political cleavages throughout history
(see, among others, Rogowski, 1987 and 1989; Gourevitch, 1986; Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007; Galiani,
Schofield and Torrens (2010); and Acemoglu and Yared, 2010).
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had voted on a large scale for the first time in 1946, an urban-rural cleavage developed
under the leadership of Pero´n which lasted until the advent of the dictatorship in 1976.
This new political equilibrium brought the economy to the verge of autarky. Democracy
did not take hold, and a series of transitions to autocracy and back to a constrained form
of democracy took place during this period. However, none of the autocratic governments
that ruled the country until the coup of 1976, which deposed a highly populist Peronist
government, was controlled by the agricultural free-trade elite, nor did any of them open
up the economy significantly. By contrast, the military government that took power in
1976 was mainly controlled by the agricultural elite and brought the economy back from
the edge of autarky (see Brambilla, Galiani and Porto, 2010).28
Another more subtle, but very telling, example is that of the repeal of the Corn Laws in
England. Britain’s bold move to free trade in 1846 was both unprecedented and unilateral;
moreover, it ran counter to the core protectionist ideology of the Conservative Party while
simultaneously undercutting the economic interests of the ruling landed aristocracy. After
the repeal of the Corn Laws, Prime Minister Peel himself said that he had sought repeal in
order to satisfy the wishes of the industrialists. He indicated that a ”narrow representation
of Parliament” –control of Parliament by the landed aristocracy– required that concessions
be made to satisfy interest groups that were clamoring for reform. Otherwise, he implied,
pressures for reform might have become overwhelming, as they had at the time of the
French Revolution (see Schonhard-Bailey, 2006). Thus, the repeal of the Corn Laws was an
attempt to moderate the mounting pressures for parliamentary reform: if the industrialists
were satisfied by this move, then the drive to gain control of parliamentary seats would ebb
and, even more importantly, the working-class Chartist movement (which was seeking a
28As explained by O’Donnell (1977), at least until 1976, the alliance of the industrialists and landlords
in Argentina lasted only for short periods; “dissolving rapidly in situations which repeatedly put these
two dominants fractions of the Argentine bourgeoisie in different political camps” (see, also, Mallon and
Sourrouille, 1975).
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more radical reform of Parliament) would lose momentum (see Searle, 1993; and Schonhard-
Bailey, 2006).29
These two examples suggest that endogenizing the choice of trade policy, with the con-
sequent possibility of intra-elite conflict that this ushers in, makes a valuable contribution
to a broader understanding of political transitions. This is what we will do in this paper.
The model we have developed in this paper provides a good explanation for the expe-
riences of Great Britain in the nineteenth century and Argentina in the twentieth century.
The key components of that explanation are a politically determined trade policy and intra-
elite conflict over trade policy. The intuition is relatively simple. When there is intra-elite
conflict over trade policy, one of the elite factions has the same trade policy preference
as the populace, while the other elite faction has the opposite trade policy preference. In
other words, when there is intra-elite conflict over trade policy, the political cleavages that
exist in relation to trade policy do not match those that exist in connection with income
taxation. This lack of alignment in political cleavages has two important political impli-
cations. First, an autocracy controlled by the elite faction that has the same trade policy
preference as the populace can placate the supporters of a popular revolt more easily than
one that is controlled by the elite faction that has the opposite trade policy preference.
This is because an elite faction that has the same trade policy preference as the people can
credibly commit to implementing the people’s preferred trade policy even after the threat of
a revolt has died down. Second, the elite faction that has the same trade policy preference
as the populace will have ambiguous feelings about autocratic governments controlled by
29Other more recent notable examples are the move made in the 1990s to embrace both democracy and
free trade by the countries of Eastern Europe and the descent into dictatorship and autarchy of much of
Africa following independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Using systematic panel data on tariffs, democracy
and factor endowments for the period 1870-1914, O’Rourke and Taylor (2006) show that an increase in
democratization raises tariffs in countries with high land-labor ratios and lowers tariffs in countries with
high capital-labor ratios, though this latter effect is smaller and not always significant (see Table 2 in
O’Rourke and Taylor, 2002).
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the other faction of the elite, since such governments will, on the one hand, reduce income
taxation and redistribution but, on the other hand, may implement a detrimental trade
policy.
The first political implication outlined above accounts for the first Reform Act as well as
the repeal of the Corn Laws in nineteenth-century Great Britain. The protectionist, landed
aristocracy, fearing a revolution, conceded a significant portion of its political power to the
pro-free-trade commercial and industrial elite. This political reform averted democrati-
zation and paved the way for a switch in trade policy. The second political implication
accounts for the coups that resulted in the continuance of import-substitution policies and
for the coup that was followed by the opening of the economy in Argentina in the second
half of the twentieth century. While democracy was not extremely populist, industrialists
supported only those dictatorships that advocated industrial protection, but when radi-
cal tendencies threatened to dominate democratic institutions, they tacitly accepted the
opening of the economy (see O’Donnell, 1977).
It is easy to see that the introduction of a politically determined trade policy will
necessarily affect the equilibrium trade policy. The crucial issue, however, is that this also
has a powerful impact on the political regime. In fact, as we will show in this paper,
even in the absence of intra-elite conflict, if the elite is protectionist (pro-free-trade) and
the populace is pro-free-trade (protectionist), democratization is more likely when trade
policy is endogenous than when there is an exogenous free-trade (protectionist) policy,
but democratization is less likely when trade policy is endogenous than when there is an
exogenous protectionist (free-trade) policy. The consolidation of democracy is always less
likely when trade policy is endogenous than when it is exogenous, regardless of the nature
of the exogenous trade policy. More importantly, if trade policy is exogenous, then none
of our key results under intra-elite conflict will hold, and we will have to revert to the
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one-dimensional Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model, which does not allow us to explain
certain features of the experiences of Great Britain in the nineteenth century and Argentina
in the twentieth century. The critical point is that trade policy opens the door to a type of
political cleavage that differs from the rich-poor/elite-populace cleavage. Indeed, though
we stress the role of trade policy in this paper, our model is more general and applies to
any policy variable that could potentially divide the elite.30
There are several other papers that relate to our work on this subject. First, there
are other papers that draw attention to the significance of intra-elite conflict in different
contexts. Caselli and Gennaioli (2008) develop a model with heterogeneity in managerial
talent in which the existence of a market for control rights over incumbent firms facilitates
some reforms (particularly financial reform) by dividing the preferences of the elite (talented
groups oppose the reform, but untalented incumbents might favor it). Therefore, albeit in
a difference context, they point out to the import role of intra-elite divisions in shaping
economic and political outcomes. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) have developed a model of
democratization in which ”the elites willingly extend the franchise because elections with a
broader franchise can give better incentives to politicians ... [and cause] a shift away from
special-interest politicking toward ... more public-oriented legislative activity.” Moreover,
in their model, only the majority of the elite needs to support the extension of the franchise,
while there can be a minority of the elite that loses ground with the reform. Acemoglu
(2010) develops a model of State capacity in which the effectiveness of intra-elite conflict
in controlling the State intensifies as the State’s capacity grows and as more efficient forms
of taxation and redistribution therefore become available. The key finding is that the
destructive effect of more intra-elite conflict can offset the beneficial effect of increased
State capacity. Ghosal and Proto (2008) build a model of democratization in which intra-
30Another obvious example is the development of a no-fee school system, which might be opposed by
landlord elites but supported by industrialist elites (see Galor, Moav, and Vollrath, 2009).
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elite conflict plays a crucial role. They develop a coalition formation game with two elite
groups that are uncertain about their relative future level of political power and a non-elite
group that cannot act collectively. Under dictatorship, the stronger elite obtains all the
surplus, while, under democracy, the weaker elite group forms a coalition with the non-
elite group, which induces a more balanced division between the elites. Democratization
occurs when the elites are sufficiently risk-averse. Our model shares the same general idea
as put forward by Ghosal and Proto (2008), i.e., that an elite group may be willing to
form a coalition with the non-elite group in order to improve its bargaining power with
the other elite group. Beyond this, however, there are several differences. Our model is
a non-cooperative one with no explicit coalition formation. In Ghosal and Proto (2008),
there is only one policy variable –the division of a unit of surplus– while, in our model,
there are two: income taxation and trade policy. Thus, in our model, there can be two
different political cleavages: one based on income taxation and the other based on trade
policy. In other words, in our model there is one elite group that can be tempted by the
other elite group with low taxation and also by the non-elite group with a favorable trade
policy. Another important difference is that we use the Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)
framework, in which democratization has nothing to do with risk aversion; rather, it is
the institutional change that the elites accept as a credible means of transferring political
power in order to avoid a revolt. The novel aspects of our model are: that democracy
may now be more costly for one elite group (the one with opposite trade policy preferences
to those of the non-elite group) than for the other; that the elite groups must somehow
bargain to reach a decision as to which one will control the dictatorship and, hence, which
trade policy the dictatorship will implement; and, finally, that the non-elite group is not
indifferent as to which group controls the dictatorship and that it may be able to influence
this decision.
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Second, there is an extensive body of literature that studies how international trade
affects domestic political alignments (see, among others, Rogowski, 1987 and 1989). In
most cases, this literature informally assumes a political economy model. We, on the other
hand, use a formal model of policy determination. More importantly, this literature often
considers only the political cleavages that result from the effects of international trade
on different social groups and pays little attention to other potential political cleavages
that might interact with the ones induced by the effects of international trade. Thus, the
underlying model of policy determination is one-dimensional. In contrast, we consider a
two-dimensional policy space in which political cleavages in respect of trade policy may
or may not coincide with political cleavages in other areas, such as income redistribution
through taxation. In other words, protectionist and pro-free-trade coalitions may differ
from poor and rich coalitions. The main message of this paper is that this situation may
have important implications for both the political regime and trade policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we introduce a model
of a society integrated by two elite groups and one non-elite group that must make two
collective decisions. In section 2.3, we incorporate this model into a simple static coup
game, while in section 2.4 we do the same with a simple static democratization game.
In both sections we illustrate the results with historical examples of intra-elite conflict:
Argentina during the twentieth century and Great Britain during the nineteenth century,
respectively. In section 2.5 we develop a fully dynamic model that integrates the coup and
the democratization game. In Section 2.6, we present our conclusions.
2.2 The Model
In this section we build a model of a society composed of two elite groups and one
non-elite group that must make two collective decisions: one about income taxation and
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one about trade policy. We first describe the economic environment. Then we explain the
political institutions involved.
2.2.1 The Economy
Consider a society formed by three groups: two elite factions, denoted by L and K
(for example, landlords and industrialists), and a non-elite group called ”the people” or
”the populace” and denoted P (for example, workers). Let ni be the proportion of the
population that belongs to group i = L,K,P ; and let yi be the gross income (before
the redistribution scheme) of a member of group i. The government runs a balanced
budget redistribution scheme that taxes the income of all citizens at a rate τ ∈ [0, 1] and
redistributes the proceeds through a lump-sum transfer. Income taxation is costly, as the
government must incur a cost of C (τ) units of output in order to collect τ units of output
in taxes, where the cost function C is strictly increasing and strictly convex, and C (0) = 0
and C ′ (0) < 1 − yPy¯ < C ′ (1) (for example, C (τ) = τ
1+η
1+η , with η ≥ 0). The government
also selects a trade policy λ ∈ {A,F}, where A denotes autarky and F free trade. Thus,
the utility of a member of group i is given by:
vi (τ, λ) = (1− τ) yi (λ) + [τ − C (τ)] y¯ (λ) ,
where yi (λ) denotes the real income of a member of group i when trade policy is λ and
y¯ (λ) =
∑
i
niyi (λ) is the average income of society.
31
31It is possible to replace the redistribution scheme with a public good financed with income taxation.
In order to see this, suppose that the utility of a member of group i is vi = (1− τ ) yi (λ) +H (g), where g
is the level of the public good. Assume that H is strictly increasing and strictly concave, H (0) = 0 and
H ′ (y¯) < yP
y¯
< 1 < H ′ (0) < mini
yi
y¯
. Since, the government budget constraint is τ y¯ = g, then the utility of
a member of group i is given by vi (τ, λ) = (1− τ ) yi (λ) +H (τ y¯ (λ)), which can be easily obtained in our
model if we set C (τ ) = τ − H(τy¯)
y¯
. Moreover, it is not difficult to prove that this cost function satisfies all
the proper assumptions. For example, C (0) = 0− H(0)
y¯
= 0.
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Several trade models are compatible with this specification. For example, consider an
economy with one final and non-tradeable good, denoted YT , which is produced employing
three perfectly tradeable intermediate goods, each intensive in one factor of production
and denoted YL, YK and YN . The production of the final good is YT = F (YL, YK , YN ),
where F is a quasi-concave constant return to scale production function (for example
YT = [(YK)
ρ + σ (YL)
ρ]
1−αN
ρ (YN )
αN ), while each of the intermediate inputs uses a sim-
ple linear technology, i.e., YK = K, YL = L, YN = N , where E = (K,L,N) is the
endowment of capital, land and labor, respectively. Under autarky, aggregate output is
y¯ (A) = F (K,L,N) and the income of a member of group i is yi (A) = Fi (K,L,N)
Ei
ni
,
where Fi (K,L,N) is the marginal product of input i evaluated at the endowment vector
E. Under free trade, aggregate output is y¯ (λ) =
∑
i
piEi, and the income of a mem-
ber of group i is yi (F ) =
piEi
ni
, where pi is the price of input Yi in the international
markets. Another alternative model of international trade, which emphasizes the role of
the terms of trade, is an economy with one final and non-tradeable good which is pro-
duced employing two perfectly tradeable intermediate goods, one land-intensive and the
other capital- and labor-intensive, i.e., YT = F (YL, YKN ), YL = L, and YKN = K
αN1−α.
Then, under autarky, yL (A) =
F1(L,KαN1−α)L
nL
, yK (A) =
αF2(L,KαN1−α)KαN1−α
nK
, yN (A) =
(1−α)F2(L,KαN1−α)KαN1−α
nN
, and y¯ (A) = F
(
L,KαN1−α
)
. Under free trade, yL (F ) =
pLL
nL
,
yK (F ) =
αKαN1−α
nK
, yN (F ) =
(1−α)KαN1−α
nN
, and y¯ (λ) = pLL+K
αN1−α, where pL denotes
the terms of trade (the relative price of the land-intensive input in terms of the capital-
and labor-intensive input). Note that, in this model, yK (F ) =
(1−α)nK
αnN
yN (F ) and, hence,
capitalists and workers want the same trade policy. Further variations of this model in-
clude the well-known Ricardo-Viner factor-specific model (for example if YT = F (YL, YK),
YK = K
αKN1−αKK , YL = L
αLN1−αLL ) or, in general, a Heckscher-Ohlin model with three
goods and three factors of production.
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Each group in society can either lose or win with different trade policies, depending
on the particular trade model that we have in mind. We say that group i is protectionist
(pro-free-trade) if and only if yi (A) > yi (F ) (yi (A) < yi (F )). We can even conceive
of cases in which all groups win or all groups lose with the opening of the economy, but
the political economy of trade policy in such cases is not very interesting; we can simple
ignore trade policy as a relevant policy variable. Hence, we focus on economies for which
protectionism is costly in the sense that y¯ (F ) > y¯ (A) and in which at least one group loses
with a change in trade policy. This does not mean that we completely ignore these other
cases. In fact, some of them have played an important role in the historical examples we
discuss in sections 3 and 4.
We impose some structure on income distribution and the effect that international trade
has on it.
Assumption 1: The elite groups have above-average incomes, while the non-elite pop-
ulace has below-average incomes, regardless of the type of trade policy that is in effect,
i.e., mini∈{K,L} yi (λ) > y¯ (λ) > yP (λ).
Note that assumption 1 not only says that the elite groups are richer than the general
population, but also means that international trade does not change this situation.
Trade policy and income taxation may seem to be two independent mechanisms of
income redistribution, but this is actually not the case, since trade policy influences income
distribution and, hence, affects the trade-off between redistribution and the cost of income
taxation. In order to see this interaction and the structure that we impose on it, we can
deduce what the policy implemented by group i would be if the government were wholly
controlled by group i. In such a context, group i would choose:
(τi, λi) = argmax
(τ,λ)
{(1− τ) yi (λ) + [τ − C (τ)] y¯ (λ)}
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Due to assumption 1, for an elite group it is always the case that yi (λ) > y¯ (λ). Therefore,
for i = K,L, τi = 0 and λi = argmaxλ yi (λ). That is, an elite group prefers no income
taxation and a trade policy that maximizes its gross income. Also due to assumption 1,
it is the case that, for the populace, yi (λ) < y¯ (λ). Then, the populace’s decision reduces
to the comparison of a pair of policies. Specifically, let τP (λ) be the income tax rate that
maximizes people’s utility when trade policy is λ; in other words, τP (λ) is the unique
solution of the following equation:
C ′ (τP (λ)) = 1− yP (λ)
y¯ (λ)
.32
Then, λP = argmaxλ vP (τP (λ) , λ) and τP = τP (λP ). Note that τP clearly depends on
how trade policy affects income distribution and particularly on how it affects the income
share of the populace (nP yP (λ) /y¯ (λ)). Due to this interdependence, it is possible that,
even if the populace is protectionist, it could prefer the combination of a free-trade policy
and the tax rate τP (F ) to a protectionist trade policy and τP (A). The following assumption
rules out such a situation, however.
Assumption 2: If the people are pro-free-trade, they prefer (τP (F ) , F ) to (τP (A) , A),
while if they are protectionist, they prefer (τP (A) , A) to (τP (F ) , F ). Formally,
yP (F ) > yP (A) =⇒ vP (τP (F ) , F ) > vP (τP (A) , A) ,
yP (A) > yP (F ) =⇒ vP (τP (A) , A) > vP (τP (F ) , F ) .
Assumption 2 simply says that income taxation is not enough to change people’s stance
on trade policy. The key question is, of course, how strong this assumption is. On
32The solution is unique because C′ (0) < 1 − yP
y¯
< C′ (1) and the second order condition always hold
since C is strictly convex.
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the one hand, when the populace is pro-free-trade, assumption 2 is, in fact, very mild.
In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish between two possible situations.
First, it may be the case that, although the populace’s gross income is higher under free
trade, people’s income share is in fact lower under free trade, i.e., yP (F ) > yP (A), but
(nP yP (F ) /y¯ (F )) < (nPyP (A) /y¯ (A)). Then, τP (F ) > τP (A), which implies that, under
free trade, the populace does not only have a higher gross income, but it also receives higher
transfers (net of taxes). Thus, it is always the case that vP (τP (F ) , F ) > vP (τP (A) , A).
Second, it may be the case that the populace’s gross income and income share are both
higher under free trade, i.e., yP (F ) > yP (A) and (nPyP (F ) /y¯ (F )) > (nP yP (A) /y¯ (A)).
Then τP (F ) < τP (A) and, therefore, (1− τP (F )) yP (F ) > (1− τP (A)) yP (A), which im-
plies that the only situation in which the populace prefers (τP (A) , A) to (τP (F ) , F ) is if
τP (A) is sufficiently higher than τP (F ) so that transfers under protectionism are much
higher than under free trade. This is very unlikely and, in fact, is impossible for some
specifications of the cost function C. On the other hand, when the populace is protection-
ist, it must be the case that (nPyP (A) /y¯ (A)) > (nPyP (F ) /y¯ (F )), which implies that
τP (F ) > τP (A). Then, assumption 2 is somewhat more robust, since it is always possible
to conceive of a cost function C that induces low enough costs of income taxation so that
the populace would rather prefer to have a higher tax rate levied on a bigger tax base under
free trade than to have a lower tax rate levied on a smaller tax base under protectionism.
Conversely, if the costs of income taxation are relatively high, then the opposite is true,
and the populace prefers (τP (A) , A) to (τP (F ) , F ). In the rest of this paper, we assume
that assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
The above discussion also explains what types of redistributions can be induced by
trade policy that are not possible under a redistribution scheme only based on income tax.
If there is no intra-elite conflict over trade policy (say, for instance, that both elite factions
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are protectionists and the populace is pro-free-trade), then trade policy allows the elite to
”transfer” income from the people to the elite (by closing the economy). It also gives the
people an extra opportunity to ”transfer” income from the elite (by opening the economy).
If there is intra-elite conflict -the setting we emphasizes through the paper, then trade
policy becomes a more interesting instrument, since it allows redistributions from one elite
faction to the other elite faction and to the people, and vice versa. This is something that
cannot be accomplished through income taxation and is a key feature that opens the door
to a number of very interesting political interactions. We hope that this discussion will
also give the reader a clearer perspective on the claim made in the introduction of this
paper to the effect that, although trade policy is relevant in and of itself, all that is needed
is a second policy dimension that can potentially divide the elites.
2.2.2 The Polity
The choice as to who makes these collective decisions and under what restrictions
depends on the distribution of political power in society. We assume that there are two
sources of political power: de jure power, which emanates from legal institutions, and
de facto power, which emanates from the ability to change legal institutions. Political
regimes allocate de jure political power to different groups in society. We consider two
alternative political regimes: dictatorship or autocracy and democracy. In a dictatorship,
the elites have de jure political power and, hence, the government maximizes the elites’
utility. However, dictatorships face a threat of revolution, which gives de facto political
power to the people. In a democracy, the populace has the de jure political power and,
hence, the government maximizes people’s utility. However, democracies face the threat
of a coup, which gives de facto political power to the elites. Revolutions and coups are
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costly events. A simple way of modeling this is to assume that a fraction µ (ϕ) of the gross
income of every group is destroyed in a revolution (coup).
In general, it is very difficult to maintain a revolt or a coup threat for a long time.
Perhaps this is because collective-action problems can be solved only in very special cir-
cumstances; or it might be the case that, with enough time, the legal authorities can always
mobilize the required resources to repress the insurgents. Thus, for whatever reason, the
de facto political power conferred by the threat of a revolution or a coup tends to be short-
lived. A simple way of modeling this is to assume that any concession obtained under
a revolt or a coup threat will be honored only to the extent of some positive probability.
Equivalently, we can say that political promises between the elite and the populace are only
partially credible. This probability can then be interpreted in several ways: for example,
as the likelihood that the revolt or the coup threat can be sustained in the future or as the
duration of the threat.33
In the following section, we begin studying a simple static coup game, while in section
4, we present a simple static model of democratization.34 In section 5 we build a fully
dynamic model of democratization and consolidation of democracy that integrates both
static models into the same framework.
2.3 A Static Model of a Coup
In this section we assume that the status quo is democracy, but that the elite has the
possibility of organizing a coup. The timing of events is as follows:
33In the dynamic model that we present in section 5, concessions under the threat of a revolt or a coup
are only partially credible because there are shocks to the cost of changing the political regime, and it may
be the case that these costs become prohibitive.
34These models are static, although there are sequential moves, and we use a game perfect equilibrium
as the solution concept, in the sense that they are played only once.
80
1. People’s Proposal: The people propose a trade policy λ ∈ {F,A} and an income
tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1].
2. Elite Bargaining: Landlords and industrialists assess the people’s proposal and
then choose to mount a coup or not. The coup costs a fraction ϕ ∈ (0, 1) of the
income of every group. If the elite decides to mount a coup, its members must
also bargaining over which elite faction will control the new dictatorship. In case of
disagreement the coup fails.
3. Implementation: If the there is a coup, the new dictatorship sets a policy. If there
is no coup, two things can happen. First, it may be the case that the populace is
forced to hold to what it originally promised (an event that occur with probability r).
Second, it may be the case that the populace has the opportunity to reset policy (an
event that occur with probability 1−r). In the latter situation, people can implement
a new trade policy λ ∈ {F,A} and a new income tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1].
The intuition behind this timing is the following. As in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006),
we model a coup as a game between the elites and the people and we assume that promises
are only partially credible. This is a simple way of capturing a more complex dynamic
game in which the coup threat is only temporary (perhaps due to the collective action
problem) and the people do not have any incentive to keep their promises in the future
once the threat of a coup has passed. The new issue that we introduce is a second dimension
of potential conflict: trade policy. In particular, although all members of the elite (both
landlords and industrialists) prefer the lowest income tax, they may disagree about trade
policy. In addition, the people may be more or less inclined to implement protectionist
policies, which means that democracy may be more costly for one elite group and more
attractive for another. A direct consequence of introducing a second policy dimension and
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two elite factions is that the coup must be the outcome of a bargaining between the elite
factions. Moreover, we just assume that in case of disagreement the coup fails.
We use backward induction to deduce the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the coup
game.
The implementation stage. In the implementation stage, the distribution of po-
litical power is completely determined, and therefore all that we need to do is to solve a
single decision problem. If there was no coup, then the people control government. Thus,
when the government has the opportunity to set a new policy, it implements the people’s
preferred policy, i.e., (τP , λP ), while, when the government does not have this option, it
simply implements the original promise, which we denote as (λD, τD). If the coup ush-
ers in a dictatorship that is controlled by the elite faction j, then the policy that will be
implemented is j’s preferred policy, i.e., (0, λj).
The elite bargaining stage. In principle, the two elite factions bargain over three
issues: they must decide if they are going to mount a coup or not and, if so, they must
decide what trade policy and what tax rate the new elite government will implement. The
elite factions do not, however, have conflicting interests in terms of the tax rate. If they
agree to mount a coup, then landlords and industrialists prefer to set τ = 0. Hence, the
only two potential sources of conflict are the coup itself and the trade policy that the
new dictatorship will implement. Thus, the elite has three options: no coup, a coup and
free trade, and a coup and protectionism. Alternatively we can say that the elite factions
bargain over three alternatives: no coup, a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled
by L, which implements (0, λL), and a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by
K, which implements (0, λK).
Suppose the people have promised (λD, τD) at the beginning of the game. If the
elite does not mount a coup, then the expected payoff for a member of group i is
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rvi (τD, λD) + (1− r) vi (τP , λP ) (with probability r the people must keep their promise,
while with probability (1− r) they can reset policy and they choose (λP , τP )). If the
elite mounts a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction j, the
expected payoff for a member of group i is (1− ϕ) vi (0, λj). Thus, we can identify four
possible regions:
1. Both dictatorships are acceptable for both elite factions. Formally:
(1− ϕ) vL (0, λK) > rvL (τD, λD) + (1− r) vL (τP , λP ) , (24)
and
(1− ϕ) vK (0, λL) > rvK (τD, λD) + (1− r) vK (τP , λP ) . (25)
Expression (24) simply says that landlords prefer a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship
controlled by industrialists rather than having a democracy, while expression (25) means
that industrialists prefer a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by landlords
rather than a democracy. In other words, for both elite factions, democracy is so bad that
they are willing to accept the worst possible dictatorship, i.e., a dictatorship controlled by
the other elite faction.
2. Only a dictatorship controlled by L is acceptable for both elite factions. Formally:
(1− ϕ) vL (0, λL) > rvL (τD, λD) + (1− r) vL (τP , λP ) ≥ (1− ϕ) vL (0, λK) , (26)
and
(1− ϕ) vK (0, λL) > rvK (τD, λD) + (1− r) vK (τP , λP ) . (27)
Expression (26) says that landlords prefer a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship
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controlled by the landlords rather than having a democracy, but they prefer a democracy
to a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by the industrialists. Expression (27)
means that industrialists prefer a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by the
landlords rather than having a democracy. Thus, landlords are willing to support a coup
only if they get complete control of the dictatorship.
3. Only a dictatorship controlled by K is acceptable for both elite factions. Formally:
(1− ϕ) vK (0, λK) > rvK (τD, λD) + (1− r) vK (τP , λP ) ≥ (1− ϕ) vK (0, λL) , (28)
and
(1− ϕ) vL (0, λK) > rvL (τD, λD) + (1− r) vL (τP , λP ) . (29)
This is just the mirror-image of the situation in region 2. Now, industrialists are willing
to mount a coup only if they get complete control of the dictatorship.
4. No dictatorship is acceptable to both elite faction at the same time. Formally:
(1− ϕ) vL (0, λL) ≤ rvL (τD, λD) + (1− r) vL (τP , λP ) , (30)
or
(1− ϕ) vK (0, λL) ≤ rvK (τD, λD) + (1− r) vK (τP , λP ) , (31)
and
(1− ϕ) vL (0, λK) ≤ rvL (τD, λD) + (1− r) vL (τP , λP ) , (32)
or
(1− ϕ) vK (0, λK) ≤ rvK (τD, λD) + (1− r) vK (τP , λP ) . (33)
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Expressions (30) and (31) say that at least one of the elite factions prefers democracy to
a coup that would give rise to a dictatorship controlled by the landlords, while expressions
(32) and (33) say that at least one of the elite factions prefers democracy to a coup that
would give rise to a dictatorship controlled by the industrialists.
The previous analysis covers the cases in which there is no intra-elite conflict (i.e.,
λL = λK), as well as the cases in which there is intra-elite conflict (i.e., λL 6= λK),
although, in the case of no intra-elite conflict, regions 2 and 3 disappear and the analysis
is much more simple.
Regions 1 to 4 describe the options open to the elite given the people’s proposal, but
the elite factions still need to select one of the options. It is easy to see that, in region 2,
the elite mounts a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by L, while, in region 3,
the elite mounts a coup that gives rise to dictatorship controlled by K . After all, in each
of these regions there is only one dictatorship that is preferred to democracy by both elite
factions. The elite’s decision in region 4 is also simple: the elite does not mount a coup.
The reason is that there is no possible agreement between the elite factions, since at least
one of the factions always prefer democracy to a coup. The real action occurs in region
1, since both dictatorships are acceptable for both elite factions.35 A simple solution is to
assume that the bargaining power of the elite faction L is χL ∈ [0, 1] and the outcome of
the bargaining process is:
max
j
{χLvL (0, λj) + (1− χL) vK (0, λj)} .
Under this assumption, we can easily solve the bargaining problem in region 1. If there
is no intra-elite conflict, regardless of the value of χL, the elite mounts a coup that gives
35This is not a real issue under no intra-elite conflict because both elite factions prefer the same trade
policy.
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rise to a dictatorship that implements (0, λE), where λE = λL = λK . On the other hand, if
there is intra-elite conflict, then the dictatorship is controlled by L and implements (0, λL),
when χL ≥ χ¯L, and it is controlled by K and implements (0, λK), when χL < χ¯L, where
χ¯L =
vK(0,λK)−vK(0,λL)
vK(0,λK)−vK(0,λL)+vL(0,λL)−vL(0,λK)
.
The people’s proposal stage. The last step in the backward induction procedure is
to determine the people’s decision at the beginning of the coup game. To do so, it helps
to define ϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj), i.e., the fraction of its income that the elite faction i is willing to
sacrifice in order to switch policy from (τ, λ) to (0, λj). Formally:
ϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) = 1− vi (τ, λ)
vi (0, λj)
.
It is also easier to distinguish between a case with no intra-elite conflict and one with
intra-elite conflict and study each case separately.
2.3.1 Coups and Trade Policy in the Absence of Intra-elite Conflict
As we have already seen, when there is no intra-elite conflict, regions 2 and 3 disap-
pear and we only have to consider regions 1 and 4. Technically speaking, when λL = λK ,
conditions (26) and (27) are mutually incompatible, which implies that region 1 is empty.
Similarly, when λL = λK , conditions (28) and (29) are mutually incompatible and, hence,
region 2 is also empty. Furthermore, when λL = λK , (30) is identical to (32) and (31)
is identical to (33), which greatly simplifies region 4. Intuitively, since both elite factions
prefer the same trade policy it doesn’t really matter which elite faction controls the dicta-
torship. The only relevant decision for the elite is whether to mount a coup that implements
(0, λE), where λE = λL = λK , or implicitly accept the partially credible people’s proposal.
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Suppose that the people propose their preferred policy, i.e., (λD, τD) = (τP , λP ). Then,
from (30) and (31) the elite does not mount a coup if and only if (1− ϕ) vL (0, λE) <
vL (τP , λP ) or (1− ϕ) vK (0, λE) < vK (τP , λP ), that is, whenever at least one of the elite
faction finds the coup too costly. Thus, if ϕ ≥ mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE), the people do not
need to make any concession in order to avert a coup. Under this condition, we say that
democracy is consolidated.
On the other hand, if this condition does not hold, then the people must offer some sort
of concession if they want to avert a coup. The people are always willing to promise to make
a concession, since the advent of a dictatorship would completely eliminate the possibilities
of redistribution through the income tax and transfer system and would pave the way for
the implementation of a harmful trade policy. Moreover, a coup has a very real cost in
terms of resources. Be this as it may, the people’s promises are only partially credible,
which means that even the most generous promise could not be enough to convince the
elite to refrain from mounting a coup. The most generous promise that the people can make
is (τD, λD) = (0, λE). Then, from (30) and (31) the elite does not mount a coup if and only
if (1− ϕ) vL (0, λE) < rvL (0, λE)+(1− r) vL (τP , λP ) or (1− ϕ) vK (0, λE) < rvK (0, λE)+
(1− r) vK (τP , λP ). Thus, if (1− r)mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE) ≤ ϕ < mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE), there
is no coup, but the people make some concession in order to avert one. Under this condition,
we say that democracy is semi-consolidated. Given that democracy can be defended, the
people choose to defend it in the cheapest possible way. Thus, they promise (τD, λD) =
argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯C(ϕ,λE) vP (τ, λ), where:
S¯C (ϕ, λE) =
 (τ, λ) ∈ S : there is i ∈ {L,K} such thatϕ ≥ rϕ¯i (τ, λ, λE) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE)
 .
Intuitively, from all the possible promises that would give one elite faction enough expected
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utility to make it prefer democracy to a coup (formally, the set S¯ (ϕ, λE)), the one that
will maximize the people’s utility in the event that they are forced to keep their promise
will be chosen. Furthermore, note that the fundamental trade-off that the people face is
between a relatively high income tax rate and their preferred trade policy versus a lower
income tax rate and the elite’s preferred trade policy.
Finally, if ϕ < (1− r)mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE), there is nothing that the people can do in
order to avert a coup. In this case, we say that democracy is unconsolidated.
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2.1: Consider a society with no intra-elite conflict over trade policy, i.e.,
λL = λK = λE 6= λP . Let ϕ¯i (λj , τ, λ) = 1 − vi(τ,λ)vi(0,λj) be the fraction of its income that the
elite faction i is willing to sacrifice in order to switch policy from (τ, λ) to (0, λj). Then,
the coup game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium:
1. If ϕ ≥ mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE), then we are in a fully consolidated democracy and the
policy that is implemented is (τP , λP ).
2. If (1− r)mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE) ≤ ϕ < mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE), then we are in a
semi-consolidated democracy and the policy that is implemented is (τD, λD) =
argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯C(ϕ,λE) vP (τ, λ) with probability r and (τP , λP ) with probability (1− r),
where:
S¯C (ϕ, λE) =
 (τ, λ) ∈ S : there is i ∈ {L,K} such thatϕ ≥ rϕ¯i (τ, λ, λE) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE)
 .
3. If ϕ < (1− r)mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE), then the elite mount a coup, we are in an uncon-
solidated democracy and the policy that is implemented is (0, λE).
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The interpretation of Proposition 2.1 is simple. If, for at least one elite factions, the
fraction of its income that it must give up in order to mount a coup is higher than the
fraction of its income that it is willing to sacrifice in order to switch policy from (τP , λP )
to (0, λE), then democracy is fully consolidated. If this is not the case, but if, for at least
one of the elite factions the fraction of its income that it must give up in order to mount
a coup is greater than the the fraction of its income that it is willing to sacrifice in order
to switch policy from (0, λE) with probability r and (τP , λP ) with probability (1− r) to
(0, λE), then we are in the presence of a semi-consolidated democracy. Finally, if, for both
elite factions, the fractions of their income that they must give up in order to mount a
coup are higher than the fractions of their income that they are willing to sacrifice in order
to switch policy from (0, λE) with probability r and (τP , λP ) with probability (1− r) to
(0, λE), then there is a coup and democracy is unconsolidated.
Figure 2.1 shows a numerical example that illustrates proposition 1, using the following
specification: YT = [(YK)
ρ + (YL)
ρ]
1−αN
ρ (YN )
αN , αN = 0.5, ρ = 1, K = 1.5, L = 1.5,
N = 1, nL = nK = 0.10, nN = 80, C (τ) =
τ1+η
1+η , with η = 0.75.
Please see Figure 2.1: Coups and Trade Policy in the Absence of Intra-elite Conflict
2.3.2 Coups and Trade Policy in the Presence of Intra-elite Conflict
When there is intra-elite conflict, the people’s decision at the beginning of the game is
more complicated.
Suppose that the people promise their preferred policy, i.e., (τD, λD) = (τP , λP ). Then,
from (30)-(33), the elite does not mount a coup if and only if (1− ϕ) vL (0, λL) ≤ vL (τP , λP )
or (1− ϕ) vK (0, λL) < vK (τP , λP ) (that is, whenever at least one of the elite fac-
tions finds the coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by L too costly) and
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(1− ϕ) vL (0, λK) < vL (τP , λP ) or (1− ϕ) vK (0, λK) < vK (τP , λP ) (that is, whenever
at least one of the elite factions finds the coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled
by K too costly). The key difference between this and a case with no intra-elite conflict
is that now a dictatorship controlled by L is not the same as one controlled by K, and
the people’s promise must be good enough to avert both types of dictatorships. Thus, if
ϕ ≥ mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λL) and ϕ ≥ mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λK), then the people does not need to
make any concession in order to avert a coup, and democracy is consolidated. Equivalently,
if:
ϕ ≥ max
j
min
i
ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ,
democracy is consolidated.
If this condition does not hold, then democracy cannot be consolidated and the
people must evaluate the option of promising some concessions. Suppose that the
populace promises (τD, λD) = (0, λ). Then, from (30)-(33), this promise is enough
to avert a coup if and only if (1− ϕ) vL (0, λL) < rvL (0, λ) + (1− r) vL (τP , λP ) or
(1− ϕ) vK (0, λL) < rvK (0, λ) + (1− r) vK (τP , λP ) (that is, whenever at least one of
the elite factions finds that a coup that would give rise to a dictatorship controlled
by L would be too costly) and (1− ϕ) vL (0, λK) < rvL (0, λ) + (1− r) vL (τP , λP ) or
(1− ϕ) vK (0, λK) < rvK (0, λ) + (1− r) vK (τP , λP ) (that is, whenever at least one of
the elite factions finds that a coup that would give rise to a dictatorship controlled by
K would be too costly). Thus, if ϕ ≥ mini rϕ¯i (0, λ, λL) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λL) and
ϕ ≥ mini rϕ¯i (0, λ, λK) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λK), then the people can avert a coup by
promising (0, λ). Therefore, the people can always stop a coup if and only if
ϕ ≥ min
λ
max
λj
min
i
rϕ¯i (0, λ, λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) .
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But, are the people willing to do so?
If the people can stop a coup by promising (τD, λD) = (0, λP ), then the answer
is ”yes” and the reason is straightforward. In the event of a coup, the best scenario
for the people is a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction with λj = λP . But in
such scenario the people get (1− ϕ) vP (0, λP ), while, if they promise (0, λP ), they get
vP (0, λP ) with probability r and vP (τP , λP ) with probability (1− r), which clearly dom-
inates (1− ϕ) vP (0, λP ). Thus, if ϕ ≥ mini rϕ¯i (0, λP , λL) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λL) and
ϕ ≥ mini rϕ¯i (0, λP , λK) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λK), then there is no coup, but the people
must make some sort of concession. Equivalently, if:
max
λj
min
i
rϕ¯i (0, λP , λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) < ϕ < max
j
min
i
ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ,
then democracy is semi-consolidated. Given that the people can and are willing to defend
the democracy, they choose to defend it in the cheapest possible way. Thus, they promise
(τD, λD) = argmax(τ,λ)∈∩j S¯(ϕ,λj) vP (τ, λ), where:
S¯C (ϕ, λj) =
 (τ, λ) ∈ S : there is i ∈ {L,K} such thatϕ ≥ rϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)
 .
If the people cannot avert a coup by promising (τD, λD) = (0, λP ), but they can do so
by promising (τD, λD) = (0, λ), they may not be willing to stop a coup. In order to see this,
assume that the people can induce a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction with λj =
λP . Then, if the people defend democracy, they get vP (τD, λD) with probability r, where
λD 6= λP and vP (τP , λP ) with probability (1− r), while, if they don not defend democracy,
they get (1− ϕ) vP (0, λP ). Formally, since λD 6= λP , it is possible that (1− ϕ) vP (0, λP ) >
rvP (τD, λD)+ (1− r) vP (τP , λP ). Intuitively, the people may prefer a coup that gives rise
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to a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction that has the same trade policy preference
rather than defend democracy by promising a harmful trade policy. Thus, if:
min
λ
max
λj
min
i
rϕ¯i (0, λ, λj)+(1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ≤ ϕ < max
λj
min
i
rϕ¯i (0, λP , λj)+(1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ,
we are either in a semi-consolidated democracy or there is a coup that gives rise to a
dictatorship controlled by the elite faction with λj = λP .
Finally, if:
ϕ < min
λ
max
j
min
i
rϕ¯i (0, λ, λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ,
then there is nothing that the people can do in order to stop a coup. However, this does
not mean that the people are completely powerless, since they can try to influence the
type of dictatorship that emerges after the coup. Here it becomes necessary to distinguish
between two possible situations.
First, assume that the elite faction that has the same trade policy preferences as the
people is also the one with more bargaining power, i.e., λL = λP 6= λK and χL ≥ χ¯L
or λK = λP 6= λL and χL < χ¯L. In that case, a coup will occur that gives rise to a
dictatorship controlled by the powerful elite faction. The proof is simple. The people
cannot avert a coup but, if they promise to embrace a very populist policy, say τD = 1,
both elite factions will prefer a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by the
powerful elite faction over a democracy. Thus, the people can always induce a coup that
gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction with λj = λP .
Second, assume that the elite faction that has the same trade policy preference as the
people is the less powerful elite faction, i.e., λL 6= λK = λP and χL ≥ χ¯L or λK 6= λL =
λP and χL < χ¯L. In this case, if both elite factions prefer a dictatorship controlled by
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the more powerful elite faction over a democracy, then a coup will occur that gives rise
to a dictatorship controlled by the more powerful elite faction. Formally, when λL 6=
λK = λP and χL ≥ χ¯L, from (24)-(27), a coup occurs that gives rise to a dictatorship
controlled by L if and only if (1− ϕ) vK (0, λL) > rvK (τD, λD) + (1− r) vK (τP , λP ) and
(1− ϕ) vL (0, λL) > rvL (τD, λD)+(1− r) vL (τP , λP ). Thus, if these inequalities hold even
when (τD, λD) = (0, λ), then the people cannot avert a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship
controlled by L. Equivalently, if:
ϕ < min
i,λ
rϕ¯i (0, λ, λL) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λL)
then a coup occurs that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by L, while, if ϕ ≥
mini,λ rϕ¯i (0, λ, λL) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λL), the people can always induce a coup that
gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by K. Similarly, when λK 6= λL = λP and χL < χ¯L,
from (24), (25), (28) and (29), a coup will occur that gives rise to a dictatorship con-
trolled by K if and only if (1− ϕ) vL (0, λK) > rvL (τD, λD) + (1− r) vL (τP , λP ) and
(1− ϕ) vK (0, λK) > rvK (τD, λD) + (1− r) vK (τP , λP ). Thus, if these inequalities hold
even when (τD, λD) = (0, λ), then the people cannot avert a coup that gives rise to a
dictatorship controlled by K. Equivalently, if:
ϕ < min
i,λ
rϕ¯i (0, λ, λK) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λK) ,
then a coup occurs that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by K, while if ϕ ≥
mini,λ rϕ¯i (0, λ, λK) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λK), the people can always induce a coup that
gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by L.
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2.2: Consider a society with intra-elite conflict over trade policy, i.e.,
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λL 6= λK = λP or λK 6= λL = λP . Let ϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) = 1 − vi(τ,λ)vi(0,λj) be the fraction of
its income that the elite faction i is willing to sacrifice in order to switch policy from
(τ, λ) to (0, λj). Then, the coup game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium. In this
equilibrium:
1. If ϕ ≥ maxλj mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), then we are in a fully consolidated democracy and
the policy that is implemented is (τP , λP ).
2. If maxλj mini rϕ¯i (0, λP , λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ≤ ϕ <
maxλj mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), then we are in a semi-consolidated democracy, and
the policy that is implemented is (τD, λD) = argmax(τ,λ)∈∩j S¯(ϕ,λj) vP (τ, λ) with
probability r and (τP , λP ) with probability (1− r), where:
S¯ (ϕ, λj) =
 (τ, λ) ∈ S : there is i ∈ {L,K} such thatϕ ≥ rϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)
 .
3. If minλmaxλj mini rϕ¯i (0, λ, λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ≤ ϕ <
maxλj mini rϕ¯i (0, λP , λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), then we are either in a semi-
consolidated democracy or in an unconsolidated democracy. In the first case,
the policy that is implemented is (τD, λD) = argmax(τ,λ)∈∩j S¯(ϕ,λj) vP (τ, λ) with
probability r and (τP , λP ) with probability (1− r). In the second case, a coup occurs
that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction with λj = λP , and the
policy that is implemented is (0, λP ).
4. If ϕ < minλmaxλj mini rϕ¯i (0, λ, λj)+ (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), then a coup occurs and
we are in an unconsolidated democracy.
(a) If the elite faction with λj = λP is the more powerful one,
36 then the dictatorship
36That is χL ≥ χ¯L when λP = λL 6= λK or χL < χ¯L, when λP = λK 6= λL.
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is controlled by the more powerful elite, and the policy that is implemented is
(0, λP ).
(b) If the elite faction with λj 6= λP is the more powerful one,37 then, when ϕ <
mini,λ rϕ¯i (0, λ, λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), the dictatorship is controlled by the
more powerful elite and the policy that is implemented is (0, λj); while, when
ϕ ≥ mini,λ rϕ¯i (0, λ, λj)+(1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), the dictatorship is controlled by
the less powerful elite and the policy that is implemented is (0, λP ).
Figure 2.2 shows a numerical example that illustrates Proposition 2.2, using the fol-
lowing specification: YT = [(YK)
ρ + σ (YL)
ρ]
1−αN
ρ (YN )
αN , αN = 0.35, σ = 1, ρ = 0.35,
K = 0.85, L = 1.75, H = 1, N = 1, γ = 0.30, nL = nK = 0.1, nN = 80, C (τ) =
τ1+η
1+η with
η = 0.75 and χL ≥ χ¯L.
Please see Figure 2.2: Coups and Trade Policy in the Presence of Intra-elite Conflict
2.3.3 Argentina in the Twentieth Century
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina’s factor endowment resembled that
of a specialized natural-resource-rich economy. Both the elite and the people supported free
trade. However, during the inter-war period, trade opportunities became scarce and the
terms of trade worsened, which triggered an industrialization process that then accelerated
with the Great Depression during the 1930s and the Second World War. As a result,
Argentina embarked on the second half of the twentieth century with a very different
economic configuration. In addition, once workers had voted on a large scale for the first
37That is χL ≥ χ¯L when λP = λK 6= λL or χL < χ¯L, when λP = λL 6= λK .
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time, in 1946, an urban-rural cleavage developed which lasted until the dictatorship of 1976.
This new political equilibrium took the economy to the brink of autarky. Democracy was
not consolidated, and a series of coups and democratizations took place during this period.
However, none of the dictatorships that ruled the country until the coup of 1976, which
deposed a highly populist government, were headed by the agricultural free-trade elite, and
none of them opened up the economy to any significant degree. By contrast, the military
government that took power in 1976 was primarily controlled by the agricultural elite and
brought the economy back from the edge of autarky.
Argentina integrated its economy into world markets in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century as an exporter of rural products. Until the 1930s, the country had a
specialized economy with very little industrial development, and almost all of the domestic
demand for manufactures was met with imports. As the country grew, the service sector in
the major cities, particularly Buenos Aires, developed rapidly. The State invested heavily
in the infrastructure that was required in order to export rural products, such as railroads
and harbors, and, later, also in public education (see Galiani et al., 2008). Thousands of
immigrants arrived in the country during this period, particularly from Spain and Italy.
Although the country was formally a democracy with a constitution and republican institu-
tions, the rural elite played a predominant role in government. Democratization pressures
came almost exclusively from the urban middle class. In fact, in 1914 a new electoral law
was passed that has been interpreted as an extension of the franchise to the middle class.
Nevertheless, trade policy was never a crucial political issue, and the economy remained
under a free-trade regime throughout the period in question (see Galiani and Somaini,
2010).
The Great Depression of the 1930s is generally considered to mark the beginning of
the import-substitution process in Argentina. The collapse of commodity prices hit the
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country’s economy very hard, since it was so heavily dependent upon exports of agricultural
products. In economic and political terms, the 1930s were a transitional period (see Galiani
and Somaini, 2010). On the one hand, the rural elite retained most of the political power
and tried to use it to mitigate the effects of the change in the terms of trade. On the other
hand, two new urban groups were emerging: industrial capitalists and industrial workers.
Thus, the society was transitioning away from a specialized economy mainly controlled by
members of a rural elite (who were faced with a middle class which demanded political
participation and some redistribution, but which did not represent a threat to the country’s
integration into world markets) and toward a much more complex society with two elite
factions: the traditional rural elite and the new industrial elite (in conjunction with a large
number of protectionist industrial workers, who could easily become a majority in a free
election).
The new economic configuration affected almost all the economic and political institu-
tions of the country. In fact, the 1940s were years of direct industrial promotion initiatives,
and the State played the leading role in the country’s industrial development. First, shortly
before Pero´n assumed power in June 1946, the government created the Argentine Institute
for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI). This institution held a monopoly over the country’s
foreign trade. In its early years, it was clearly anti-agriculture, as it withheld a percentage
of the high prices that agricultural products were bringing in the world market after the
end of the war. Together with this, a package of what was by then typical protectionist
measures was implemented: import tariffs were raised, the multiple exchange-rate system
was maintained and a scheme of import permits was created in order to manage the flow of
foreign currency. Second, an interventionist State became an active agent in the economy
as a result of the wave of nationalizations that the country witnessed in the early Peronist
years.
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After the Peronist experience, it was clear to all concerned that democracy meant
protectionism and populism; thus, the traditional rural elite had a huge incentive to mount
a coup, while the new industrial elite had mixed incentives in that regard. Two elements
completed the scene. First, the effervescence of subsidies, industrial promotion efforts
and ambitious social programs routinely ran up against a major problem, namely, the
appearance of a large deficit on the balance of payments (Diaz Alejandro, 1970). Second,
the military was no longer a united force that was obedient to the traditional rural elite.
On the contrary, the development of major industrial sectors was now in the armed forces’
sphere of influence, when not under their direct control. The coup of 1955 reflected this
new and complex situation. Although the coup was welcomed by the traditional rural
elite and a majority of the middle class, and although the new government implemented
transitional policies to promote agricultural exports, the import-substitution policies were
never abandoned. In terms of our model (proposition 2), the industrialists supported the
coup because they could control the dictatorship and, hence, keep industrial protection
mechanisms in place.38
The exclusion of the Peronist party, and hence of industrial workers, from the political
arena after 1955 put a great deal of pressure on the government, particularly since, by then,
industrial workers were well-organized in unions and worshiped Pero´n as their national
leader. Thus, political tensions persisted. In principle, the elites were willing to accept
democracy, but only if populist policies were rescinded. Industrial workers preferred this
type of democracy to a dictatorship, but they could not credibly pledge to not vote for Pero´n
if free elections were allowed. The ”solution” was a democratic regime in combination with
38Symbolically, one of the most famous slogans used by the new government to describe this new pol-
icy was ”Peronism without Pero´n”, which essentially meant industrialization through import substitution
without the populist component of the Peronist policies. In fact, most of the measures that promoted agri-
cultural exports (for example, a devaluation) were thought to alleviate the balance-of-payments constraint;
what is more, most of the burden of these measures fell on urban workers rather than on the industrialist
elite.
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the proscription of the Peronist party. Under the proscription scheme, Arturo Frondizi was
elected President in 1958 with the support of industrial workers and part of the middle class.
Fear of a balance-of-payments crisis paved the way for the ”developmentalist” strategy
originally envisioned by Pero´n in 1952-1955 and carried out by Frondizi between 1958
and 1962. Under this strategy, the basic inputs sectors, namely, the metallurgical and oil
industries, were developed as a way of overcoming the chronic deficit in the balance of
payments.39 After a few years, a new item appeared on the economic policy agenda: the
local-market solution for industry was increasingly seen as inefficient, and the idea of an
export industry was gaining support among the country’s authorities. A military coup
overthrew a democratic government in 1966, but economic policy did not change radically.
In the early 1970s, the limitations of the proscription scheme as a permanent solution
became increasingly clear. First, the proscription was apparently not enough to convince
the elite to refrain from mounting coups, and it did not completely avert populist policies
either. In fact, all the democratic governments after 1955 somehow met their demise when
they reached the point where they did not have sufficient maneuvering room to simultane-
ously satisfy the opposing demands of unionized industrial workers and the armed forces
(read ”the elites” ). Second, some industrial workers, although not the traditional Peronist
unions, and part of the middle class began to radicalize their position and to move toward
socialism. In this context, the proscription scheme was abandoned and the democratic
elections of 1973 resulted in the formation of a new Peronist government, which then pro-
ceeded to carry out an extreme version of the previous developmentalist strategy. However,
the possibilities of growth under import substitution had, by then, been exhausted. The
country rapidly slid into chaos: in 1975, in the midst of a social, political and economic cri-
sis that would trigger the bloodiest military coup in Argentina’s history the following year,
39In addition, the automotive industry (which was not particularly ”heavy” but nonetheless quite in tune
with growing middle-class demands) was actively promoted.
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the government’s fiscal deficit amounted to almost 15% of GDP. The military government
that took power in March 1976 very rapidly made it clear that the import-substitution
strategy was no longer part of the government’s agenda. This time, the authorities opted
for a policy of open trade. Industrial capitalists accepted this policy because the alterna-
tive was, at best, a highly populist democracy, if not an outright changeover to socialism.
Propositions 5 and 6 capture this change. Note, in particular, that proposition 6 implies
that an increase in populism makes a coup controlled by the pro-free-trade rural elite more
likely.
Summing up, in terms of our model: in the second half of the twentieth century,
Argentina appears to have been a particularly clear example of a case in which intra-elite
conflict (the pro-free-trade landlords and the protectionist industrialists) coexisted with a
protectionist populace. In fact, as O’Donnell (1977) pointed out, the oscillations in the
political regime resulted from shifting alliances between social classes. When industrialists
were allied with the working class, democracy prevailed, as did a highly protectionist trade
policy and redistributive pressures that were curbed by the proscription of the Peronist
party. Two destabilizing forces appeared in this context. First, as soon as economic
activity gained strength, a balance-of-payments problem emerged as industrial imports
grew and agricultural exports remained stagnant. Second, industrial workers demanded
more redistribution and the elimination of the proscription of the Peronist party. In that
context, industrialists allied themselves with the landlords in order to force a coup and
a devaluation of the currency, which basically raised the real revenues of both of these
sectors while depressing workers’ real wages. After this economic slump came renewed
growth, and, under those circumstances, the industrialists again allied themselves with
the working class, particularly when the regime was threatened with strikes, riots and
demonstrations that seriously disrupted the order of the industrial workforce. And then
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the cycle began again. Viewed from this perspective, it is understandable why, between
1945 and 1975, Argentina continuously switched back and forth from one political regime
to the next, but nonetheless invariably maintained its import-substitution industrialization
policy as its core development strategy. The radicalization of popular demands in the early
1970s paved the way for the breakdown of the proscription solution, which ultimately led to
the 1976 coup and the opening of the economy. As predicted by proposition 2, industrialists
supported this policy because the alternative was, at best, a highly populist democracy, if
not an outright changeover to socialism.
2.4 A Static Model of Democratization
In this section we assume that the status quo is a dictatorship, but that the populace
has the choice of organizing a revolution. The timing of events is as follows:
1. Elite Bargaining: Landlords and industrialist bargaining over which elite faction
controls the elite government. The elite faction in control gains the right to offer
a proposal to the people and reset the policy in the implementation stage, if such
option is available. The set of possible offers includes democratization.
2. People’s revolt decision: The populace assesses the elite’s proposal and decides
to mount a revolution. If the populace organizes a revolution, all factor endowments
are expropriated and redistributed evenly among the people, and the economy moves
into autarky. The revolution costs a fraction µ ∈ [0, 1] of aggregate income, which
includes the cost of organizing the revolution as well as the long-standing reduction
in economic efficiency caused by the elimination of private property.
3. Implementation: If the elite offers to democratize the country and the populace
does not organize a revolt, then the people take power and the new democratic
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government sets the policy. If the elite makes any other offer and the people do not
organize a revolution, then the elite stays in power. The elite faction that controls
the government might have the opportunity to reset policy, an event that occurs with
probability q, or it might be forced to keep its original promise, an event that occurs
with probability (1− q).
We use backward induction to deduce the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the democ-
ratization game.
The implementation stage. The implementation stage is relatively simple. First,
suppose that the people mount a revolt. Then, each elite faction gets zero utility
and the people get (1−µ)y¯(A)nP . Second, suppose that the elite offers to democratize
the country and the people don not mount a revolt. Then, the people implement
λP = argmaxλ vP (τP (λ) , λ) and τP = τP (λP ). Finally, if the elite stays in power and the
elite government is controlled by the elite faction j, with probability q, the policy cannot be
reset and the elite government must keep its promise, but with probability (1− q) the policy
can be reset and the elite government will implement τE = 0 and λE = argmaxλ vj (0, λ).
People’s revolt decision. The revolt invariably offers (1−µ)y¯(A)nP to the people. How-
ever, the people’s expected utility, in the event that they do not revolt, will depend on
what the elite is offering. First, suppose that the elite offers to democratize the country.
Then, if the people don not mount a revolt, they will obtain vP (τP , λP ). Thus, when the
elite offers to bring in a democracy, there is a revolt if and only if (1−µ)y¯(A)nP > vP (τP , λP ).
Second, suppose that the elite that controls the dictatorship is j and it promise (τ, λ).
Then, if the people don not mount a revolt, they obtain qvP (τ, λ) + (1− q) vP (0, λj).
Thus, when the elite in charge is j and it promise (τ, λ), there is a revolt if and only if
(1−µ)y¯(A)
nP
> qvP (τ, λ) + (1− q) vP (0, λj).
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The elite bargaining stage. We can identify four possible regions in the elite bar-
gaining stage.
1. There is no way of stopping the revolt. Formally:
(1− µ) y¯ (A)
nP
> vP (τP , λP ) . (34)
Expression (34) simply says that the people prefer a revolution to democracy. Since the
people always prefer democracy to any dictatorship, no matter what concession is offered
by the elite (vP (τP , λP ) > qvP (τ, λ) + (1− q) vP (0, λj) for all (τ, λ) and for all λj), this
expression implies that the elite cannot stop a revolution.
2. Only democratization stop the revolt. Formally:
qvP (τP , λP ) + (1− q) vP (0, λP ) < (1− µ) y¯ (A)
nP
≤ vP (τP , λP ) . (35)
Expression (35) means that democratization is enough to stop a revolution ( (1−µ)y¯(A)nP ≤
vP (τP , λP )), but there is no other way to stop it. In particular, not even a dictatorship
controlled by the elite faction with λj = λP plus the promise (τP , λP ) is enough to avert a
revolt (qvP (τP , λP ) + (1− q) vP (0, λP ) < (1−µ)y¯(A)nP ).
3. Only an elite government controlled by the elite faction with λj = λP can stop the
revolt. Formally:
qvP (τP , λP )+(1− q) min
λ∈{λL,λK}
vP (0, λ) <
(1− µ) y¯ (A)
nP
≤ qvP (τP , λP )+(1− q) vP (0, λP ) .
(36)
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Expression (36) says that a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction with λj = λP
can stop a revolt, provided that it is backed up by the right type of promise ( (1−µ)y¯(A)nP ≤
qvP (τP , λP ) + (1− q) vP (0, λP )), but a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction with
λj 6= λP cannot (qvP (τP , λP ) + (1− q)minλ∈{λL,λK} vP (0, λ) < (1−µ)y¯(A)nP ).
4. Both elite governments can stop the revolt. Formally:
(1− µ) y¯ (A)
nP
≤ qvP (τP , λP ) + (1− q) min
λ∈{λL,λK}
vP (0, λ) , (37)
Expression (37) means that even a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction with
λj 6= λP can stop a revolt if it is backed up by the right type of promise.
In regions 1, 2 and 3, the elite factions do not really have many alternatives that
they can bring into the negotiations. In region 1 there will be a revolution regardless of
the elite proposal; in region 2, both elite factions agree that democratization is the only
available alternative to a revolt; and in region 3 only one of the elite faction can avoid
democratization. This is not the case in region 4, in which both elite factions can control
the dictatorship and avert a revolt. Thus, in this region, the elite factions must bargaining
over which faction will have the right to propose a policy and reset policy in the event
that the opportunity arises. We assume that the bargaining power of the elite faction L is
χL ∈ [0, 1] and the outcome of the bargaining process is given by:
max
j
χLE [vL (j)] + (1− χL)E [vK (j)] ,
where E [vi (j)] is the expected utility of elite faction i when elite faction j controls the
dictatorship.
2.4.1 Democratization and Trade Policy in the Absence of Intra-elite Conflict
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When there is no intra-elite conflict, region 3 disappears, since both elite factions prefer
the same trade policy, i.e. λL = λK . Thus, (34), (35), and (37) characterize the regions
in which there is a revolution, there is democratization, and the elite stays in power,
respectively. Formally, define µ¯ (τ, λ) to be the proportion of aggregate income that the
people are willing to sacrifice to expropriate the elite instead of accepting (τ, λ), i.e.:
µ¯ (τ, λ) = 1− nP vP (τ, λ)
y¯ (A)
.
Then, from (34), if µ < µ¯ (τP , λP ), then there is a revolution; from (35), if µ¯ (τP , λP ) ≤
µ < qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λE), then there is democratization; and from (37), if µ ≥
qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λE), then the elite stays in power.
In order to complete a fully characterization of the sub-game perfect equilibrium of
the democratization game, we need only to determine which elite faction controls the
dictatorship when the elite stays in power and the optimal concession that this faction
will promise to make in order to avert the revolt. If the elite has the chance to reset
the policy, regardless of which elite faction has the control of the dictatorship, the policy
implemented will be (0, λE). Thus, the only relevant issue is what promise the elite will
offer. The set of promises that stop a revolt is given by all the (τ, λ) ∈ S such that
qvP (τ, λ) + (1− q) vP (0, λE) ≥ (1−µ)y¯(A)nP . Formally:
S¯ (µ, λE) = {(τ, λ) ∈ S : µ ≥ qµ¯ (τ, λ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λE)} .
Then, the selected policy will be the one that maximizes χLvL (τ, λ) + (1− χL) vK (τ, λ)
subject to (τ, λ) ∈ S¯ (µ, λE). Equivalently, if the elite faction j is in control, it will pick
(τ (j) , λ (j)) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯(µ,λE) vj (τ, λ). Then, the selected policy will be the one
favored by L if and only if the bargaining power of L is such that χLvL (τ (L) , λ (L)) +
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(1− χL) vK (τ (L) , λ (L)) is higher than χLvL (τ (K) , λ (K)) + (1− χL) vK (τ (K) , λ (H)).
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2.3: Consider a society with no intra-elite conflict, i.e., λE = λL =
λK 6= λP . Let µ¯ (τ, λ) = 1 − nP vP (τ,λ)y¯(A) be the proportion of aggregate income that the
people are willing to sacrifice to expropriate the elite instead of accepting (τ, λ). Then, the
democratization game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium:
1. If µ < µ¯ (τP , λP ), then there is a revolution.
2. If µ¯ (τP , λP ) ≤ µ < qµ¯ (τP , λP )+(1− q) µ¯ (0, λE), then there is democratization, and
the policy that is implemented is (τP , λP ).
3. If µ ≥ qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λE), then the elite stays in power but, possibly,
makes concessions.
(a) If the elite faction j controls the dictatorship, then the policy that is implemented
is (τ (j) , λ (j)) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯(µ,λE) vj (τ, λ) with probability q and (0, λE)
with probability (1− q), where:
S¯ (µ, λE) = {(τ, λ) ∈ S : µ ≥ qµ¯ (τ, λ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λE)} .
(b) The elite faction L controls the dictatorship if and only if χL ≥ χ¯L (µ), where:
χ¯L (µ) =
vK (τ (K) , λ (K))− vK (τ (L) , λ (L))
vL (τ (L) , λ (L))− vL (τ (K) , λ (K)) + vK (τ (K) , λ (K))− vK (τ (L) , λ (L)) .
Figure 2.3 shows a numerical example that illustrates Proposition 2.3, using the follow-
ing specification: YT = [(YK)
ρ + σ (YL)
ρ]
1−αN
ρ (YN )
αN , αN = 0.5, σ = 1, ρ = 1, K = 1.75,
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L = 1.75, N = 1, nL = nK = 0.1, nN = 0.8, C (τ) =
τ1+η
1+η with η = 0.75, and χL ≥ χ¯L (µ)
for all µ.
Please see Figure 2.3: Democratization and Trade Policy in the Absence of Intra-elite
Conflict
2.4.2 Democratization and Trade Policy in the Presence of Intra-elite Conflict
Now we focus on the case of intra-elite conflict. Here again, (34) and (35) identify the
regions in which there is a revolution and democratization, respectively.
From (36), if qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λP ) ≤ µ < qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q)maxλ µ¯ (0, λ),
then only an elite government controlled by the elite faction with λj = λP can stop the
revolt. Thus, in this region, the elite factions agree that the faction with λj = λP must
take control of the dictatorship and next this faction promises to institute a policy that
maximizes its utility from the set of promises that stop a revolt. Formally, if the faction
with λj = λP is j, it selects (τ (j) , λ (j)) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯(µ,λj) vj (τ, λ), where:
S¯ (µ, λj) = {(τ, λ) ∈ S : µ ≥ qµ¯ (τ, λ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λj)} .
Moreover, since vj (τ, λj) ≥ vj (τ, λ) and qµ¯ (τ, λ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λj) ≥ qµ¯ (τ, λj) +
(1− q) µ¯ (0, λj), it must be the case that λ (j) = λj = λP . Thus, j selects (τ (j) , λj).
From (37), if µ ≥ qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q)maxλ µ¯ (0, λ), then either elite governments
can stop a revolt. Thus, in this region, the elite factions bargain over which faction will
control the dictatorship. Assume that they agree that the elite faction j will be in con-
trol. Then, this faction will promise to institute (τ (j) , λ (j)), which will only be imple-
mented if j is forced to keep its promise, while if j can reset policy, it will implement
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(0, λj). Therefore, the expected utility of elite faction i when the elite faction j is in
control is E [vi (j)] = qvi (τ (j) , λ (j)) + (1− q) vi (0, λj). Thus, L can impose its will if
and only if χLE [vL (L)] + (1− χL)E [vK (L)] ≥ χLE [vL (K)] + (1− χL)E [vK (K)], i.e.,
χL ≥ χ¯L (µ, q) = E[vK(K)]−E[vK(L)]E[vL(L)]−E[vL(K)]+E[vK(K)]−E[vK(L)] .
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2.4: Consider a society with intra-elite conflict, i.e., λP = λL 6= λK
or λP = λK 6= λL. Let µ¯ (τ, λ) = 1 − nP vP (τ,λ)y¯(A) be the proportion of aggregate income
that the people are willing to sacrifice in order to expropriate the elite instead of accepting
(τ, λ). Then, the democratization game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In this
equilibrium:
1. If µ < µ¯ (τP , λP ), then there is a revolution.
2. If µ¯ (τP , λP ) ≤ µ < qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λP ), then there is democratization and
the policy that is implemented is (τP , λP ).
3. If qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λP ) ≤ µ < qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q)maxλ µ¯ (0, λ), then the
elite stays in power but the dictatorship must be controlled by the elite faction with
λj = λP . Assume that the faction with λj = λP is j. Then, the policy that is
implemented is (τ (j) , λj) with probability q and (0, λj) with probability (1− q).
4. If µ ≥ qµ¯ (τP , λP ) + (1− q)maxλ µ¯ (0, λ), then the elite stays in power and the dic-
tatorship can be controlled by any of the elite factions.
(a) If the elite faction j controls the dictatorship, then the policy that is implemented
is (τ (j) , λ (j)) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯(µ,λj) vj (τ, λ) with probability q and (0, λj) with
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probability (1− q), where:
S¯ (µ, λj) = {(τ, λ) ∈ S : µ ≥ qµ¯ (τ, λ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λj)} .
(b) Let E [vi (j)] = qvi (τ (j) , λ (j)) + (1− q) vi (0, λj) be the expected utility of elite
faction i when elite faction j controls the dictatorship. Then, the elite faction
L controls the dictatorship if and only if χL ≥ χ¯L (µ, q), where:
χ¯L (µ, q) =
E [vK (K)]−E [vK (L)]
E [vL (L)]−E [vL (K)] +E [vK (K)]−E [vK (L)] .
Figure 2.4 shows a numerical example that illustrates Proposition 2.4, using the fol-
lowing specification: YT = [(YK)
ρ + σ (YL)
ρ]
1−αN
ρ (YN )
αN , αN = 0.5, σ = 1, ρ = 0.35,
K = 2, L = 0.75, N = 1.5, nL = nK = 0.1, nN = 0.8, C (τ) =
τ1+η
1+η with η = 0.75, and
χL ≥ χ¯L (µ, q) for all (µ, q).
Please see Figure 2.4: Democratization and Trade Policy in the Presence of Intra-elite
Conflict
2.4.3 Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century
Britain’s bold move toward free trade in 1846 was both unprecedented and unilat-
eral; moreover, it ran counter to the core protectionist ideology of the conservative party
while simultaneously undercutting the economic interests of the ruling landed aristocracy.
Thereafter, Great Britain had a stable free-trade policy throughout its transition to a
fully consolidated democracy, even during international crises and depressions that put the
system under stress and prompted many British trading partners to adopt protectionist
measures.
109
Before the Reform Act of 1832, the rural aristocracy dominated British politics. The
Reform Act established the right to vote based solely on income and property, thereby
considerably changing the distribution of political power. As discussed in Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006), the Reform Act had three main features. First, it was passed primarily
because there was a fear that social disturbances would arise. Second, it was a strategic
concession on the part of the aristocracy, since it did not create a full democracy, but simply
extended the franchise to the new industrial and commercial elite and the upper-middle
class. Third, the working classes were completely excluded by the reform. In terms of
our model, the rural aristocracy and the industrial and commercial elite were the two elite
factions. Before the reform, the aristocracy controlled the autocratic government. The
reform, although it did not completely transfer control over the autocracy to the industrial
and commercial elite, did erode the power of the aristocracy and significantly expand the
power of the new industrial and commercial elite. However, this was just the beginning
of a process that reallocated political power between the aristocracy and the industrial
and commercial elite. The debate about the Corn Laws was another decisive factor in this
process, as well as an excellent test for the new distribution of political power.
Manufacturers had opposed the protectionist Corn Laws as early as the 1820s, but
were never strong enough to repeal them. But, beginning in 1836, an economic downturn,
together with a series of poor harvests, goaded the industrialists into action. High food
prices and unemployment also gave impetus to both the middle and working classes, with
the former being organized as the Anti-Corn Law League and the latter as the Chartist
movement. The Anti-Corn Law League was the first modern, nationwide political pressure
group to emerge in Britain (see, among others, Howe, 1984, and Turner, 1995). The
leaders of the League were manufacturers and professionals engaged in export trade. By
the 1840s, the Anti-Corn League had garnered the support of many urban groups, including
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some urban workers. The Chartists were an organized working-class movement that sought
parliamentary reform, arguing that reform must encompass the entire social and political
horizon. In contrast, the League chose a single-issue strategy in it efforts to achieve repeal
(Schonhard-Bailey, 2006).
The Conservatives entered the government in 1841 with a strong and unified commit-
ment to protecting agriculture, yet their leader, Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, completely
reversed this stance within a few years. In 1846, Prime Minister Peel decided to accept
the repeal of the Corn Laws, and about a third of the members of Parliament in his party
followed his lead; the rest remained firmly committed to protecting agriculture. Within a
month of securing the repeal, the Peel government fell, while the Conservatives remained
divided (the repeal of the Corn Laws triggered the expulsion of the Peelite faction from
the Tories, led by Bentink and Disraeli), and then remained out of office for decades. This
division paved the way for almost 30 years of Whig and Liberal dominance, which “rested
on a firm alliance of the urban working and middle classes, of labor and capital” (Rogowski,
1989). During this period, a free-trade policy was the norm. Moreover, “liberal govern-
ments steadily pursued even freer trade, lower taxes and transaction costs, expansion of
the franchise, and diminution of the remaining powers of local landowners, the Crown, and
the House of Lords” (Rogowski, 1989).
Schonhardt-Bailey (2006) tells a simple but compelling story: economic interests gener-
ated the momentum behind the repeal movement, a momentum that overshadowed almost
all else. Indeed, as part of a broader movement toward democratic reform, these same
interests, left unsatisfied, could have snowballed into revolution, as Peel and others had
feared (and as happened, just two years later, in France). Schonhard-Bailey (2006) rightly
argues that the fatal factor for the Corn Laws was the growth of the British manufactur-
ing industry and export trade, especially in textiles. More particularly, as the industrial
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prosperity and export boom of the early 1830s began to wane, industrialists became in-
creasingly vocal about the “unfair” protection enjoyed by agriculturists. In fact, after the
repeal of the Corn Laws, Peel himself argued, in an elaborate display of concessionary
politics, that he sought repeal in order to “satisfy the wishes of those outside” (the middle-
class industrialists). He implied that a “narrow representation of Parliament” (control of
Parliament by the landed aristocracy) required that concessions be made to satisfy interest
groups that were clamoring for reform. The alternative, he implied, was that pressures for
reform might become overwhelming, as they had in France (see Schonhard-Bailey, 2006). In
sum, repeal was an attempt to moderate the mounting pressures for parliamentary reform:
by satisfying the middle class and industrialists with repeal, their drive to gain control
of parliamentary seats would wane and, moreover, the working-class Chartist movement
(seeking more radical reform of Parliament) would lose momentum (see Searle, 1993; and
Schonhard-Bailey, 2006). In terms of our model, the protectionist aristocracy, by partially
transferring control over the government to the pro-free-trade industrialists (the Reform
Act of 1832) and allowing a switch in trade policy (the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846),
placated the populace, thereby convincing it to relinquish its more radical demands.
In such a context, the only option for the Conservatives was to match the set of policies
offered by the Liberals. In fact, in 1867, Disraeli supported the Second Reform Act, which
significantly extended the franchise. Indeed, after the reform, “working-class voters became
the majority in all urban constituencies” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). The particular
events leading up to the Second Reform Act were similar to those that preceded the Reform
Act of 1832: riots and social disturbances that convinced the capitalist and commercial
elite that the only alternative to a revolt was an extension of the franchise to the working
classes. In fact, the Chartist movement had significantly increased its power since 1832.
The 1873-1876 crisis provided an excellent test for trade policy. After 1875, imports
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from America had a significant impact on landowners, and the Conservatives, led by Dis-
raeli, had a majority in Parliament. A group of Conservatives guided by Joseph Cham-
berlain,“. . . tried to organize a coalition with a family resemblance of Bismarck’s grouping
of industrialists, farmers and workers hit by foreign competition” (Gourevitch 1986) and
attempted to reopen the discussion about tariffs. However, this attempt did not succeed,
since even “Disraeli - who had made protection his by-word in the 1840s - flatly refused to
help” (Rogowski, 1989). Moreover, this time, workers were clearly against protectionism.
”Labor, by the 1870s, was quite strong in support of free trade. In the 1840s, anti-corn-law
activists had argued that labor ought to support free trade in order to keep down con-
sumer costs, especially the price of food. Labor activists at the time were more skeptical,
seeing tariffs as a middle-class concern that distracted attention from the broader political
demands of Chartism. It was only after experiencing the prosperity of the 1850s and 1860s
that British labor accepted free trade” (Gourevitch 1986). It is worth mentioning that the
protectionist pressures that were brought to bear during the 1873-1876 crisis were really
very strong. Internally, some of the consequences of the free-trade policy were “a new wave
of bitterness and violence in Ireland (still almost wholly agricultural) [and] the bankruptcy
and reform of the Oxford colleges (whose endowments were largely in land)” (Rogowski,
1989). Almost all the countries that played an important role in the international arena,
including Germany, France and the United States, implemented protectionist measures, al-
though of different types and to different degrees (Gourevitch, 1986; and Rogowski, 1989).
In 1884 the Third Reform Act extended the coverage of voting regulations to rural
constituencies and the “Redistribution Act of 1885 removed many remaining inequalities in
the distribution of seats” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). The result was that ”after 1884,
about 60% of male adults were enfranchised” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Mainly
negotiated during the war, “the Peoples Act of 1918 gave the vote to all adult males over
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the age of twenty-one and women over the age of thirty who were ratepayers or married
to ratepayers” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). In the realm of trade policy, there was no
further attempt to alter the free-trade status quo. As already mentioned, this was to be
expected, since the newly enfranchised members of the population were industrial workers
who supported free trade. Moreover, it is likely that the new industrial and commercial
elite was less reluctant to extend the franchise to industrial workers. This was true for
two reasons. First, workers did not pose a threat to the free-trade policy favored by
this elite group. Second, free trade probably reduced income inequality, thereby making
workers less willing to support redistribution through income taxation. The old aristocracy,
already severely weakened, preferred this democratization path, which was coupled with
a stable free-trade policy, because, at the least, it restrained the workers’ most extreme
redistributionist policy proposals. The industrial and commercial elite always enjoyed a
huge advantage in its negotiations with the aristocracy, since, if the aristocrats refused
to support free trade, the industrial and commercial elite could always accelerate the
democratization process and achieve free trade anyway. Of course, this came at a price,
namely, welfare legislation.
Summing up, Great Britain in the nineteenth century provides an example of intra-
elite conflict (the protectionist, landed aristocracy versus the pro-free-trade industrial and
commercial elite) in combination with a pro-free-trade populace. The aristocracy, facing
radical demands, had no other option but to gradually concede political power to the
new industrial and commercial elite. The Reform Act of 1832 and the repeal of the Corn
Laws in 1846 were two landmark events in this process. The repeal of the Corn Laws
was an unprecedented move toward free trade that both reflected and reinforced the new
distribution of political power. Proposition 2.4 captures this reallocation of political power
among the elite, as well as the switch in trade policy. After 1846, Great Britain had a
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stable free-trade policy throughout the entire transition to a consolidated democracy, which
was fully completed in the twentieth century. The transition was primarily an ongoing
bargaining process between industrialists and workers over welfare legislation. Proposition
2.4 properly captures this transition.
2.5 A Dynamic Model of Regime Determination with Endogenous Trade
Policy
In this section we present a fully dynamic model of regime determination. There are
several reasons for doing so. First, the dynamic model confirms that the democratization
and coup static models that we studied in the previous sections are mutually compatible.
Second, the dynamic model captures some situations that, by construction, cannot be
captured by the static models. In particular, with a dynamic model, it is possible to have
an equilibrium in which waves of democratization and coups alternate with each other,
which corresponds more accurately to the model of an unconsolidated democracy. Finally,
unlike the static models, in the dynamic model there is a natural way of generating partially
credible promises.
Let yi,t be the gross income (before the redistribution scheme) of a member of group i
in period t. In each period, the government runs a balanced budget redistribution scheme
that taxes the income of all citizens at a rate τt ∈ [0, 1] and redistributes the proceeds
through a lump-sum transfer. In each period, the government also selects a trade policy
λt ∈ {A,F}. The per period utility function of a member of group i is given by:
vi (τt, λt) = (1− τt) yi (λt) + [τt − C (τt)] y¯ (λt) ,
where yi (λt) is the the gross income of a member of group i when the trade policy is λt
and y¯ (λt) =
∑
i
niyi (λt) is the average income of society when trade policy is λt. The
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expected utility of a member of group i at time t is given by:
Vi = Et
∑∞
k=t
βk−tvi (τk, λk) ,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor and Et is the expectation operator taken
over the probability distribution of sequences of the form {τk, λk}∞k=t.
The choice of who makes collective decisions (τ, λ) in each period and under what
restrictions depends on the distribution of political power in society. There are two sources
of political power: de jure power, which emanates from legal institutions, and de facto
power, which emanates from the ability to change legal institutions. Political regimes
allocate de jure political power to different groups in society. We consider two alternative
political regimes: dictatorship or autocracy, and democracy. In a dictatorship, the elites
have the de jure political power and, hence, the government maximizes the elites’ utility.
However, sometimes dictatorships face a threat of revolution, which temporarily gives de
facto political power to the people. In a democracy, the populace has the de jure political
power and, hence, the government maximizes the people’s utility. Sometimes democracies
may face the threat of a coup, however, which temporarily gives de facto political power
to the elites. Revolutions and coups are costly events. A simple way of modeling this is
to assume that a fraction µ (ϕ) of the gross income of society is destroyed in a revolution
(coup). The de facto political power conferred by the threat of a revolution or a coup is
also transitory. A simple way of modeling this is to assume that, if the political regime is
a dictatorship, then, during any given period, there is some probability that people will
be able to overcome the collective action problem and thus pose a revolutionary threat.
Similarly, if the political regime is a democracy, then, in every given period, there is
some probability that the elite will be able to pose the threat of a coup. Formally, in
a dictatorship, the state of nature can be either H, with probability q < 1/2, or L, with
116
probability (1− q). When the state of nature is H, the cost of the revolution is µH = µ < 1;
when the state is L, the cost of the revolution is µL = 1. Thus, in state H, people may
be coming together in order to organize a revolution, while in state L, the revolution has
a prohibitive cost. In a democracy, the state of nature can be either H, with probability
r < 1/2, or L, with probability (1− r). When the state of nature is H, the cost of the
coup is ϕH = ϕ < 1; when the state is L, the cost of the coup is ϕL = 1. Thus, in state
H, the elites may coalesce for the purpose of organizing a coup, while in state L, the cost
of the coup is prohibitive.
The timing of events within a given period in a democracy is as follows:
1. The state ϕt is revealed.
2. The people propose a policy (τ, λ) to be implemented by the democratic government.
3. One of the elite faction, indicated by l ∈ {L,K}, observes the people’s proposal and
then chooses to mount a coup or not. If l mounts a coup, it also backs one of the
elite’s factions to control the new dictatorship.
4. The other faction of the elite, indicated by s ∈ {L,K}, examines the people’s proposal
and l’s move. If l has begun a coup, s must decide whether to support it or not. If
s supports the coup, then the coup takes place, the new elite government takes form
and the elite faction that controls it selects a policy. The coup costs a faction ϕt of
aggregate income. If s does not support the coup, then the coup fails and the elite
cannot take power.
5. If there is no effective coup, either because l does not mount it, or because s does
not support it, then the people’s proposal is implemented.
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The intuition behind this timing is the following. We model a coup as a game between
the elites and the people in which the people’s promises are credible only when the elites
have a credible coup threat, i.e., in the state H. The new issue that we introduce is a second
dimension of potential conflict: trade policy. In particular, although all members of the
elites prefer the lowest income tax, they may disagree about trade policy. Also, people may
have a higher or lower propensity to implement protectionist policies, which implies that
democracy may be more costly for one elite group and more attractive for the other. For
the intra-elite bargaining over the coup, we assume that one of the elite factions, denoted
l, takes the lead and decides whether to mount a coup and proposes which group should
control the new elite government, while the other elite faction, denoted s, has veto power.
When both elite factions have the same trade policy preferences, it does not significantly
matter which one is l and which one is s, since λl = λs 6= λP . However, when there is
intra-elite conflict over trade policy, it is very important to determine which elite faction
has the power to propose and which has veto power. We assume that the elite faction s
and the people share the same trade policy preferences, i.e., λl 6= λs = λP . Note also that
there is no credible commitment problem between the elite factions, since, once a coup has
been mounted, only one faction of the elite will control the new dictatorship.
The timing of events within a given period in a dictatorship is as follows:
1. The state µt is revealed.
2. The elite faction that controls the dictatorship decides whether to concede the control
of the dictatorship to the other elite faction or not.
3. The elite faction that controls the dictatorship proposes democratization or a policy
(τ, λ); and
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4. The people observe the elite’s move and decide whether they should mount a revolu-
tion or not. If the elite offers democratization and the people accept the offer, they
take over, and the new democratic government selects a policy. If the populace orga-
nizes a revolution, all factor endowments are expropriated and redistributed evenly
among the people, and the economy moves into autarky. The revolution costs a frac-
tion µt of aggregate income, which includes the cost of organizing the revolution as
well as the long-standing reduction in economic efficiency caused by the elimination
of private property.
Only step 2 requires some explanation. The idea is that the elite faction that controls
a dictatorship might prefer to concede the control of the dictatorship to the other elite
faction if that would help to avoid democratization. This concession is a reallocation of
de jure political power between the elite factions and can be accomplished through an
extension of the franchise or any political reform that properly re-balances the legal rights
of the two elite factions in the autocratic regime.
In order to study this dynamic game, we only consider Markov strategies, which means
that the decision of player i in period t can only depend on the political regime at the
beginning of the period, the realization of the random variables µt or ϕt, and the actions
taken by other players in period t before i must move. Given this restriction, we then find
the Markov perfect equilibrium of the game.
In order to characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium, it is useful to define some
thresholds values for µ and ϕ. Recall that µ¯ (τ, λ) = 1 − nP vP (τ,λ)y¯(A) denotes the proportion
of aggregate income that the people are willing to sacrifice to expropriate the elite rather
than accepting (τ, λ), while ϕ¯i (λj , τ, λ) = 1 − vi(τ,λ)vi(0,λj) denotes the fraction of its income
that the elite faction i is willing to sacrifice in order to switch policy from (τ, λ) to (0, λj).
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In the appendix40 we prove that the set of promises that will placate a revolt when the
autocracy is controlled by the elite faction j is given by:
S¯R (µ, λj) = {(τ, λ) ∈ S : µ ≥ [1− β (1− q)] µ¯ (τ, λ) + β (1− q) µ¯ (0, λj)} .
The intuition is the following. Suppose that the autocracy is controlled by the elite fac-
tion j, there is a revolt threat, and the elite promises to implement (τ, λ). For the period
concerned, the elite’s proposal is completely credible, but in the future it will be credible
only when there is a threat of a revolt (an event that occurs with probability q), since
if there is no such threat (an event that occurs with probability (1− q)), the elite gov-
ernment can safely implement (0, λj). qµ¯ (τ, λ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λj) indicates the proportion
of aggregate income that the people are willing to sacrifice in order to expropriate the
elite rather than accepting (τ, λ) with probability q and (0, λj) with probability (1− q).
Thus, (1− β) µ¯ (τ, λ)+β [qµ¯ (τ, λ) + (1− q) µ¯ (0, λj)] indicates the proportion of aggregate
income that the people are willing to sacrifice in order to expropriate the elite rather than
accepting (τ, λ) now and (τ, λ) with probability q and (0, λj) with probability (1− q) in
the future. Since, µ is the proportion of aggregate income that the people must sacrifice
in order to mount a revolt and expropriate the elite, S¯R (µ, λj) is the set of promises that
placate those threatening to revolt.
In the appendix, we prove that the set of promises that will stop a coup that would
give rise to a short-lived dictatorship controlled by the elite faction j is given by:
S¯C (ϕ, λj) = {(τ, λ) ∈ S : there is i ∈ {L,K} such that [1− β (1− q)]ϕ ≥
[1− β (1− q − r)] ϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) + β (1− q − r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)} .
40Please see online appendix.
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The intuition is the following. Consider a situation in which a threat of a revolt forces the
elite to offer to institute a democracy (since, otherwise, the people will revolt). Thus, au-
tocracies cannot be long-lasting because, sooner or later, a revolt will lead to a democracy.
Suppose that we are in a democratic regime, there is a coup threat and the people promise
to implement (τ, λ). During the period in question, the promise is completely credible,
but, in the future, it will be credible only when there is a coup threat (an event that occurs
with probability r), since, when there is no such threat, the people can safely implement
(τP , λP ). Thus, if the elite does not mount a coup, with probability r, the policy is (τ, λ)
and, with probability (1− r), it is (τP , λP ). Conversely, if every time that there is a coup
threat the elite mounts a coup that gives rise to a dictatorship controlled by the elite faction
j, then society will continuously switch back and forth between one political regime and the
other. Under democracy, the people implement (τP , λP ) until there is a coup and the policy
is switched to (0, λj), which in turn is implemented until a new revolt threat leads to an-
other wave of democratization. Thus, from the point of view of the elite, the key difference
between accepting the people’s promise or not is that a coup would lead to (0, λj) under
circumstances in which the policy to be implemented would have been (τ, λ) or (τP , λP ).
More formally, (1− β) ϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) + β [(r + q) ϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) + (1− r − q) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)] in-
dicates the proportion of its income that elite faction i is willing to sacrifice in order to
get (0, λj) instead of (τ, λ) now and (τ, λ), with probability (r + q), and (τP , λP ), with
probability (1− r − q), in the future. Engineering this policy change has an expected cost
for the elite, which is given by (1− β)ϕ + βqϕ (the cost is expressed as a fraction of i’s
income). The first term is the immediate cost of mounting a coup, while the second term is
the expected discounted cost of future coups (there will be a coup each time that a democ-
racy is established, an event that occurs with probability q). Finally, the inequalities that
characterize S¯C (ϕ, λj) must be valid only for one i ∈ {L,K} because only one elite faction
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needs to oppose the coup in order for it to fail.
In the appendix, we also prove that the set of promises that stop a coup which gives
rise to a lasting dictatorship controlled by the elite faction j is given by:
S˜C (ϕ, µ, λj) = {(τ, λ) ∈ S : there is i ∈ {L,K} such that (1− β)ϕ ≥
[1− β (1− r)] ϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) + β (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)− βqϕ¯i (τ (j) , λ (j) , λj)}
where (τ (j) , λ (j)) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯R(µ,λj) vj (τ, λ). The intuition is similar to the one be-
hind S¯C (ϕ, λj). However, there is one key difference: once the elite mounts a coup, there
will be no further attempt at democratization. This does not affect the value of the people’s
offer, but it significantly changes the cost and benefits of a coup. Now a coup implements
(0, λj) when there is no revolt threat and (τ (j) , λ (j)) when there is a revolt threat. More
formally, (1− β) ϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) + β [rϕ¯i (τ, λ, λj) + (1− r) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)] indicates the pro-
portion of its income that elite faction i is willing to sacrifice in order to obtain (0, λj)
instead of (τ, λ) now and (τ, λ) with probability r and (τP , λP ) with probability (1− r) in
the future. However, a coup cannot always implement (0, λj), since, when there is a revolt
threat, the elite must placate the potential rebels by offering (τ (j) , λ (j)). For this reason
we must subtract βqϕ¯i (τ (j) , λ (j) , λj) from the benefits of a coup. In terms of the costs,
in this situation, a coup occurs only once, which implies that a long-lasting dictatorship
costs the elite (expressed as a fraction of its income) just (1− β)ϕ.
2.5.1 In the Absence of Intra-elite Conflict
We begin with a situation in which there is no intra-elite conflict. The following propo-
sition summarizes the results.
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Proposition 2.5: Consider a society with no intra-elite conflict over trade policy, i.e.,
λL = λK = λE 6= λP . Then, the political regime determination game has a unique Markov
perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium:
1. If µ ≥ [1− β (1− q)] µ¯ (τP , λP ) + β (1− q) µ¯ (0, λE), the society remains non-
democratic. When µt = µ
L, the elites set (0, λE); when µt = µ
H , they offer
(τ (l) , λ (l)) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯(µ,λE) vl (τ, λ).
2. If µ < [1− β (1− q)] µ¯ (τP , λP ) + β (1− q) µ¯ (0, λE), society switches to democracy
the first time µt = µ
H . Thereafter:
(a) If [1− β (1− q)]ϕ ≥ mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE), then democracy is fully consolidated
and the people set (τP , λP ).
(b) If β (1− q − r)mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE) ≤ [1− β (1− q)]ϕ < mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE),
then democracy is semi-consolidated. When ϕt = ϕ
L, the people set (τP , λP );
when ϕt = ϕ
H they offer (τ, λ) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯(ϕ,λE) vP (τ, λ).
(c) If [1− β (1− q)]ϕ < β (1− q − r)mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE), then democracy is un-
consolidated. The society continuously switches political regimes and trade poli-
cies. In a dictatorship, when µt = µ
L, the elites set (0, λE); when µt = µ
H ,
they democratize and the people set (τP , λP ). In a democracy, when ϕt = ϕ
L,
the people set (τP , λP ); when ϕt = ϕ
H , there is a coup and the elites set (0, λE).
Proof : we present a detailed proof in an online appendix. 
The main message of proposition 2.5 can be easily summarized in a less formal way,
which also has the advantage of highlighting the relationships between the political regime
and trade policy. Consider a society in which there is no intra-elite conflict over trade
policy. If the cost of organizing a revolt is high enough (µ ≥ [1− β (1− q)] µ¯ (τP , λP ) +
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β (1− q) µ¯ (0, λE)), the elites can always placate the populace by offering a temporary con-
cession. In this case, society remains non-democratic, there is very low redistribution and
the economy tends to operate under the trade policy preferred by the elites, except under
special circumstances, when the best way of stopping a revolt without giving up the po-
litical regime is by offering a temporary change in trade policy. If the cost of organizing a
revolt is low enough (µ < [1− β (1− q)] µ¯ (τP , λP ) + β (1− q) µ¯ (0, λE)), then a temporary
concession cannot placate the people and the elites are forced to democratize. The type of
democratic regime that emerges will depend on the cost of coups. If the cost of organizing a
coup is relatively high ([1− β (1− q)]ϕ ≥ mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE)), then, after the first revolt,
society switches from a dictatorship with no income redistribution and the trade policy
preferred by the elite to a consolidated democracy with high levels of income taxation and
redistribution and a trade policy preferred by the people. If the cost of organizing a coup
is moderate (β (1− q − r)mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE) ≤ [1− β (1− q)]ϕ < mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE)),
then, after the first revolt, society switches from a dictatorship with no income redistribu-
tion and the trade policy preferred by the elites to a semi-consolidated democracy, which
usually levies high income taxes and implements the trade policy preferred by the people,
but may sometimes face a coup threat, which it can counter by moderating income taxation
and perhaps by introducing a change in trade policy for a brief period. Finally, if the cost
of organizing a coup is relatively low ([1− β (1− q)]ϕ < β (1− q − r)mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λE)),
then society continuously switches between political regimes, levels of income taxation and
types of trade policy. Under a dictatorship, there is no income taxation and the trade
policy that is implemented is the one preferred by the elite, while, under a democracy,
there is a high level of income taxation and the trade policy that is implemented is the one
preferred by the people.
2.5.2 Intra-elite Conflict
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Next, we study the equilibrium of the dynamic game when there is intra-elite conflict
over trade policy. First, we cover situations in which at least one elite faction can stop a
revolt by offering a temporary concession and, hence, the key political issue is who controls
the autocracy. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2.6: Consider a society with intra-elite conflict over trade policy, i.e.,
λl 6= λs = λP . Then, the political regime determination game has a unique Markov per-
fect equilibrium. In this equilibrium, before the first time that µt = µ
H , the autocracy is
controlled by the elite faction l, which sets (0, λl). Thereafter:
1. If µ ≥ [1− β (1− q)] µ¯ (τP , λP ) + β (1− q) µ¯ (0, λl), the society remains non-
democratic, but the autocracy continues under the control of l only if Vl
(
l, µH
) ≥
Vl
(
s, µH
)
.41 Otherwise, the first time that µt = µ
H , the control of the autocracy is
transferred to s. Moreover, when the autocracy is under the control of the elite fac-
tion j, when µt = µ
L, the autocratic government sets (0, λj), while when µt = µ
H ,
it sets (τ (j) , λ (j)) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯R(µ,λj) vj (τ, λ).
2. If [1− β (1− q)] µ¯P (τP , λP )+β (1− q) µ¯P (0, λs) ≤ µ < [1− β (1− q)] µ¯P (τP , λP )+
β (1− q) µ¯P (0, λl), then, the first time that µt = µH , society switches to an autocracy
controlled by s or to a democracy. Moreover:
(a) Suppose that democratization leads to: (i) a fully consolidated democracy; (ii)
a semi-consolidated democracy in which each time ϕt = ϕ
H , the people set
τ ≤ τP (λP ) and λP ; or (iii) a short period of democracy until ϕt = ϕH , followed
by a coup that gives rise to a permanent autocracy controlled by s. Then, the
first time µt = µ
H , the elite faction l transfers the control of the autocracy to s.
41Note that Vi
(
j, µH
)
= (1− β)−1 {[1− β (1− q)] vi (τ (j) , λ (j)) + β (1− q) vi (0, λj)}, where
(τ (j) , λ (j)) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S¯R(µ,λj) vj (τ, λ).
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(b) Suppose that democratization leads to: (i) a semi-consolidated democracy in
which each time ϕt = ϕ
H , the people set τ ≤ τP (λl) and λl; or (ii) an
unconsolidated democracy with periodic coups that give rise to a dictatorship
controlled by l. Then the elite faction l choose to democratize if and only if
Vl
(
D,ϕL
) ≥ Vl (s, µH).42
Proof : we present a detailed proof in an online appendix. 
The main message of proposition 2.6 (parts 1 and 2) can be easily summarized in
a less formal but clearer way. Consider a society in which there is intra-elite con-
flict over trade policy. In particular, suppose that the aristocracy is protectionist,
while the capitalists and the populace are pro-free-trade. If the cost of orga-
nizing a revolt is high enough (µ ≥ [1− β (1− q)] µ¯ (τP , λP ) + β (1− q) µ¯ (0, λl)), then
society remains non-democratic. If the autocracy is controlled by the aristocracy, the
economy tends to operate under protectionism, except when the people are threatening
to revolt and must be placated with temporary redistribution measures and, possibly, a
brief period of free trade. If the autocracy is controlled by the capitalists, there is al-
ways a free-trade policy and the potential proponents of a revolt are placated with tem-
porary redistribution measures. The aristocracy will be more willing to transfer control
of the autocracy over to the capitalists if such an autocracy can stop revolts with much
lower taxation levels than an autocracy controlled by the aristocracy. If the cost of or-
ganizing a revolt is low enough ([1− β (1− q)] µ¯P (τP , λP ) + β (1− q) µ¯P (0, λs) ≤ µ <
[1− β (1− q)] µ¯P (τP , λP ) + β (1− q) µ¯P (0, λl)), then there are two possible situations: ei-
ther the aristocracy transfers the control of the autocracy to the capitalists and, hence,
42For a semi-consolidated democracy Vi
(
D,ϕL
)
= (1− β)−1 {βrvi (τD, λD) + (1− βr) vi (τP , λP )},
where (τD, λD) = argmax(τ,λ)∈S˜C(,ϕ,µ,λP ) vP (τ, λ). For an unconsolidated democracy Vi
(
D,ϕL
)
=
(1− β)−1 [1− β (1− q − r)]−1 {[1− β (1− q)] vi (τP , λP ) + βrvi (0, λl)− βr [1− β (1− q)]ϕvi (0, λl)} . For
the defintion of Vl
(
s, µH
)
see the previous footnote.
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democratization can be avoided, or the aristocracy democratizes. Depending on the type
of democratic regime that emerges, the aristocracy prefers one or the other alternative.
In particular, suppose that the aristocracy has very little de facto political power in a
democracy, such that democratization leads to a fully consolidated democracy, a semi-
consolidated democracy that always implements a free trade policy, or a brief period of
democracy, followed by a coup that gives rise to an embedded autocracy controlled by cap-
italists. Then, the aristocracy will always prefer to transfer control over the autocracy to
the capitalists. However, suppose that the de facto political power wielded by the aristoc-
racy in a democracy is such that democratization leads to a semi-consolidated democracy
that must offer a protectionist trade policy whenever there is a coup threat or to an un-
consolidated democracy with periodic coups that give rise to a dictatorship controlled by
the aristocracy. Then, the aristocracy might be better off if it offers democratization than
if it transfers the control of the autocracy to the capitalists.
Next, we cover situations in which only democratization will stop a revolt and, hence,
the key political issues are the consolidation of democracy and the nature of the coups that
could take place. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2.6 (continued): Consider a society in which there is intra-elite conflict
over trade policy, i.e., λl 6= λs = λP . Then, there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in
the game. In this equilibrium, before the first time that µt = µ
H , the autocracy is controlled
by the elite faction l, which sets (0, λl). Thereafter:
3. If µ < [1− β (1− q)] µ¯P (τP , λP ) + β (1− q) µ¯P (0, λs), the first time that µt = µH ,
society switches to democracy. Moreover, let r′ = [1− β (1− q − r)], and ϕ′ =
[1− β (1− q)]ϕ. Then:
(a) If ϕ′ ≥ maxλj mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), democracy is fully consolidated and the people
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set (τP , λP ).
(b) If maxλj mini r
′ϕ¯i (0, λP , λj) + (1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ≤ ϕ′ <
maxλj mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), democracy is semi-consolidated. In particular,
when ϕt = ϕ
L, the people set (τP , λP ); while when ϕt = ϕ
H , they offer a
temporary concession in order to stop the coup.
(c) If minλmaxλj mini r
′ϕ¯i (0, λP , λ) + (1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ≤ ϕ′ <
maxλj mini r
′ϕ¯i (0, λP , λj) + (1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), democracy is either
semi-consolidated or unconsolidated democracy. In the first situation, when
ϕt = ϕ
L, the people set (τP , λP ); while when ϕt = ϕ
H , they offer a concession
that includes λl in order to stop the coup.
43 In the second situation, society
continuously switches between political regimes, but it always maintains the
same trade policy λs = λP . In particular, when µt = µ
L, the elites set (0, λs);
when µt = µ
H , there is democratization and the people set (τP , λP ); when
ϕt = ϕ
L, the people set (τP , λP ); and when ϕt = ϕ
H , there is a coup and the
elites set (0, λs). Democracy is semi-consolidated democracy if and only if the
people cannot induce a coup controlled by s or, even if they can so, they prefer
to defend democracy.44
(d) If mini,λ r
′ϕ¯i (0, λ, λl) + (1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λl) ≤ ϕ′ <
minλmaxλj mini r
′ϕ¯i (0, λP , λ) + (1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj), democracy is un-
consolidated and society continuously switches between political regimes, but it
always maintains the same trade policy λs = λP . In particular, when µt = µ
L,
43Formally, the people promise τ = argmax(τ,λl)∈∩jS¯C(ϕ,λj) vP (τ, λl) and λ = λl
44Formally, the people can induce a coup controlled by the elite faction s if and
only if there is (τ, λ) ∈ S¯C (ϕ, λl) − S¯C (ϕ, λs). If such (τ, λ) exists, it is still possi-
ble that the people prefer a semi-democratic regime if VP
(
D,ϕH , τ, λ
)
≥ VP
(
s, µL
)
−
ϕvP (0, λs), where VP
(
D,ϕH , τ, λ
)
= (1− β)−1 {[1− β (1− r)] vi (τ, λ) + β (1− r) vi (τP , λP )},
τ = argmax(τ,λl)∈∩jS¯C(ϕ,λj) vP (τ, λl), λ = λl, and Vi
(
s, µL
)
− ϕvi (0, λs) =
(1− β)−1 [1− β (1− q − r)]−1 {[1− β (1− r)] vi (0, λs) + βqvi (τP , λP )− [1− β (1− r)] [1− β (1− q)]ϕvi (0, λs)} .
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the elites set (0, λs); when µt = µ
H , there is democratization and the people set
(τP , λP ); when ϕt = ϕ
L, the people set (τP , λP ); and when ϕt = ϕ
H , there is a
coup and the elites set (0, λs).
(e) If ϕ′ < mini,λ r
′ϕ¯i (0, λ, λl)+(1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λl), democracy is unconsolidated
and society continuously switches between political regimes and trade policies. In
particular, when µt = µ
L, the elites set (0, λl); when µt = µ
H , there is democ-
ratization and the people set (τP , λP ); when ϕt = ϕ
L, the people set (τP , λP );
and when ϕt = ϕ
H , there is a coup and the elites set (0, λl).
Proof : we present a detailed proof in an online appendix. 
The main message of proposition 2.6 (part 3) can be easily summarized in a less for-
mal way. Consider a society in which there is intra-elite conflict over trade policy
and a protectionist populace. Let λl = F and λs = λP = A, which can represent,
for example, the economic cleavages seen in Argentina in the second half of the twentieth
century (l = L are the landlords and s = K are the capitalists). Suppose that the cost of
organizing a revolt is relatively low (µ < [1− β (1− q)] µ¯P (τP , λP ) + β (1− q) µ¯P (0, λs)).
If the cost of mounting a coup is very high (ϕ′ ≥ maxλj mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)), then, after the
first revolt, society will switch from an autocracy controlled by l, no redistribution and a
free trade policy to a consolidated democracy that implements high levels of taxation and
redistribution and a protectionist trade policy. If the cost of mounting a coup is high
(maxλj mini r
′ϕ¯i (0, λP , λj) + (1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ≤ ϕ′ < maxλj mini ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)),
then, after the first revolt, society will switch from an autocracy controlled by l, no redistri-
bution and a free-trade policy to a semi-consolidated democracy which usually implements
high levels of redistribution and a protectionist trade policy, but which sometimes lowers
income taxes and may introduce free trade for a short period of time in order to counter
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a threatened coup. If the cost of the coup is moderate (minλmaxλj mini r
′ϕ¯i (0, λP , λ) +
(1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj) ≤ ϕ′ < maxλj mini r′ϕ¯i (0, λP , λj)+(1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)), then, af-
ter the first revolt, society will switch from an autocracy controlled by l, no redistribution
and a free-trade policy to either a semi-consolidated or an unconsolidated democracy. A
semi-consolidated democracy usually implements high levels of taxation and redistribution
and a protectionist trade policy, but sometimes faces a coup threat which it counters by
lowering income taxes and temporarily instituting a free trade policy. If the transition is to
an unconsolidated democracy, the society will continuously switch between political regimes
and levels of income taxation and redistribution, but the protectionist trade policy will al-
ways be retained. If the cost of a coup is low (mini,λ r
′ϕ¯i (0, λ, λl)+(1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λl) ≤
ϕ′ < minλmaxλj mini r
′ϕ¯i (0, λP , λ) + (1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λj)), then, after the first revolt,
society will switch from a dictatorship controlled by l, no redistribution and a free-trade
policy to an unconsolidated democracy, with ongoing changes in the political regime and
levels of income taxation and redistribution, but with a stable protectionist trade policy.
If the cost of a coup is very low (ϕ′ < mini,λ r
′ϕ¯i (0, λ, λl) + (1− r′) ϕ¯i (τP , λP , λl)), then,
after the first revolt, society will switch from an autocracy controlled by l, no redistribution
and a free-trade policy to an unconsolidated democracy, with continuous changes in the
political regime, levels of income taxation and redistribution, and trade policy.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have looked at some of the connections between the political regime and
trade policy. As we have shown, international trade can crucially affect political alignments
and hence the political regime, as well as trade policy. Indeed, our model suggests that
significant connections exist among political transitions, trade policy switches, and the
comparative advantages of an economy. The critical point is that trade policy opens the
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way for a political cleavage other than the rich-poor/elite-populace one. Indeed, though
we stress the role of trade policy in this paper, our model is more general and applies to
any policy variable that could potentially divide the elites.
In fact, once we introduce trade policy as an endogenous outcome of the political
game, even when there is no intra-elite conflict over trade policy, the model predicts that
major changes in the political regime will be associated with major switches in trade
policy. Moreover, the direction of those switches depends on the comparative advantages
of the economy and the nature of the political change that occurs. Thus, for instance,
democratization in societies with a protectionist elite and a pro-free-trade populace should
be associated with an opening of the economy, while democratization in societies with a
pro-free-trade elite and a protectionist populace should be accompanied by the proliferation
of protectionist measures. When we also incorporate intra-elite conflict over trade policy
into the model, a new and more diverse landscape emerges. First, as we have already
mentioned in connection with the case of Great Britain, a crucial switch in trade policy
can happen before full democratization takes place through a reallocation of political power
within the elite. Second, as we discussed in relation to the case of Argentina, there can be
coups that give rise to dictatorships that maintain protectionist policies or to dictatorships
that open up the economy.
Additionally, for societies with no intra-elite conflict and a pro-free-trade (protectionist)
populace, our model predicts a democratization process that begins with an autocracy
implementing a protectionist (free-trade) policy; it then moves to a period of unconsolidated
democracy and an unstable trade policy and then ends with a consolidated democracy with
a free-trade (protectionist) policy. On the other hand, for societies in which there is intra-
elite conflict, the model predicts a much more complicated democratization process that can
potentially include a changeover in control of the prevailing autocracy and coups that either
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close or open the economy. The discussion of the cases of Great Britain and Argentina
shows that intra-elite conflict over trade policy is an important factor in arriving at an
understanding of the different political and economic paths followed by these countries.
The model also points to interesting implications for some institutions and organiza-
tions, such as unions or the armed forces, which affect the cost of coups and revolts. For
example, unionization probably decreases the cost of a revolt and increases the cost of a
coup. If this is the case, then our model can tell us how the different groups will react to
legislation that promotes labor unions. Similarly, the cost of a coup depends on the avail-
ability and organization of the armed forces. Thus, our model can indicate which groups
will be more willing to extend financial support to the military. In general, when there is
no intra-elite conflict, the elite is better off when the cost of a coup is low and the cost of a
revolt is high, while the opposite is usually true for the general public. However, when there
is an intra-elite conflict, the analysis is more subtle. In particular, it is perfectly possible
that one of the elite factions will be better off when a coup would be more costly or when a
revolt would be less costly. The details are somewhat involved, but the intuition is simple.
Consider, for example, the situation of the commercial and industrial elite in Great Britain
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. While a revolt would have been very costly for
the populace, the aristocracy was able to placate the people without relinquishing control
of the government. However, when the people found that a revolt would be less costly,
the aristocracy was forced to transfer its control over the autocracy to the commercial and
industrial elite, which paved the way for the repeal of the Corn Laws. Thus, it is very
likely that a moderate decrease in the cost of a revolt was beneficial for the commercial
and industrial elite.
Another interesting implication refers to how populism affects the political regime.
Since populism tends to be an elusive and sometimes not very precise concept, we can
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adopt an agnostic approach and simply associate populism with two parameters of our
model. The parameter 1− q captures how credible the people’s promises are. In this sense,
we can say that populism is greater when the people’s promises become less credible. A
second parameter captures the degree of redistributive pressures exerted on democratic
institutions. In this second sense, we can say that populism is greater when democratic
institutions are more redistributionist. It is not difficult to show that, for a society with no
intra-elite conflict, a more populist democracy, measured in either of these two alternative
ways, makes coups more likely and, hence, the consolidation of democracy less likely. It is
also possible to show that, for a society in which there is an intra-elite conflict, populism
can affect the nature of coups. As we have seen, Argentina is an excellent example. As
populist pressures were held at bay in the late 1950s and the 1960s, coups kept protectionist
barriers in place, while, when Argentina’s democracy became more populist in the 1970s,
the protectionist industrial elite agreed to join the pro-free-trade landlords in mounting a
coup that did away with protectionist barriers.
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Figure 2.1: Coups and Trade Policy in the Absence of Intra-elite Conflict
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Figure 2.3: Democratization and Trade Policy in the Absence of Intra-elite Conflict
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PART II
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MEDIA INDUSTRY
140
Chapter 3: Optimal Regulation of the Media Industry
Abstract
This paper studies how a society should optimally organize and regulate its media
industry. First, a political economy model of the media industry is developed. Second, a
constitutional stage is considered and the optimal regulation of the industry is deduced.
A simple but powerful normative message is derived from this analysis. The media should
not be treated as a standard industry. Even if it operates under increasing returns to scale,
this is not enough to conclude that the best solution is a media monopoly. Unless media
productivity is extremely low, the optimal regulation is either to encourage entry with
subsidies or to impose moderate entry limitations. It is worthwhile to pay the extra costs
associated with several media companies obtaining and reporting the same news because
competition avoids media capture and the corresponding dissipation of resources in the
political system.
3.1 Introduction
The media industry plays a crucial role in all modern societies, where the majority
of citizens does not have direct access to relevant information about public policies, but
rather obtains it by reading newspapers, listening to the radio and watching television.
Many authors have acknowledged the importance of the media in modern politics and
drawn attention to the effects of the media on political outcomes (see, e.g., MacChesney
2004 and Bagdikian 2004). However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no systematic
work that studies how society should organize and regulate its media industry. The goal
of this paper is to fill this gap.
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The organization and regulation of the media industry varies greatly across countries
and, sometimes, even within a country over time. In contrast to most of the autocratic
regimes where the state tightly controls the media, in democracies, the state presence in
media is more restricted and diverse. For example, Dejankov et al. (2002) document the
contrast between autocratic regimes in which the state almost always controls television
and has a strong presence in newspapers, with democratic countries, where the government
does not own newspapers and has a limited presence in television (almost none in the United
States and intermediate presence in Europe and other democracies). Moreover, there has
been an increasing interest in the regulation of the media and regulatory reforms have
been discussed and even introduced in some countries.45 This paper seeks to develop a
normative framework that can be used to evaluate current organizational diversity and
potential future reforms to existing regulations in the media industry.
Information, the commodity provided by the media industry, has several characteris-
tics. First, information can be seen as a public good since many agents can use the same
piece of information at the same time (it is a non-rival good) and it is difficult to exclude
the agents that do not pay for it (it is a non-excludable good). Second, there are impor-
tant economies of scale in the process of gathering and disseminating information. While
there are significant fixed costs of gathering information (e.g., journalists and distribution
facilities), the marginal costs of an extra subscription are very low. Thus, information is
a public good with decreasing average costs of production. This suggests that we should
employ the standard literature on Public Economics and Regulation in order to deduce the
optimal regulation of the media industry.
45For example, in 2009 the Argentine Congress enacted the controversial Law No. 26522, which introduced
changes in the regulation of the media (see http://www.infoleg.gov.ar for the full text of the law). In 2011
the Brazilian Congress enacted Law No. 12485, which changed the norms for the provision of Pay TV
services. In particular, the law eliminated previous restrictions to foreign investments in Pay TV services,
and introduced restrictions on cross-ownership in telecommunications activities (see Beppu and Sampaio
at http://www.latinlawyer.com for a summary of the law).
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Unfortunately, the existing literature cannot be blindly applied to the media industry
because a distinctive characteristic of the media is its vulnerability to political manipula-
tion. Some groups might pay for receiving accurate information while others might pay to
suppress or distort information. For example, politicians and bureaucrats could be tempted
to censor or bribe the media to suppress information about corruption; or special interest
groups could use their economic power to influence news about the effects of public policies.
Obviously, this is not in the interest of the general public, which benefits from accurate
and unbiased information.46
These two characteristics have created a tension on conventional views about the op-
timal organization and regulation of the media. On one hand, those who emphasize
economies of scale and believe in a more benevolent government tend to recommend a
state-owned monopoly or, at least, more government involvement. Indeed, a state-owned
company or a regulated private monopoly would be the standard textbook solution to an
industry with decreasing average costs. On the other hand, those who focus attention
on information distortion and manipulation tend to favor a more competitive industry
integrated by several privately owned companies. The starting point of this paper is to
acknowledge that both features are present and then ask the normative question: How
should society organize the media industry? Following Laffont (2000), the approach is to
consider this question as a problem of constitutional design. In other words, the goal of
this paper is to deduce optimal constitutional norms for the media industry.
Besides more fundamental issues, such as freedom of speech, and more practical is-
sues, such as journalists’ right to not reveal their sources, there are two key instruments
to consider in a realistic constitutional design problem. First, should society encourage or
46An extreme case is Peru during the 1990’s. As McMillan and Zoido (2003) document, Vladimiro
Montesinos, president Fujimori’s chief of the secret police, systematically bribed congressmen, judges and
other political players. Moreover, he managed to avoid any public exposure for more than 10 years offering
very generous bribes to the most important newspapers and television stations of the country.
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restrict entry into the media industry? Note the normative trade off. While economies
of scale call for entry restrictions, the dangers of information distortion and manipulation
suggest a need for a more competition. Second, should society encourage or restrict the
participation of some specific groups in the media? Note again the normative trade off.
A highly conglomerated media industry probably helps special interest groups manipulate
information about public policies, especially when they are required to inform the public
about policies that affect business within the conglomerate. For example, if the same con-
glomerate owns a company that pollutes the environment and a newspaper, the newspaper
may report distorted information about the impact of a new environmental regulation.
Similarly, bureaucrats that control a public media may tend to suppress news that would
negatively affect an incumbent politician. However, conglomerates can help special interest
groups to limit the power of politicians and public media can help politicians to reduce the
power of special interest groups. In other words, the constitution can use conglomerates
and public media to erect an optimal web of checks and balances.
Modeling different groups that try to control several media companies is not an easy
task. Hence, I begin by developing a baseline model with only one group capable of influ-
encing the media. Then, I extend the analysis to two groups. The baseline model includes
a politician, who is more informed than the general public about collective decisions (the
cost of public projects) and a media industry that gathers information about these col-
lective decisions (each media company receives an informative signal of the cost of public
projects). The politician would like to keep the general public uninformed so he can ex-
tract informational rents, but in order to do so he must convince each media company to
suppress the information about these collective decisions. Media companies which decide
to suppress information collects bribes from the politician, but lose their audience. Since
audience-related revenues are particularly high when no company is reporting news, in
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equilibrium, the politician captures the whole industry only if he is willing to bribe every
media company with the amount that each company would receive if it was the only one
in the industry. As a result competition in the media industry makes media capture more
difficult.
The baseline model has some of the basic features of a model developed by Besley
and Prat (2006). In particular, it assumes that the general public is informed even when
only one media reports the news. This implies that if the politician wants to suppress
information, he must bribe and capture the whole industry. However, there are important
differences between this paper and Besley and Prat (2006). First, the main focus of the
current work is normative, i.e., the goal is to deduce the optimal organization of the media.
Second, while Besley and Prat (2006) consider an adverse selection model in which the
general public must decide whether to reelect an incumbent who can be good (i.e., generates
a surplus of 1 to the general public) or bad (i.e., generates no surplus to the general public),
in my model the general public and the politician play a principal-agent game in which
the general public is the uninformed principal and the politician is the informed agent. As
a consequence, the rents of the politician and the surplus of the general public come from
the principal-agent game, rather than being exogenous variables.
Adding a constitutional stage to the baseline model I deduce the optimal regulation of
the media industry. A simple but powerful normative message is derived from this analysis.
The media should not be treated as a standard increasing-returns industry. Although there
can be good reasons to believe that the media operates under increasing returns to scale,
this is not enough to conclude that the best solution is a media monopoly. In fact, if
media productivity is higher than a threshold, the optimal regulation is either to encourage
entry with subsidies or to impose a moderate entry limitation (proposition 3.2). It is
worthwhile to pay the extra costs associated with several media companies obtaining and
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reporting the same news because competition makes media capture more difficult, avoiding
the dissipation of resources in the political system. In more technical terms, the general
public is the principal, the politician is the agent and the media plays the role of a supervisor
that can be captured by the agent. Indeed, there are multiple supervisors because there
are several media companies and the optimal regulation encourages or restricts entry in
order to induce the optimal number of supervisors.
A limitation of the baseline model is that only the politician is allowed to influence
the media. However, special interest groups could also have incentives to manipulate
information (Grossman and Helpman, 2001). In fact, Corneo (2005) and Petrova (2008)
build models of media capture that stress the role of special interest groups. In Corneo’s
model, agents have different shares in a company that pollutes the environment, but they
do not know the social cost of the pollution. The media gathers information about this cost
and then approaches one agent to bargain over the report. In equilibrium, the media tends
to form a conglomerate with a rich agent and to misreport the social cost of pollution. In
Petrova’s model, there are only two groups: the rich, who are informed about the cost of
public goods, and the poor, who do not know the cost of public goods. As a consequence
of this information asymmetry, the rich have an incentive to bribe the media to keep the
poor median voter uninformed about the cost of public goods. In an extension, I introduce
special interest groups to the baseline model.47
In the extended model there are two policy variables and two players who try to in-
fluence the media (the politician and the elite). One of the policy variables models the
vertical dimension of social conflict (i.e., the conflict between citizens and the politician)
while the other models the horizontal dimension of social conflict (i.e., the conflict between
the elite and the general public). In equilibrium, the elite plays an ambiguous role in the
47The politician of the baseline model can be considered a special interest group. However, the really
interesting environment is one in which a politician and a special interest group are two separate entities.
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media industry. On one hand, it tends to neutralize the politician by making media cap-
ture more difficult for him. On the other hand, the elite encourages the media to withhold
information when it can be used to promote policies that negatively affect its interest.
Two new messages emerge from the normative analysis of this extended model. First, re-
stricting the involvement of the elite in the media industry tends to increase social welfare
when the horizontal dimension of social conflict dominates, but tends to reduce it when
the vertical dimension horizontal dominates (proposition 3.6). Second, free entry is even
more appealing when the elite has the ability to influence the media (proposition 3.7).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the baseline model.
Section 3.3 defines and characterizes the equilibrium of the model (proposition 3.1). Section
3.4 derives the optimal regulation of the media under the assumption that the media
industry is a natural monopoly. This section contains the core message of the paper
(propositions 3.2-3.4). Section 3.5 confirms that analogous results apply if the media
industry is a natural oligopoly (proposition 3.5). Section 3.6 extends the baseline model
and characterizes the optimal regulation in this extended setting (propositions 3.6 and 3.7).
Finally, section 3.7 presents the conclusions.
3.2 A Model of the Media Industry
In this section I develop a principal-agent model augmented with a media industry.
The general public is the principal, the politician is the agent and the media companies
gather information about public policies and transmit it to the general public.
Consider a simple economy with one private good and one public good. The general
public has an endowment of the private good y. The public good is produced with a simple
linear technology, i.e., the total cost of producing g units of it is cg units of the private
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good. The unit cost of the public good c is a random variable that can adopt the values
cL or cH (cL < cH) with probabilities p ∈ (0, 1) and (1− p), respectively.
The general public gets utility from the consumption of both goods. The provision of
the public good is financed with a tax T , which generates a deadweight loss of λT units of
the private good, where λ ≥ 0. The general public also expends EM units of its endowment
on media subscriptions. Thus, the utility function of the general public is given by:
uGP (g, T,EM ) = u (g) + y − (1 + λ)T − EM , (38)
where the sub-utility function u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously
differentiable and satisfies limg→0 u
′ (g) = ∞ and limg→∞ u′ (g) = 0. EM =
∑n
i=1
EM,i,
where EM,i is the general public expenditure on media subscriptions of company i = 1, ..., n.
The politician collects the taxes and provides the public good. He also expends B
units of the private good on bribes to the media industry. Thus, the utility function of the
politician is given by:
uP (g, c, T,B) = T − cg −B, (39)
where B =
∑n
i=1
Bi, and Bi is the bribe the politician gives to media company i =
1, ..., n.48
The information about the cost of the public good is asymmetrically distributed among
48In reality bribes can adopt several forms and they do not only represent direct payments to newspapers,
radios and television channels as it was the case of Peru during the 1990’s. Advertising can be a more subtle
and indirect way of bribing the media. Indeed, DiTella and Franceschelli (2011) show that the extent to
which the main newspapers in Argentina report government corruption is negatively correlated with the
extent to which each newspaper receive government advertisement. Bribes can also be non-pecuniary
in the form of favorable treatment or access. For example, McChesney (2004) suggests that presidents
in the United States give exclusive interviews only to journalists who report a favorable view of their
administration. Thus, although in the model bribes are direct payments, they should be interpreted as
representing any direct or indirect way through which the politician buys media silence.
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the politician, the general public and the media. In particular, the politician knows the
realization of c, the general public only knows the probability distribution of c, and the
media industry receives an informative signal about c, which I denote s. Table 3.1 shows
the probability distribution of the signal s. Note that when c = cL, the media is perfectly
informed (s = cL) with probability δ and it does not have any information (s = ∅) with
probability (1− δ), while when c = cH , the media does not receive any information (s = ∅).
Table 3.1: Probability Distribution of the Signal s
Signal Value
s = cL s = ∅
c = cL δ 1− δ
Actual Value
c = cH 0 1
The media cannot fabricate news. Thus, when s = ∅, every media company is forced
to report ri = ∅, while when s = cL, each media company can choose to report the truth
(ri = cL) or it can withhold the signal (ri = ∅). Table 3.2 summarizes possible media
reports for each signal value.
Table 3.2: Possible Reports
Signal Value
s = cL s = ∅
Possible Reports (ri) {cL, ∅} ∅
The assumption that the media can withhold, but not fabricate information implies
that information is verifiable. Although this seems a strong assumption, the key idea is
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that news are at least partially informative. In other words, news are not pure cheap
talk, which implicitly requires that the signal s comes from an ”independent” source of
information.49
Media companies have two sources of revenue: news-related revenues (e.g., subscriptions
and advertisement) and bribes.50 In particular, media company i gets EM,i from news-
related revenues (the general public expenditure on media i) and Bi from bribes paid by the
politician. The cost of receiving the signal for an individual company is CS (for example,
the cost of journalists and facilities). Then, the payoff function of media company i is given
by:
uM,i (EM,i, Bi, CS) = EM,i +Bi − CS . (40)
The expenditure on media subscriptions depends on the news. When there are no news
(ri = ∅ for all i = 1, ..., n) the general public does not expend anything on media sub-
scriptions, while when there are some news the general public expends a positive amount.
Thus, the expenditure on subscriptions as a function of the reports is given by:
EM (r1, ..., rn) =
 0 if ri = ∅ for all i,E¯M if ri = cL for at least one i, (41)
49For example, Bagdikian (2004) and McChesney (2004) discuss the role of the media during the Iraq
war and they conclude that the media failed to inform the American public about crucial issues (such as
the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq). They argue that the critical problem was that media
companies blindly relied on official sources of information. However, this is probably an extreme case, in
which it is very costly to get an independent source of information. In terms of the model, this is a situation
in which the politician controls the signal or the cost of an independent signal is prohibitive.
50Theoretically, it is easy to separate news-related revenues and bribes. The key distinction is that
news-related revenues come from agents that demand information (e.g., subscribers and commercial adver-
tisement), while bribes come from agents that want to suppress or manipulate information. However, in
reality it is very difficult to disentangle them. For example, imagine that the government is advertising
in the media a new vaccination program. This advertisement could be part of a real effort to inform the
population about the advantages of the program and, hence, it should be treated as a news-related revenue.
However, it is also possible that the advertisement, or part of it, is just a hidden bribe to media companies
in order to suppress information about corruption in the vaccination program.
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where E¯M > 0. There are several ways of interpreting (41). One simple possibility is to
consider that at least a fraction of the population is interested in politics and, hence, they
are willing to pay for media subscriptions in order to be informed about public policies.
The intuition is that those who stay uninformed free ride those who pay for subscriptions.
Another possibility is to assume that people demand information about public policies
not because they are interested in making more informed collective decisions, but rather
because they need this information to take better private decisions (Stro¨mberg, 2004).
Regardless of the interpretation, the key idea is that the general public is willing to pay
E¯M > 0 whenever the media informs c = cL.
The total expenditure on media subscriptions must be somehow distributed among
media companies. Following Besley and Prat (2006), suppose that the total expenditure
is evenly shared by all the active media companies, i.e., the companies that are reporting
some news. Formally, the news-related revenue of media company i (bribes are the other
source of revenue) is given by:
EM,i (r1, ..., rn) =
 0 if ri = ∅,E¯M
m if ri = cL,
(42)
where m = # {i : ri = cL} is the number of companies reporting news.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Entry: Companies simultaneously decide to enter into the media industry. If a
company decides to enter it must pay CS , regardless of the its future report.
2. Signal: Nature determines c. The politician observes the realization of c. A signal
s about c is realized. All the media companies and the politician observe this signal.
3. Bribes:
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a. The politician offers bribes to the media companies. Each bribe is a take it or
leave it offer of the following form: the politician commits to pay a bribe Bi (ri)
to media company i if and only if the media company i agrees to report ri. Since
the media cannot fabricate news, if s = ∅, then ri = ∅, while if s = cL, then
ri ∈ {cL, ∅}.
b. The media companies simultaneously accept or reject the bribe offers and then
report news.
4. Contracts:
a. The general public observes the news and then offers a contract or a menu of
contracts to the politician. A contract specifies the level of the public good g
and taxes T .
b. The politician selects a contract among the alternatives offered by the general
public.
A key idea behind this timing is that the general public can use the information provided
by the media to control the politician. Note that the general public offers a menu of
contracts to the politician after observing media reports.51
51There are several works that suggest that mass media play an important role monitoring politicians.
Besley and Burgess (2001) use data from India to show that state governments react more to falls in food
production and floods where newspaper circulation is higher (they expend more on public food distribution
and calamity relief). Finan and Ferraz (2008) study the effects of disclosing information about corruption
using data from an anti-corruption program implemented by the Brazilian federal government. They find
that the release of information has a significant impact on incumbents’s electoral performance, and that the
effects are more pronounced in areas with more local radios. Querubin and Snyder (2011) employ data from
the United States to estimate the rents obtained by congressmen between 1850-1880. They find significant
rents during the Civil War period and they hypothesize that this is partly due to a decrease in control by
the media, which was mainly focus on reporting news about the war. Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2008) use
modern data from the United States and they show that ”congressmen who are less covered by local press
work less for their constituencies”. Moreover, they also document that ”federal spending is lower in areas
where there is less press coverage of the local members of congress”.
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This model can be represented as a game with incomplete information. A strategy for
the politician is a schedule of bribes (B1, ..., Bn) (a bribe offer to each media company in
the industry) and a public budget (T, g). Each Bi is of the following form: the politician
commits to pay Bi (ri) to the media company i if and only if i agrees to report ri. The
politician also selects a public budget (T, g) for each menu of budgets offered by the general
public. A strategy for media company i is a report ri. A strategy for the general public is a
menu of possible public budgets for each schedule of reports (r1, ...rn). Formally, let M be
the set of possible public budgets and let P (M) be the power set of M . Then, a strategy
profile (αP , αM,1, ..., αM,n, αGP ) is given by: (i) Politician: αP = (B1, ..., Bn, T, g), where
Bi : {cL,∅} → ℜ2+ and (T, g) : P (M) → M ; (ii) Media companies: αM,i : Bi → {cL,∅}
for i = 1, ..., n; and (iii) General Public: αGP : (r1, ..., rn)→ P (M).
Definition 3.1: A perfect Bayesian equilibrium with n media companies is a strategy
profile (αP , αM,1, ..., αM,n, αGP ) and a belief about the cost of the public good such that:
1. Belief : Bayesian updating given the media reporting strategy.
2. Contracts:
a. Given its belief, the general public offers the menu of public budgets that maxi-
mizes its expected utility.
b. For each menu of budgets offered by the general public, the politician selects the
budget that maximizes his utility.
3. Bribes: The politician selects the bribe schedule that maximizes his expected utility.
4. Reports: Given the bribe schedule, each media company selects the report that max-
imizes its expected utility.
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It is useful to distinguish two different types of equilibria. When the politician uses
bribes to keep the general public uninformed (formally, when in equilibrium ri = ∅ for all i)
we say that the media industry has been captured by the politician, while when the media
truthfully reports the news (formally, when in equilibrium ri = s for at least one i), we say
that the media industry is free.
Definition 3.1 assumes that there are n media companies in the market. It is not
difficult to extend this definition to introduce endogenous entry.
Definition 3.2: An equilibrium with endogenous entry is a strategy profile
(αP , αM,1, ..., αM,n, αGP ), a belief about the cost of the public good, and a number of media
companies n such that:
1. The strategy profile and the belief is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with n media
companies.
2. The expected profit of each media company is nonnegative and it would be negative
in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium with n+ 1 companies.
Definitions 3.1 and 3.2 apply for any specification of CS. However, it is useful to
impose some assumptions on CS . In particular, since the total revenue of the industry is
equally shared among the companies that report news, it is easy to induce several market
structures just making CS a function of the number of active companies. The simplest
market structure is a natural monopoly.
Assumption 3.1: The media industry is a natural monopoly.Formally, the cost of a
media company is CS (n) = C¯S > 0 for all n ≥ 1.
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It is useful to clarify why assumption 3.1 implies that the media industry is a natural
monopoly.52 The cost of receiving the signal for an individual media company is CS (n) =
C¯S . This means that if there are n companies the total cost of the industry is nC¯S, which
it is minimizes when n = 1. In other words, from a technological point of view, the only
relevant feature of this industry is whether the signal is received or not by at least one
company, which implies that one company can supply the market at a lower cost than two
or more companies.
Assumption 3.2: A media monopoly is always profitable. Formally, pδE¯M > C¯S .
Note that, if it were the case that pδE¯M < C¯S , then the expected revenue of the
industry (pδE¯M ) would be lower than its lowest possible cost (C¯S) and, hence, not even a
single company would be willing to enter into the media market.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section I characterize the equilibrium of the media industry. The menu of con-
tracts that the general public offers to the politician depends on media reports. Subscrip-
tions, bribes and the number of active companies determine media reports and, ultimately,
the expected revenue obtained by each media company. Finally, companies optimally de-
cide whether to enter into the media industry and, hence, the equilibrium number of media
companies is determined. The key message of this section is that as media companies
are more productive, there is more competition in the media market and capture is more
difficult.
52I follow the standard definition of a natural monopoly due to Baumol (1977): ”an industry in which
multi-firm production is more costly than production by a monopoly”.
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Proposition 3.1 below formally characterizes the equilibrium of the media industry;
but first I need to introduce some notation. Let gL and g
cap
H be implicitly defined by the
following expressions:
u′ (gL) = cL (1 + λ) , (43)
u′
(
gcapH
)
=
(
cH − pcL
1− p
)
(1 + λ) , (44)
where recall that c ∈ {cL, cH} is the cost of the public good, p = Pr (c = cL) and λ ≥ 0
is the deadweight loss associated with a tax of one unit of the private good.53 It is not
difficult to prove that the utility gain of the politician when the media withholds s = cL
(formally, when s = cL but ri = ∅ for all i) is
∆P = g
cap
H (cH − cL) . (45)
Proposition 3.1: Let int (x) indicates the integer part of x. Let ∆P be defined
by expression (45) and let n denotes the number of media companies. Then, the media
industry is free if n > n¯ = int
(
∆P
E¯M
)
, while it is captured by the politician if n ≤ n¯.
Moreover, suppose that assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Then, free entry leads to a free
media industry if and only if C¯S ≤ δpE¯Mn¯+1 . Indeed, if C¯S > δpE¯Mn¯+1 , the equilibrium number
of media companies is n¯, while if C¯S ≤ δpE¯Mn¯+1 , it is nˆ = int
(
pδE¯M
C¯S
)
. Proof : See appendix
3.1.1. 
A few remarks about proposition 3.1. First, I am interpreting E¯M as a parameter of
53It is easy to verify that gL and gH are unique and gL > gH > 0. limg→0 u
′ (g) =∞, limg→∞ u
′ (g) = 0
and u′′ (g) < 0 imply that: (i) there is a unique gL > 0 such that u
′ (gL) = cL (1 + λ); and (ii) there is a
unique gH > 0 such that u
′ (gH) =
(
cH−pcL
1−p
)
(1 + λ). cL <
cH−pcL
1−p
and u′′ (g) < 0 imply that gL > gH .
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the media demand, but it is also possible to consider it as a combination of a demand
parameter and the transaction costs of bribes. For example, in Besley and Prat (2006) B
dollars of bribes paid by the politician becomes B/τ dollars received by the media, where
τ > 0 is a measure of the transactions costs involved in bribing. Then, we must replace
E¯M by E¯M τ . Second, technically speaking when nE¯M = ∆P , the politician is indifferent
between paying bribes of nE¯M and a captured media and do not paying bribes and a
free media. I arbitrarily break this indifference assuming that the politician captures the
media. Since the final goal is to find a constitutional rule for the media industry, I prefer
to be in the safe side and have a free media industry only when this is strictly better for
the politician. In the next section, the assumption is also convenient because it simplifies
welfare comparisons.
The first part of proposition 3.1 establishes that if there is enough competition in the
media market, then the media will be free. The intuition behind this result is that if the
politician wants to capture the media, he must pay to each company a bribe equal to the
amount that a company would obtain if it was the only one that reports the truth. The
second part of proposition 3.1 establishes that free entry will lead to enough competition
to avoid capture if the productivity of the media is higher than some threshold. Media
productivity is measured as the ratio δ
C¯S
. The higher the ratio δ
C¯S
the more productive the
media industry is, in the sense that it is less costly to obtain the same signal (equivalently,
it costs the same to obtain a more precise signal). The threshold is the inverse of the
expected revenue of a media company when the number of companies is just enough to
makes the industry free, i.e., n¯+1. Alternatively, free entry leads to a free media industry if
the expected profit of each media company when there are n¯+1 companies is nonnegative,
i.e., pδE¯Mn¯+1 − C¯S ≥ 0.
Figure 3.1 illustrates proposition 3.1 for u (g) = A ln (g) with A = 1 million, cL = 1,
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cH = 2.25, C¯S = 500, 1500, p = 0.25, λ = 0.35, and δ = 0.25. The dark curve indicates the
expected revenue of a media company for each possible value of n (the number of companies
that operates in the market). For n ≤ n¯ = 4, the media is captured by the politician and,
hence, the expected revenue of each company is pδE¯M (which is coming from bribes). For
n > n¯ = 4, the media is free and, hence, the expected revenue of each company is pδE¯M/n
(which is coming from subscriptions). The two thin horizontal lines indicate the cost of
receiving the signal (C¯S = 500, 1500). The equilibrium number of firms is given by the
intersection between the expected revenue curve and the cost line. For C¯S = 500, nine
companies enter into the market and the media is free, while for C¯S = 1500 only four firms
enter into the market and the media is captured by the politician.
Please see Figure 3.1: Equilibrium with Endogenous Entry
Example: Let u (g) = A ln (g). Then, ∆P =
A(1−p)(χ−1)
(1+λ)(χ−p) , where χ =
cH
cL
. Hence, from
proposition 1, the media industry is free if and only if the following condition holds (recall
that int (x) indicates the integer part of x)
n > n¯ = int
(
A (1− p) (χ− 1)
(1 + λ) (χ− p) E¯M
)
.
Free entry leads to a free media industry if and only if C¯S ≤ δpE¯Mn¯+1 . It is easy to check
that as taxation is more costly (λ higher), or the general public is more willing to expend
in the media, or the transaction cost of bribing are higher (E¯M higher), a less productive
media is enough to secure a free media. It is easy to see that the RHS is increasing in χ.
Thus, as the agency problem becomes more serious (χ higher), a more productive media
is necessary to avoid capture.
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3.4 Optimal Regulation
In the previous section I have fully characterized the media industry when there is no
public intervention. In this section I study the optimal regulation of the industry. After
finding the first best allocation, I argue that it is very unlikely that any realistic regulation
can implement it. Then, I consider a relatively unrestrictive constitutional environment in
which entry can either be restricted or promoted to any degree. Finally, I study increasingly
restrictive environments in which the constitution can only restrict or promote entry and,
even more restrictively, it has a discrete choice: monopoly or free entry.
First Best Allocation. It is useful, as a benchmark, to begin deducing the first best
allocation. On the one hand, in appendix 3.1.2 I show that under very mild conditions,
a captured media industry imposes a welfare loss. Thus, in order to avoid this loss it is
better to have a free media industry. On the other hand, since all media companies receive
and transmit the same signal, an industry with more than one company is an unnecessary
waste. Thus, in order to avoid this waste it is better to have a media monopoly. Therefore,
the first best allocation is reached when a media monopoly always reports the truth to
the general public. The problem with this solution is that it is really hard to imagine any
realistic environment in which it is possible to force a media monopoly to truthfully report
the news. Note that the textbook solution, i.e., public ownership, does not seem to work in
this case since the bureaucrat that runs the state-owned company will be easily captured
by the politician.54 A regulated privately owned monopoly does not seem to work either,
54An interesting example that illustrates the difficulties involved in regulating a state-owned media com-
pany is TVE and RTVE in Spain. After a terrorist attack in Madrid one week before a national election,
TVE and RTVE were accused of manipulating the information about the perpetrators, favoring the official
point of view of the event. As a consequence, a new procedure was established to design the CEOs and
important managers of TVE and RTVE. According to the new system any designation requires 65% of
the parliamentary votes, implicitly forcing an agreement between the two major parties (PP and PSOE).
The goal was to avoid that the party that wins the election also captures TVE and RTVE. However, very
recently, after a national election that gave a parliamentary majority to PP, a simple majority repealed
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unless there is an independent and incorruptible regulatory agency that somehow observes
the signal. Summing up, it is very unlikely that any realistic regulation can implement the
first best allocation.
A Constitutional Stage. Suppose that at the beginning of the game a stage 0 is
added, which can be interpreted as a constitutional stage. The goal is to find a consti-
tutional norm for the media industry that maximizes aggregate welfare. In order to so I
explore constitutional norms that can only restrict or promote entry into the media indus-
try. Moreover, I assume a simple, but realistic asymmetry. The constitution can always
restrict entry at no cost, but it cannot completely shut down the industry (there must
be at least one media company, i.e., n ≥ 1.) However, to promote entry the constitution
must subsidize media companies. The intuition behind this asymmetry is that in the long
run it is relatively difficult to promote entry into an industry only employing threats and
legal punishments.55 However, it is easy to restrict entry employing non-pecuniary punish-
ments such as legal licenses and fines. The key assumption is that through a constitutional
norm or any other social mechanism society is able to impose and enforce restrictions and
incentives to entry into the media industry.
The expected aggregate welfare that the constitution tries to maximize as a function
of the number of companies is given by:56
W (n) = E [uGP ] +E [uP ] +
∑n
i=1
E [uM,i] .
the new law, allowing the government to designed new authorities for TVE and RTVE. Moreover, the PP
justified the change, alleging that the previous authorities were strongly linked with PSOE.
55Legal punishments to force entry into a market could also infringe fundamental rights, usually protected
by liberal constitutions.
56I adopt a utilitarian welfare function, i.e., the aggregate welfare is the sum of the payoffs the agents
involved. This is a standard approach in the literature on industrial organization and regulation of public
utilities (see for example Laffont 2000). An analogous normative exercise can be repeated for other welfare
functions.
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In other words, the constitution tries to influence n in order to maximize W (n) employing
two policy instruments (entry restrictions and entry subsidies).57 The crucial trade off
depends on whether free entry leads to a free or a captured media industry. When, free
entry leads to a captured media industry, the constitution can try to subsidize entry in order
to obtain a free media or it can restrict entry to obtain a captured monopoly. When, free
entry leads to a free media industry, the constitution can try a moderate entry limitation
to avoid the costs of excessive entry by keeping a free media or it can go all the way to a
captured monopoly. Proposition 3.2 below formally formally considers this trade off; but
first I need to introduce some notation.
Let ∆B denotes the expected benefit of a free media (relative to captured media). In
appendix 3.1.2, I prove that:
∆B = pλ (cH − cL)
[
gcapH − (1− δ) gfreeH
]
+
+(1− p)
[
u
(
gfreeH
)
− u (gcapH )− (1 + λ) cH (gfreeH − gcapH )] , (46)
where gcapH and g
free
H are implicitly given by expression (44) (i.e., u
′
(
gcapH
)
=(
cH−pcL
1−p
)
(1 + λ)) and
u′
(
gfreeH
)
=
[
(1− δp) cH − p (1− δ) cL
1− p
]
(1 + λ) , (47)
respectively.
Proposition 3.2: Natural Monopoly. Suppose that assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Let
∆B be defined by expression (46) and assume ∆B > pδE¯M
(
n¯
n¯+1
)
, and let n¯ = int
(
∆P
E¯M
)
.
57Later I also consider alternative constitutional environments in which the constitutional choices are
even more restrictive.
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Assume that the constitution can restrict and promote entry. Then:
1. Suppose that a media monopoly will be captured by the politician (formally, n¯ ≥ 1).
Then:
a. If C¯S >
∆B+λpδE¯M
(1+λ)n¯+λ , then the optimal media industry is a monopoly captured by
the politician.
b. If pδE¯Mn¯+1 < C¯S ≤ ∆B+λpδE¯M(1+λ)n¯+λ , then the optimal media industry is free. Moreover,
entry to the industry must be subsidized, with the optimal subsidy given by S =
C¯S − pδE¯Mn¯+1 .
c. If C¯S ≤ pδE¯Mn¯+1 , then the optimal media industry is free. Moreover, entry to the
industry must be restricted to n¯+ 1 companies.
2. Suppose that a media monopoly cannot be captured by the politician (formally, n¯ < 1).
Then, the optimal media industry is a monopoly.
Proof : See appendix 3.1.2. 
The message of Proposition 3.2 is simple, but powerful. The media should not be
treated as a standard natural monopoly. Although there can be good reasons to believe
that the media in an increasing-returns industry, this is not enough to conclude that the
best we can do is to have one big media company. In fact, if the entry cost is low enough
(C¯S ≤ ∆B+λpδE¯M(1+λ)n¯+λ ), the optimal regulation is either to encourage entry with subsidies or to
impose just a moderate entry limitation. The reason is that it is worthwhile to pay the extra
costs associated with several media companies obtaining and reporting the same signal, if
extra competition helps to avoid the dissipation of resources in the political system.
Proposition 3.2 can be seen as a formalization of the concerns informally discussed in
Djankov et al (2001), who expose the limitations of a standard Pigouvian approach to
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the media industry. They argue that a standard Pigouvian approach would lead us to
recommend that the media industry should be organized as one public owned company
or, at least, as a regulated monopoly. However, they ask what would happen with the
incentives to collect and report news if the media is monopolized and/or controlled by the
state, a political economy issue not covered by the standard approach, but the central point
of this paper.
Proposition 3.2 can also be contrasted with the literature on optimal entry. For ex-
ample, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Zhao (2009) show that in a Cournot oligopoly
free entry could lead to excessive entry, in the sense that the optimal number of firms
is less than the equilibrium number of firms. The main reason is that when firms take
their entry decisions they do not fully internalize economies of scale. A similar logic also
applies to the model in this paper. However, in the media industry there could also exist a
counterbalancing effect; namely, free entry may lead to too few companies and, therefore,
to a captured media industry. Indeed, Proposition 3.2 balances these two opposite effects.
Proposition 3.2 is also related to the literature on principal-agent relationships with
supervisors. The key idea in this literature is that the principal must design a contract
in such a way that the agent does not have an incentive to collude with the supervisors
(see for example Laffont 2000). Usually, more supervisors help the principal because they
make collusion more complicated, but they also cost more resources. The trade off behind
proposition 3.2 is analogous, with the media companies playing the role of supervisors.
However, there are two important differences between the principal-agent models with
supervisors and the model in this paper. First, in the principal-agent literature the principal
is allow to design a full contract subject to the incentive and participation constraints while
here the constitution can only restrict or promote entry. Second, in the principal-agent
literature more supervisors hinder collusion in several different ways (for example yardstick
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competition), while in the model of this paper more media companies make capture more
difficult due to the way they compete for news-related revenues.
Example. Let u (g) = A ln (g). Then, from (44) and (47):
gcapH =
A (1− p)
(cH − pcL) (1 + λ) , g
free
H =
A (1− p)
[(1− δp) cH − p (1− δ) cL] (1 + λ) .
From proposition 3.1 (recall that int (x) denotes the integer part of x and χ = cHcL ):
n¯ = int
(
∆P
E¯M
)
= int
(
A (1− p) (χ− 1)
(1 + λ) (χ− p) E¯M
)
, nˆ = int
(
pδE¯M
C¯S
)
.
From (46):
∆B = (1− p)A ln
[
(χ− p)
(1− δp)χ− p (1− δ)
]
− δAp (1− p)
2 χ (χ− 1)
(χ− p) [(1− δp)χ− p (1− δ)] (1 + λ) .
It is tedious but easy to prove that ∆B (δ = 0) = 0 and ∂∆B∂δ > 0 for all δ > 0. Hence
∆B > 0 for all δ > 0, i.e., a captured media industry imposes a welfare loss.
From proposition 3.2 part 1, the optimal regulation leads to a free media industry if and
only if C¯S ≤ ∆B+λpδE¯M(1+λ)n¯+λ . Since∂∆B∂δ > 0 and n¯ does not depend on δ as the media becomes
more productive (C¯S lower or δ higher) the the region for which the optimal media is free
is bigger. Analogously, since n¯ is decreasing in E¯M , as the general public is more willing to
expend in the media (E¯M higher), the region for which the optimal media is free expands.
When regulation requires an entry subsidy (proposition 3.2 part 1.b), the optimal sub-
sidy is S = C¯S− pδE¯Mn¯+1 , which is decreasing in E¯M and δ and increasing in C¯S. Thus, as the
general public is more willing to expend in the media (E¯M higher), and the media is more
productive (δ higher or C¯S lower), the subsidy we need to make the industry free is lower.
When regulation requires an entry restriction (proposition 3.2 part 1.c), it is optimal to
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allow only n¯ + 1 companies, while free entry would leave to nˆ companies. The difference,
i.e., ∆n = nˆ − (n¯+ 1), is a measure of the magnitude of the restriction. ∆n is increasing
in E¯M , and
δ
C¯S
. Thus, as the general public is more willing to expend in the media (E¯M
higher), more firms would enter into the market under free entry (nˆ higher) and fewer
firms are enough to secure a free media (n¯+1 lower). As a consequence, the magnitude of
the entry restriction imposed by the optimal regulation increases. When the productivity
of the media industry increases ( δ
C¯S
higher) more firms would enter under free entry and,
hence, the entry restriction becomes more severe.
Alternative Constitutional Environment I. The welfare analysis behind Proposi-
tion 3.2 assumes that the constitution can promote and restrict entry. However, there could
be situations in which the constitution can promote but not restrict entry or vice versa.
Proposition 3.3 summarizes the optimal regulation in such constitutional environments.
Proposition 3.3: Suppose that assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Let ∆B be defined
by expression (46) and assume ∆B > pδE¯M
(
n¯
n¯+1
)
, let n¯ = int
(
∆P
E¯M
)
≥ 1, and nˆ =
int
(
pδE¯M
C¯S
)
. Then:
1. Assume that the constitution can promote, but not restrict entry. Then:
a. If C¯S ≤ ∆B+λpδE¯M(1+λ)n¯+λ , then the optimal media industry is free. Entry to
the industry might be subsidized, with the optimal subsidy given by S =
max
{
C¯S − pδE¯Mn¯+1 , 0
}
. Moreover, the optimal industry is an oligopoly with
max {n¯+ 1, nˆ} companies.
b. If C¯S >
∆B+λpδE¯M
(1+λ)n¯+λ , then the optimal media industry is an oligopoly with n¯
companies captured by the politician.
2. Assume that the constitution can restrict, but not promote entry. Then:
165
a. If C¯S ≤ pδE¯Mn¯+1 , then the optimal media industry is free. Entry should be restricted
to n¯+ 1 companies.
b. If C¯S >
pδE¯M
n¯+1 , then the optimal media industry is a captured monopoly. Entry
should be restricted to only one company.
Proof : See appendix 3.1.3. 
Comparing proposition 3.2 part 1 with proposition 3.3 part 1, if the constitution cannot
employ entry restrictions, then the region for which the optimal media is free is bigger.58
The reason is that when it is not possible to restrict entry the equilibrium number of
companies will be at least n¯. In other words, entry restrictions make a captured industry
more attractive because a monopoly avoids the unnecessary duplication of CS . Comparing
proposition 3.2 part 1 with proposition 3.3 part 2 it is possible to prove that if the consti-
tution cannot employ entry subsidies, then the region for which the optimal media is free
is smaller.59 The reason is again that entry restrictions make a captured industry a better
alternative.
Alternative Constitutional Environment II. Consider an even more restrictive
constitutional environment in which the constitution can only make a discrete choice: free
entry or monopoly. Proposition 3.4 summarizes the optimal regulation in such environment.
Proposition 3.4: Suppose that assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Let ∆B be defined by
expression (46) and assume ∆B > 0, let n¯ = int
(
∆P
E¯M
)
≥ 1 and nˆ = int
(
pδE¯M
C¯S
)
. Assume
that the constitution can only select between free entry and a monopoly. Then, free entry
dominates monopoly if and only if C¯S ≤ min
{
pδE¯M
n¯+1 ,
∆B
nˆ−1
}
. Proof : See appendix 3.1.4.

58Formally, ∆B+λpδE¯M
λn¯+1+λ
≥ ∆B+λpδE¯M
(1+λ)n¯+λ
since n¯ ≥ 1.
59Note that ∆B+λpδE¯M
(1+λ)n¯+λ
≥ pδE¯M
n¯+1
.
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Proposition 3.4 reaffirms the case against a media monopoly. Even when the media
operates under increasing returns and the only available option to a media monopoly is
free entry, monopoly is not automatically justified.
3.5 Extension I: Natural Oligopoly
The notion that the media industry is a natural monopoly might sound extreme. How-
ever, the main message of proposition 2 remains unaltered if this assumption is relaxed.
Consider the following generalization of assumption 3.1.
Assumption 3.1bis: The media industry is a natural oligopoly with nmin ≥ 1 compa-
nies. Formally, the cost function CS (n) is given by:
CS (n) =

GS(n)
n if n ≤ nmin,
C¯S
nmin
if n ≥ nmin,
where GS (n) is any decreasing function such that GS (nmin) = C¯S.
It is easy to see that if nmin = 1, then assumption 3.1bis is equivalent to assumption 1.
For nmin > 1, assumption 3.1bis generates a natural oligopoly of nmin > 1 companies. In
order to see this, note that nmin = argminn {nCS (n)}. In other words, nmin companies can
supply the media market at the lowest possible cost. Several remarks about assumption
1bis apply. First, note that the minimum cost of the industry is always C¯S , regardless of
the value of nmin. This implies that when nmin varies only the market structure of the
media industry is changing, but the total minimum cost of the industry is fixed. Second,
assumption 3.1bis is compatible with a standard constant return to scale industry for which
the number of companies is undetermined. Just define GS (n) = C¯S and nmin =∞, which
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means that CS (n) =
C¯S
n for all n ≥ 1 and, therefore, the total cost of the industry is C¯S
for all n.
The following assumption is a generalization of assumption 3.2.
Assumption 3.2bis: A media oligopoly of nmin companies is always profitable. For-
mally, pδγ∆GP > C¯S.
Proposition 3.5 summarizes the optimal regulation when the media industry is a natural
oligopoly.
Proposition 3.5: Natural Oligopoly. Suppose that assumptions 3.1bis and 3.2bis hold.
Let ∆B be defined by expression (46) and assume ∆B > pδE¯M
(
n¯+1−nmin
n¯+1
)
, and let n¯ =
int
(
∆P
E¯M
)
. Assume that the constitution can restrict and promote entry. Then:
1. Suppose that an oligopoly with nmin companies will be captured by the politician (for-
mally, n¯ ≥ nmin.) Then:
a. If C¯S >
nmin(∆B+λpδE¯M)
(1+λ)(n¯+1)−nmin
, then the optimal media industry is a captured oligopoly
with nmin companies.
b. If pδE¯Mnminn¯+1 ≤ C¯S ≤
nmin(∆B+λpδE¯M)
(1+λ)(n¯+1)−nmin
, then the optimal media industry is free.
Moreover, entry to the industry must be subsidized with the optimal subsidy given
by S = C¯Snmin −
pδE¯M
n¯+1 .
c. If C¯S <
pδE¯Mnmin
n¯+1 , then the optimal media industry is free. Moreover, entry to
the industry must be restricted to n¯+ 1 companies.
2. Suppose that an oligopoly with nmin cannot be captured by the politician (formally,
n¯ < nmin.) Then, the optimal media industry is an oligopoly with nmin companies.
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Proof : See appendix 3.1.5. 
Proposition 3.5 is a natural generalization of proposition 3.2, with one important re-
mark. Note that, as the media industry becomes more competitive, in the sense that nmin
increases, it is more likely that the the constitution favors a free media. In order to see
this formally, note that the threshold in part 1 is decreasing in nmin. The intuition is that
when nmin increases, the difference between the number of companies necessary to make
the industry free and nmin decreases.
Proposition 3.5 part 1 implicitly assumes an upper bound on nmin (note that n¯ ≥
nmin, which implies that nmin must be finite). This eliminates the possibility of perfect
competition in the media market. However, it is reasonable to ask what would happen if
the industry becomes more and more competitive, eventually reaching a point for which
nmin > n¯. Proposition 3.5 part 2 answers this question. Once this happens, there is no
more a trade off between excessive entry (due to duplication of the cost of the signal) and
insufficient entry (due to capture). Therefore, the optimal constitution rule can restrict
entry to nmin, without any fear of inducing a captured industry.
3.6 Extension II: Two Sources of Capture
Previous sections have stressed the role of politicians as the main source of media
capture. This is a reasonable starting point because usually government officials are in a
privileged position to bribe and extort the press and are those who can profit the most from
information manipulation. Nevertheless, powerful constituencies (e.g., special interests
groups) could be another important source of media capture and information manipulation.
In other words, the baseline model emphasizes the vertical dimension of social conflict, i.e.,
the conflict between politicians that run the government and citizens with homogeneous
policy preferences, but it overlooks the horizontal dimension, i.e., the conflict among groups
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of citizens with heterogeneous policy preferences. In this section, I extend the baseline
model in order to introduce two groups of citizens, one of which has privileged access to
the media. Then, I use the extended model to study the optimal regulation of the media
industry.
3.6.1 An Extended Model of the Media Industry60
Consider a society composed by two homogeneous groups, indexed by h = GP,E, where
GP indicates the general public and E indicates the elite. Each group has a proportion
nh of the citizens, with nGP > 1/2, and each citizen in group h has income yh (i.e., an
endowment of the private good), with yE > yGP . Let y indicates the average income of
the economy, i.e., y = nGPyGP + nEyE. Assume also that there are two public goods, g
1
and g2. Each public good is produced with a simple linear technology, i.e., the total cost
of producing gj units of the public good j = 1, 2 is cjgj units of the private good, where
cj is a random variable that can adopt the values cjL or c
j
H (c
j
L < c
j
H) with probabilities
pj ∈ (0, 1) and (1− pj), respectively.
Citizens get utility from the consumption of the private good and the two public goods,
whose provision is financed with a proportional income tax. Each unit of the private good
taxed at the rate τ ≥ 0 generates a deadweight loss equal to λτ , where λ ≥ 0. Citizens in
group h also expends EM (h) on media subscriptions and/or advertisements.
61 The utility
function of a citizen of group h is given by:
60As I briefly mentioned in the introduction, Corneo (2005) and Petrova (2008) study media capture
in environments populated by citizens with heterogeneous policy preferences. In both models, a group
of citizens manage to bribe the media, distorting available information about public policies, and, hence,
pushing public policies in the direction of their interests. In particular, Petrova (2005) develops a model in
which the rich elite, who are informed about the cost of public goods, tries to influence the media in order
to keep the poor median voter uninformed about the real cost of public goods. I adapt and incorporate
this framework to the baseline model.
61The general public buys subscriptions and the elite pays advertisements.
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uh
(
g1, g2, τ, EM (h)
)
= βu
(
g1
)
+ (1− β) u (g2)+ [1− (1 + λ) τ ] yh − EM (h) , (48)
where the sub-utility function u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously
differentiable and satisfies limg→0 u
′ (g) = ∞ and limg→∞ u′ (g) = 0; and β ∈ [0, 1] is a
measure of the importance of g1.
The politician collects taxes and provides the public goods. He also expends B units
of the private good on bribes to the media industry. Thus, the utility function of the
politician is given by:
uP
(
g1, g2, τ, B
)
= τy − c1g1 − c2g2 −B (49)
As in the baseline model, information about the cost of the public goods is asymmet-
rically distributed. In particular, the politician and the elite observe the realization of(
c1, c2
)
, the general public only knows the probability distribution of
(
c1, c2
)
, and the me-
dia industry receives an informative signal
(
s1, s2
)
. When cj = cjL, s
j = cjL with probability
δj and sj = ∅ with probability
(
1− δj); when cj = cjH , sj = ∅. As before media companies
cannot fabricate news, i.e., when sj = cjL, r
j
i ∈
{
cjL,∅
}
, when sj = ∅, rji = ∅. Compared
with the baseline model, the innovation is that the elite is informed about
(
c1, c2
)
.
Media companies have three rather than two sources of revenue. The general public
still expends on subscriptions (EM,i) and the politician pays bribes (Bi), but now the elite
pays advertisements (Ai). Thus, the payoff function of media company i is given by:
uM,i (EM,i, Ai, Bi, CS) = EM,i +Ai +Bi − CS , (50)
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where CS is the cost of an individual company.
As in the baseline model total expenditure on subscriptions is evenly shared among
all the active media companies. In particular, let mj = #
{
i : rji = c
j
L
}
be the number
of companies reporting news about cj . Then, the subscription-related revenue of media
company i is EM,i = E
1
M,i + E
2
M,i, where E
j
M,i =
E¯jM
mj
if rji = c
j
L, E
j
M,i = 0 if r
j
i = ∅, and
E¯jM > 0 are two constants.
The timing of events is essentially the same as in the baseline model, except for the
following modifications. 1. Entry: In the entry stage now companies must also decide to
specialize in gathering information about c1, c2 or both. 2. Signals: In the signaling stage,
not only the politician but also the elite observes
(
c1, c2
)
and
(
s1, s2
)
. 3. Bribes: In the
bribing stage, now there are two groups (the politician and the elite) with the capacity of
influencing news. Moreover, they move sequentially: first, the elite offers advertisements
and, then, the politician offers bribes. 4. Contracts: Now a contract specifies g1, g2 and
a tax rate τ . g2 must be the same in every contract of the menu and τ can be contingent
on the realization of c2, but not on the realization of c1. The idea is that g1 captures
the conflict of interests between citizens and the politician, while g2 captures the conflict
between the elite and the general public.62
The extended model can be represented as a game with incomplete information.63
62The intuition is as follows. On the one hand, when the general public can offer a menu of contracts
with different values of g1, but with a tax rate that cannot be contingent on the realization of c1, there is a
principal-agent problem and, hence, the crucial issue is not the level of g1 but the rents that the politician
keeps due to his information advantage with respect to the general public. On the other hand, when the
general public must select a level of g2, but the tax rate can be contingent on c2, the politician cannot
capture any rents and the crucial issue is the level of g2 (the elite prefers a lower g2 than the general public).
63A strategy for the politician αP is a schedule of bribes
((
B11 , B
2
2
)
, ...,
(
B1n, B
2
n
))
(a pair of bribe offers
to each media company in the industry) and a public budget
(
g1, g2, τy
)
. Each Bji is of the following form:
the politician commits to pay Bji
(
r
j
i
)
to media company i if and only if the media company i commits to
report rji . The politician also selects a public budget
(
g1, g2, τy
)
for each menu of budgets offered by the
general public. A strategy for the elite αE is schedule of advertisements
((
A11, A
2
1
)
, ...,
(
A1n, A
2
n
))
(a pair of
advertisement offers to each media company in the industry). Each Aji is of the following form: the elite
commits to pay Aji
(
r
j
i
)
to media company i if and only if media company i commits to report rji . A strategy
for media company i αM,i is a pair of feasible reports
(
r1i , r
2
i
)
for each schedule of bribes
(
B1i , A
1
i , B
1
i , A
2
i
)
.
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Moreover, an equilibrium for this game is a natural extension of definition 1.
Definition 3.3: An equilibrium with n media companies (nj ≥ 0 that special-
ize in sj and n − n1 − n2 ≥ 0 that receive both signals)64 is a strategy profile
(αP , αE , αM,1, ..., αM,n, αGP ) and a belief about the cost of the public goods such that: 1.
Belief: Definition 3.1 applies with c =
(
c1, c2
)
, p =
(
p1, p2
)
, s =
(
s1, s2
)
and ri =
(
r1i , r
2
i
)
.
2. Contracts: Definition 3.1 applies with a contract given by a public budget
(
g1, g2, τy
)
.
3. Bribes: (a) The elite selects the advertisement schedule that maximizes its expected
utility; and (b) For each advertisement schedule the politician selects the schedule of bribes
that maximizes his expected utility. 4. Reports: Definition 3.1 applies with ri =
(
r1i , r
2
i
)
.
When the politician uses bribes to keep the general public uninformed about c1 (for-
mally, when in equilibrium r1i = ∅ for all i) we say that the media industry has been
captured by the politician and when the elite uses advertisements to keep the general pub-
lic uninformed about c2 (formally, when in equilibrium r2i = ∅ for all i) we say that the
media industry has been captured by the elite.
Definition 3.3 takes (n1, n2, n) as given, but if companies can decide entry, these are
endogenous variables.
Definition 3.4: An equilibrium with endogenous entry is a strategy profile, a belief
about the cost of the public goods, and a vector
(
n1, n2, n
)
, where nj ≥ 0 and n ≥ n1+n2,
such that: 1. The strategy profile and the belief is an equilibrium with n media companies
(nj that specialize in sj and n − n1 − n2 that receive both signals); and 2. (n1, n2, n) is
such that: (a) the expected profit of each company is nonnegative; (b) a company cannot
increase its expected profit unilaterally changing its entry decision; and (c) the expected
A strategy for the general public αGP is a menu of possible public budgets for each schedule of reports.
64Note that it is always possible to relabel media companies in such a way that the companies that
specialize in s1 are i = 1, ..., n1, the ones that specialize in s
2 are i = n1 + 1, ..., n1 + n2, and the ones that
receive both signals are i = n1 + n2 + 1, ..., n. Thus, only the numbers n
1, n2, and n matter.
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profit of a company that receives sj would be negative in an equilibrium with one more firm
that receives sj .
Definitions 3.3 and 3.4 are consistent with any specification of the cost function of a
media company CS. However, it is useful to introduce some assumptions about the cost
and market structure of the media industry.
Assumption 3.3: The cost function of a media company is CS = e
1C¯1S + e
2C¯2S −
e1e2α
(
C¯1S + C¯
2
S
)
, where C¯jS > 0, e
j = 1 if the company pays for signal for sj, ej = 0 if the
company does not pay for sj, and α is a measure of the degree of economies of scope.
Assumption 3.3 implies that the media industry is either a natural monopoly or a
natural duopoly with one company specialized in s1 and another in s2. In order to see this,
note that the total cost of the media industry is given by
CS
(
n1, n2, n
)
=
(
n− n2) C¯1S + (n− n1) C¯2S − (n− n1 − n2)α (C¯1S + C¯2S) .
When there are economies of scope (α > 0 ) CS
(
n1, n2, n
)
adopts its minimum for(
n1 = 0, n2 = 0, n = 1
)
. Thus, the industry is a natural monopoly. When there are disec-
onomies of scope (α < 0 ) CS
(
n1, n2, n
)
adopts its minimum for
(
n1 = 1, n2 = 1, n = 0
)
.
Thus, the industry is a natural duopoly.
Assumption 3.4: A natural duopoly with one company specialized in s1 and another
in s2 is profitable for each company. Formally, pjδjE¯jM > C¯
j
S for j = 1, 2.
Assumption 3.4 simply states that at least one company will be willing to pay the cost
of receiving sj.
3.6.2 Equilibrium
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In appendix 3.2.1 I fully characterize the equilibrium of the media industry for the
extended model.65 In this section I briefly summarize the key features of the equilibrium
and illustrate it employing a simple example. The critical result is that the elite uses
advertisements to make media capture by the politician more difficult, but also to distort
information about the cost of g2.
Let ∆P denotes the utility gain of the politician when the media withholds s
1 = c1L, ∆
1
E
the utility gain of the elite when the media reports r1 = c1L, and γE ∈ [0, 1] the proportion
of the elite that pays advertisements. In the online appendix 3.2.1, I prove that:
∆P =
(
c1H − c1L
)
g1,capH ,
∆1E =
(
c1H − c1L
)
g1,capH (1 + λ)
(
nEyE
y
)
,
where g1,capH is implicitly given by βu
′
(
g1,capH
)
=
(
c1H−p
1c1L
1−p1
)
(1 + λ) yGPy . Then, in equi-
librium, the media is captured by the politician if and only if n − n2, i.e., the number of
companies that receive s1, is less than n¯1 + 1, where n¯1 is given by: (recall the int (x)
indicates the integer part of x)
n¯1 = int
(
∆P − γE∆1E
E¯1M
)
. (51)
Compared with the baseline model, the innovation is γE∆
1
E, which is the amount that the
elite uses to counter the politician’s bribes. Note that if the elite cannot advertise, then
the media will be captured by the politician whenever there are less than n˜1+1 companies
that receive s1, where n˜1 = int
(
∆P
E¯1M
)
< n¯1. In other words, the presence of the elite makes
media capture by the politician more difficult.
Let ∆2E denotes the utility gain of the elite when the media withholds s
2 = c2L. In the
65Appendix 3.2 can be found online at http://gustavotorrens.wordpress.com/.
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online appendix 3.2.1, I prove that
∆2E = max
{
0, (1− β)nE
[
u
(
g2,cap
)− u (g2L)]− (g2L − g2,cap) c2L (1 + λ) nEyEy
}
,
where g2,cap and g2L are implicitly given by (1− β)u′
(
g2,cap
)
=
(1 + λ)
[
p2c2L +
(
1− p2) c2H] yGPy and (1− β) u′ (g2L) = (1 + λ) c2L yGPy . Then, in equi-
librium, the media is captured by the elite if and only if n− n1, i.e., the number of media
companies that receive s2, is less than n¯2 + 1, where n¯2 is given by:
n¯2 = int
(
γE∆
2
E
E¯2M
)
. (52)
Compared with the baseline model, there are two innovations. First, concerning g2, the
source of media distortion is the elite, who is willing to pay up to γE∆
2
E in advertisements
if the media withholds s2 = c2L. Second, the politician is neutral about g
2. The reason
is that the tax rate can be contingent on c2 and, hence, the politician cannot obtain any
rents from g2.
Figures 3.2.a and 3.2.b illustrate the equilibrium of the media industry under free entry
when there are diseconomies of scope (α < 0) for u (g) = A ln (g) with, β = 0.50, λ = 0.35,
γE = 0.50, nGP = 0.75, nE = 0.25, yE/yGP = 4, p
1 = p2 = 0.25, δ1 = δ2 = 0.25,
c1H/c
1
L = c
2
H/c
2
L = 2.25, C¯
1
S = 250, 1500, and C¯
2
S = 500, 1500. Note that media companies
prefer to operate in only one market, i.e., no company pays both signals. In each figure,
the dark curve indicates the expected revenue of a media company for each possible value
of nj (the number of companies that operates in market j = 1, 2), while the two thin
horizontal lines indicate the cost of receiving the signal (C¯jS). The equilibrium number of
firms is given by the intersection between the expected revenue curve and the cost line.
n¯1+1 and n¯2+1 are the thresholds for the number of companies that stop capture by the
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politician and the elite, respectively. Note, however, an important difference between both
markets. While only the elite tries to influence r2, the elite and the politician are willing
to influence r1. In fact, when n1 ∈ [n˜1, n¯1 + 1], part of the revenue of the media is coming
from advertisements paid by the elite.
Please see Figure 3.2.a: Equilibrium in Market 1 with Endogenous Entry (Diseconomies
of Scope)
Please see Figure 3.2.b: Equilibrium in Market 2 with Endogenous Entry (Diseconomies
of Scope)
Figure 3.3 illustrates the equilibrium of the media industry under free entry when
economies of scope are high (α > αˆ =
max{C¯1S ,C¯2S}
C¯1S+C¯
2
S
) for u (g) = A ln (g) with A = 1,
β = 0.50, λ = 0.35, γE = 0.50, nGP = 0.75, nE = 0.25, yE/yGP = 4, p
1 = p2 = 0.25,
δ1 = δ2 = 0.25, c1H/c
1
L = c
2
H/c
2
L = 2.25, E¯
1
M =, E¯
1
M =, (1− α)
(
C¯1S + C¯
2
S
)
= 500, 1500
(for example, C¯1S = C¯
2
S = 500, 1500 and α = 0.50). Note that all media companies prefer
to operate in both markets, i.e., no company pays only one signal. Again, the dark curve
indicates the expected revenue of a media company for each possible value of n (the number
of companies), while the two thin horizontal lines indicate the total cost of an integrated
firm ((1− α) (C¯1S + C¯2S)). The equilibrium number of firms is given by the intersection
between the expected revenue curve and the cost line. n¯1 + 1 and n¯2 + 1 are again the
key thresholds. Indeed, if the expected profit of a media company when there are n¯1 + 1
companies in the market is nonnegative, at least n¯1 + 1 will enter into the market and,
hence, the media will not be captured by the elite or the politician. If the expected profit of
a company when there are n¯1+1 companies in the market is negative, but it is nonnegative
when there are n¯2 + 1, at least n¯2 + 1, but less than n¯1 + 1 companies will enter into the
market and, hence, media will be captured by the politician, but not by the elite. Finally,
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if the expected profit of a company when there are n¯2 + 1 companies in the market is
negative, less than n¯2 + 1 companies will enter into the market and, hence, the media will
be captured by the politician and the elite.
Please see Figure 3.3: Equilibrium with Endogenous Entry (Economies of Scope)
3.6.3 Optimal Regulation
In the previous section I have characterized the equilibrium of the media industry when
there is no public intervention. In this section I study the optimal regulation of the industry
with a focus on how society should regulate the ability of the elite to influence the media.
Following the approach of section 3.4, I begin finding the first best allocation. Then, I
consider a relatively unrestrictive constitutional environment in which entry can either be
restricted or promoted to any degree and the elite can be allowed or not to advertise.
Finally, I study a more restrictive environment in which the constitution has a discrete
choice, duopoly (monopoly) or free entry, and the elite’s ability to influence the media
through advertisements cannot be affected by the constitution.
First Best Allocation. It is useful, as a benchmark, to begin deducing the first best
allocation. As in the baseline model a media industry captured by the politician induces a
welfare loss. In the online appendix 3.2.2, I prove that this welfare loss is given by:
∆B1 = p1λ
(
c1H − c1L
) [
g1,capH −
(
1− δ1) g1,freeH ]
+
(
1− p1) {β [u(g1,freeH )− u(g1,capH )]− (1 + λ) c1H (g1,freeH − g1,capH )} , (53)
where g1,capH and g
1,free
H are implicitly given by βu
′
(
g1,capH
)
= (1 + λ)
(
c1H−p
1c1L
1−p1
)
yGP
y and
βu′
(
g1,freeH
)
= (1 + λ)
[
(1−δ1p1)c1H−(1−δ
1)p1c1L
(1−p1)
]
yGP
y . g
1,cap
H (g
1,free
H ) is the equilibrium level
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of g1 when c1 = c1H and the media is (not) captured by the politician. A media captured
by the elite also has a negative welfare effect. In the online appendix 3.2.2, I prove that
this welfare loss is given by:
∆B2 = (1− β)
[
p2δ2u
(
g2L
)
+
(
1− p2δ2)u(g2,free)− u (g2,cap)]
+ (1 + λ)
{[
p2c2L +
(
1− p2) c2H] (g2,cap − g2,free)+ p2δ2c2L (g2L − g2,free)} , (54)
where g2L, g
2,free, and g2,cap are implicitly given by (1− β) u′ (g2L) = (1 + λ) c2L yGPy ,
(1− β) u′ (g2,free) = (1 + λ) [(1−δ2)p2c2L+(1−p2)c2H
(1−δ2)p2+(1−p2)
]
yGP
y , (1− β) u′
(
g2,cap
)
=
(1 + λ)
[
p2c2L +
(
1− p2) c2H] yGPy . Therefore, in order to reach the first best alloca-
tion the media must always report the truth, i.e., rj = sj. Next, consider the total cost
of the signals. When there are diseconomies of scope (α < 0) the total cost adopts its
minimum when the media industry is a duopoly; while when there are economies of scope
(α > 0), the total cost adopts its minimum when the media industry is a monopoly. Thus,
when α < 0, the first best allocation is reached with a duopoly (one company that reports
r1 = s2 and another that reports r2 = s2); while when α > 0, the first best allocation is
reached with a monopoly that always reports
(
r1, r2
)
=
(
s1, s2
)
. For the same reasons
discussed in section 3.4, it is very unlikely that any realistic regulation can reach the first
best allocation.
A Constitutional Stage. Suppose that the constitution can impose entry restric-
tions, offer entry subsidies and allow or not the elite to advertise. Compared with the
constitutional environment studied in section 3.4, the innovation is the regulation of ad-
vertisements. The intuition is that the constitution can directly or indirectly restrict the
involvement of the elite in the media industry, for example, imposing some limits on ad-
vertising or through explicit ownership restrictions.
179
Since in this extension there are two sources of conflict, it is useful to distinguish which
source has a greater impact on aggregate welfare. When there are diseconomies (economies)
of scope we say that the vertical dimension of social conflict (g1) is more important than
the horizontal dimension (g2) if and only if the following condition holds
∆B2 ≤ ∆B1 −
 n¯
1C¯1S if α < 0,
n¯1 (1− α) (C¯1S + C¯2S) if α > 0. (55)
The interpretation of this condition is simply. Suppose that there are diseconomies
(economies) of scope and take as a reference point a natural duopoly (monopoly) captured
by the politician and the elite. If the constitution avoids a media industry captured by the
politician, there is a welfare gain equal to ∆B1, but it must be the case that at least n¯1 ex-
tra companies are induced to report s1. Thus, ∆B1− n¯1C1S (∆B1− n¯1 (1− α)
(
C¯1S + C¯
2
S
)
)
is the maximum change in expected welfare that can be obtained avoiding a media industry
captured by the politician, a measure of the social importance of the vertical dimension of
social conflict. The constitution can always avoid a media industry captured by the elite
just forbidding the elite to offer advertisements, which generates a welfare gain equal to
∆B2. Thus, ∆B2 is the maximum change in expected welfare that can be obtained avoid-
ing a media industry captured by the elite, a measure of the importance of the horizontal
dimension of social conflict.
Proposition 3.6 : Suppose that assumptions 3.3 and 3.4 hold and free entry leads to
a media industry captured only by the elite when the elite can advertise, but it leads to a
media industry captured only by the politician when the elite cannot to advertise. Assume
that the constitution can impose entry restrictions, offer entry subsidies and allow or not
the elite to advertise. Suppose that there are diseconomies of scope, i.e., α < 0, and the
cost of making the media industry free is lower when the elite can advertise (there are
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economies of scope, i.e., α > αˆ, and n¯1 < n¯2 < n˜1). Then, if condition (55) holds, the
optimal regulation allows the elite to advertise. Moreover, if the optimal regulation does
not allow the elite to advertise, condition (55) does not hold. Proof : see online appendix
3.2.3.66 
Proposition 3.6 shows that restricting the involvement of the elite in the media industry
is more attractive when the horizontal dimension of social conflict is more important than
the vertical one. The intuition behind this result is that a constitutional restriction that
limits the ability of the elite to influence the media will reduce the checks on the politician,
but it will increase the checks on the elite. Note, however, that when there are economies
of scope it is easier that the horizontal dimension dominates the vertical dimension than
when there are diseconomies of scope. The reason is that the extra cost of avoiding a media
industry captured by the politician with respect to a situation with only one company that
receives s1 is n¯1C1S when there are diseconomies of scope, while it is n¯
1 (1− α) (C¯1S + C¯2S)
when there are economies of scope.
Proposition 3.6 can also be understood as a formalization of an old conservative/liberal
debate. Those who emphasize the vertical dimension of conflict tend to welcome the
involvement of elite in the media industry because they see it as a way of imposing a limit
to politicians. On the other hand, those who emphasize the horizontal dimension of conflict
tend to favor restrictions to the involvement of the elite because they fear that a powerful
elite that controls the media will manipulate the information about public policies. In terms
of the model, when β → 1 the horizontal dimension vanishes and the elite contributes to
make the media free, while when β → 0 the vertical dimension vanishes and the elite
distorts information about policies.
Alternative Constitutional Environment. Suppose that the elite’s ability to in-
66Appendix 3.2 can be found online at http://gustavotorrens.wordpress.com/.
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fluence the media through advertisements is exogenous and cannot be affected by the
constitution, which can only select between free entry and a natural duopoly when there
are diseconomies of scope and between free entry and a natural monopoly when there are
economies of scope.
Proposition 3.7: Suppose that assumptions 3.3 and 3.4 hold and there are disec-
onomies of scope, i.e., α < 0 (economies of scope, i.e., α > αˆ). Assume that the con-
stitution can only select between free entry and duopoly (monopoly) and the elite’s ability
to influence the media through advertisements is exogenous and cannot be affected by the
constitution. Then, if free entry dominates a duopoly (monopoly) when the elite cannot ad-
vertise then free entry also dominates a duopoly (monopoly) when the elite can advertise.
Proof : See online appendix 3.2.4.67
Proposition 3.7 shows that free entry is more attractive when the elite can advertise.
The intuition is that when the elite can advertise free entry is useful to avoid media capture
by the politician and the elite, while when the elite cannot advertise, it cannot capture the
media either and, hence, free entry is only useful to avoid media capture by the politician.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper develops a political economy model of the media industry and derives the
optimal regulation of the media under several alternative constitutional settings. The
fundamental message of the paper is that the media should not be treated as a standard
industry and that economies of scale are not a sufficient condition for restricting entry or
favoring a media monopoly. More competition inoculates the media from being captured
by powerful politicians, avoiding the dissipation of resources in the political system. In
67Appendix 3.2 can be found online at http://gustavotorrens.wordpress.com/.
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other words, the standard argument in Industrial Organization about excessive entry in
oligopolistic industries might not apply to the media industry because it neglects the effect
that media competition has on political outcomes. In general, the optimal regulation favors
free entry or, at least, the elimination of major entry barriers. Moreover, when free entry
leads to a captured media, it might be optimal to actively promote entry rather than
passively accept a captured industry.
Although my model stresses how competition contributes to stop media capture, com-
petition in the media industry could be beneficial for other reasons. For example, Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006) show that competition tends to reduce the proclivity of media com-
panies to confirm the public’s views (prior beliefs) rather than inform objectively. Fur-
thermore, my model ignores the standard deadweight loss due to imperfect competition.
Nevertheless, introducing these or any other positive welfare effects caused by competition
can only reinforce the main message of this paper.
The extended model developed in section 3.6 incorporates two sources of social conflict
and two groups that try to capture the media (the politician and the elite). The elite plays
an ambiguous role in the media industry. On one hand, it tends to neutralize the politician
in the sense that it is more difficult for the politician to capture the media when the elite
is also trying to influence news. From this point of view, the elite provides a public good.
On the other hand, the elite encourages the media to withhold information when it can be
used to promote policies that negatively its interest.
Two important results emerge from this extension. First, due to the ambiguous role of
the elite, the relative importance of the vertical dimension of social conflict (i.e., the politi-
cian versus the general public and the elite) in comparison with the horizontal dimension
(i.e., the general public versus the elite) is the key determinant of whether the involvement
of the elite in the media industry is welfare enhancing. Second, free entry is even more
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appealing when the elite is involved in the media because if the elite can easily influence
the media free entry helps to avoid media capture by the politician and the elite, while if
the elite cannot influence the media, free entry is only useful to avoid media capture by the
politician. The model also suggests that mergers and acquisitions in the media industry
are complicated because they can dramatically change the equilibrium of the industry. For
example, if integrated68 companies merge and block entry, then media capture becomes
more likely because there will be fewer media companies in the market. However, if there
are economies of scope, allowing mergers between two non-integrated companies is a simple
way of reducing entry barriers and, hence, decreasing the chances of capture.
This paper is far from answering all the relevant questions about the optimal organiza-
tion of the media industry. Indeed, there are several interesting open questions. First, in
my model there is no explicit distinction between private and public media companies. Can
public media enhance aggregate welfare? It is easy to see that in the baseline model the
answer is “no” because ultimately, public media will be controlled by the politician. Thus,
it will only reduce the cost of capture, most likely decreasing aggregate welfare. When the
horizontal dimension of conflict is present, public media might be useful. In the extended
model this is not the case: the politician only cares about the vertical dimension of conflict
and he is neutral regarding the horizontal dimension. As a result, a public media controlled
by the politician has little incentive to report the true signal about c2. However, if the
game is repeated and the general public can reelect the politician, it is possible that he
strictly prefers to use public media to report about c2. Moreover, the general public will
be more willing to reelect a politician that reports the true signal about c2. Nevertheless,
public media will have an ambiguous effect on aggregate welfare, making media capture by
the politician easier at the cost of making media capture by the elite more complicated.
68”Integrated” is defined as a company that gathers information about both policy dimensions. A “non-
integrated” company is one that only reports about one policy dimension.
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There are at least three more specific open issues with respect media industry orga-
nization: the distribution of official government advertising; exclusive interviews versus
general press conferences; and, the extension of the right of journalists to protect their
sources. With respect to the first issue, politicians might be tempted to use government
paid advertising to influence the media. A simple way of alleviating this problem could
be a regulation that allocates government advertising to media companies according their
fraction of readership and/or viewers.69 Second, sometimes politicians give exclusive in-
terviews only to journalists who favor their agenda, thereby distorting the information
received by the public. A simple way to solve this problem is to promote general press
conferences in which media companies with diverse ideological leanings can participate
and ask questions.70 Third, journalists tend to protect the anonymity of their sources,
while government agencies always find a good reason to ask journalists to disclose them.
An optimal regulation should define the extension of the journalists’ right to protect the
anonymity of their sources by balancing between the potential value of the information for
the government against the value of journalists’ reputation.
Finally, in future works, it would be really interesting to integrate these specific and
more focus regulations with the broader regulations considered in this paper.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium with Endogenous Entry
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Figure 3.2.a: Equilibrium in Market 1 with Endogenous Entry (Diseconomies of Scope)
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Figure 3.2.b: Equilibrium in Market 2 with Endogenous Entry (Diseconomies of Scope)
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium with Endogenous Entry (Economies of Scope)
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Appendix 3.1: Baseline Model
In this appendix I present the proofs of the propositions for the baseline model (sections
3.3, 3.4 and 3.5).
Appendix 3.1.1: Proof of Proposition 3.1
In order to prove proposition 3.1, it is useful to begin proving the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: Let r = cL if ri = cL for at least one i = 1, ..., n and r = ∅ if ri = ∅
for i. Let αc denotes the probability that the media is captured and let µ (r) denotes the
probability that c = cL conditional on observing the report r. Then, the menu of contracts
offered by the public are (gL, TL), (gH , TH), where:
u′ (gL) = (1 + λ) cL,
u′ (gH) = (1 + λ)
[
cH − µ (r) cL
1− µ (r)
]
for µ (r) < 1, gH = 0 for µ (r) = 1,
TL = gH (cH − cL) + cLgL, TH = cHgH ,
µ (r) = Pr (c = cL| r = r) =

αcδp+(1−δ)p
αcδp+(1−δ)p+(1−p)
if r = ∅,
1 if r = cL.
Proof : Let αc denotes the probability that the media is captured and let µ (r) denotes
the probability that c = cL conditional on observing the report r. Then, from a sim-
ple application of the Bayes’ rule µ (r = ∅) = Pr (c = cL| r = ∅) = αcδp+(1−δ)pαcδp+(1−δ)p+(1−p) and
µ (r = cL) = Pr (c = cL| r = cL) = 1. Then, due to the revelation principle the problem of
the general public for each possible report is:
max
{gL,TL,gH ,TH}
{µ (r) [u (gL)− (1 + λ)TL] + [1− µ (r)] [u (gH)− (1 + λ)TH ]} ,
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subject to participation constraints TL − cLgL ≥ 0 and TH − cHgH ≥ 0, and the incentive
compatibility constraints TL − cLgL ≥ TH − cLgH , and TH − cHgH ≥ TL − cHgL. Bribes
paid by the politician do not appear in the constraints because at this time there have
already been paid and, hence, there are just a sunk cost. This is an standard principle-
agent problem (see Laffont 2000), whose unique solution is u′ (gL) = (1 + λ) cL, u
′ (gH) =
(1 + λ)
[
cH−µ(r)cL
1−µ(r)
]
for µ (r) < 1, gH = 0 for µ (r) = 1, TL = gH (cH − cL) + cLgL, and
TH = cHgH . Note that since limg→0 u
′ (g) =∞, limg→∞ u′ (g) = 0, and u′′ (0) < 0 there is
a unique (gL, gH) that satisfies the first two expressions. 
Lemma 3.2: Let ∆P = g
cap
H (cH − cL), where u′ (gL) = cL (1 + λ), and u′
(
gcapH
)
=(
cH−pcL
1−p
)
(1 + λ). Assume that n companies have entered into the media market. Then,
the media industry is free (indeed ri = s for all i) if nE¯M > ∆P , while it is captured by
the politician ( ri = ∅ for all i) if nE¯M ≤ ∆P .
Proof : When s = ∅, since the media cannot fabricate news, r = ∅. Thus, the only
relevant node is when s = cL. Suppose that the politician does not bribe the media.
Then, whenever s = cL, the media reports r = cL and, from lemma 3.1, the contract
offered by general public is (gL, TL), where u
′ (gL) = (1 + λ) cL and TL = cLgL. Thus, the
politicians gets a payoff equal to 0. On the contrary, suppose that the politician decides
to capture the media. Then, in equilibrium αc = 1. Hence, µ (r = ∅) = p and, from
lemma 3.1, the menu of contracts offered by the general public is (gL, TL) and
(
gcapH , TH
)
,
where u′ (gL) = (1 + λ) cL, u
′
(
gcapH
)
= (1 + λ)
(
cH−pcL
1−p
)
, TL = g
cap
H (cH − cL) + cLgL,
TH = cHg
cap
H . Thus, when s = cL the politician gets a payoff of g
cap
H (cH − cL), while if he
had not captured the media he would have obtained a payoff equal to 0. As a consequence,
∆P = g
cap
H (cH − cL) is the maximum bribe that the politician is willing to offer in order
to change the report from r = cL to r = ∅ when s = cL.
The total amount that the politician must pay in bribes if he wants to induce a change
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in reports from r = cL to r = ∅ is nE¯M . In order to see this, suppose that all media
companies are reporting ri = ∅. Then, if only one company decides to deviate it gets E¯M
and the report changes from r = ∅ to r = cL. Thus, if the politician wants r = ∅, he must
offer E¯M to each company. Since there are n companies, he must pay nE¯M .
If nE¯M > ∆P , the amount that the politician must pay is higher than the maximum
that he is willing to offer. Hence, the best strategy for the politician is to offer zero bribes
to all media companies. Then, the media will be free and all companies will report ri = cL.
Conversely, if nE¯M ≤ ∆P , the politician will offer Bi (∅) = E¯M to each media company
and the media will be captured by the politician. Note that Bi (∅) ≥ E¯M for all i also
induces ri = cL for all i, but a bribe in excess of E¯M is a total waste from the point of
view of the politician. 
Lemma 3.3: Suppose that assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Then, free entry leads to a
free media industry if and only if C¯S ≤ δpE¯Mn¯+1 , where n¯ = int
(
∆P
E¯M
)
Moreover, if C¯S >
δpE¯M
n¯+1 , the equilibrium number of media companies is n¯, while if C¯S ≤ δpE¯Mn¯+1 , it is nˆ =
int
(
pδE¯M
C¯S
)
.
Proof : From lemma 3.2, if n ≤ n¯, the politician captures the media, while if n ≥ n¯+1,
the politician cannot capture the media. Thus, the expected profit of a company is given
by:
E [uM,i] =
 pδE¯M − CS if n ≤ n¯,pδE¯M
n −CS if n ≥ n¯+ 1.
Note that E [uM,i] is a decreasing function of n. Under free entry a company will enter
into the market whenever E [uM,i] ≥ 0. Therefore, if pδE¯Mn¯+1 ≥ CS then at least n¯ + 1
companies will enter and, hence, the politician will not capture the media. Indeed, the
equilibrium number of companies will be nˆ. In order to prove this note that pδE¯Mnˆ ≥ CS ,
but pδE¯Mnˆ+1 < CS. On the other hand, if
pδE¯M
n¯+1 < CS , at most n¯ companies will enter and,
194
hence, the politician will capture the media. Indeed the equilibrium number of firms will be
n¯. In order to prove this note that when there are n¯ companies each gets pδE¯M −CS ≥ 0,
while when there are more than n¯, each company gets a negative expected profit. 
The proof of proposition 3.1 is immediate from lemmas 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. 
Appendix 3.1.2: Proof of Proposition 3.2
In order to prove proposition 3.2, first I need to prove the following lemma. Indeed,
the lemma will also be useful to prove propositions 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
Lemma 3.4: The expected benefit under a free media (relative a captured media) ∆B
is given by:
∆B = pλ (cH − cL)
[
gcapH − (1− δ) gfreeH
]
+ (1− p)
[
u
(
gfreeH
)
− (1 + λ) cHgfreeH − u
(
gcapH
)
+ (1 + λ) cHg
cap
H
]
.
Moreover, if − gu
′′
(g)
u′(g) >
(1−δ)p(cH−cL)
(1−δp)cH−(1−δ)pcL
, ∆B ≥ 0 (with strict inequality if δ > 0) and
∆B is increasing in δ.
Proof : When the media is free, µ (r) = Pr (c = cL| r = r) = (1−δ)p(1−δ)p+(1−p) if r = ∅
and µ (r) = 1 if r = cL. Then, from lemma 3.1, the menu of contract offered by
the general public is (gL, TL) and (gH , TH), where u
′ (gL) = (1 + λ) cL, u
′
(
gfreeH
)
=
(1 + λ)
[
(1−δp)cH−(1−δ)pcL
(1−p)
]
, TL = g
free
H (cH − cL) + cLgL, TH = cHgfreeH . Therefore, the
expected aggregate benefit under a free media industry is given by:
BF = pδ [u (gL)− (1 + λ) cLgL]
+ p (1− δ)
[
u (gL)− (1 + λ) cLgL − λgfreeH (cH − cL)
]
+ (1− p)
[
u
(
gfreeH
)
− (1 + λ) cHgfreeH
]
.
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When the media is captured, µ (r) = Pr (c = cL| r = r) = p if r = ∅, and µ (r) = 1
if r = cL. Then, from lemma 3.1, the menu of contract offered by the general public
is (gL, TL) and (gH , TH), where u
′ (gL) = (1 + λ) cL, u
′
(
gcapH
)
= (1 + λ)
(
cH−pcL
1−p
)
, TL =
gcapH (cH − cL) + cLgL, TH = cHgcapH . Therefore, the expected aggregate benefit under a
captured media industry is given by:
BC = pδ
[
u (gL)− (1 + λ) cLgL − λgcapH (cH − cL)
]
+ p (1− δ) [u (gL)− (1 + λ) cLgL − λgcapH (cH − cL)]
+ (1− p) [u (gcapH )− (1 + λ) cHgcapH ] .
Therefore, the expected benefit of a free media (relative to a captured media) is:
∆B = (BF −BC)
= pλ (cH − cL)
[
gcapH − (1− δ) gfreeH
]
+ (1− p)
[
u
(
gfreeH
)
− (1 + λ) cHgfreeH − u
(
gcapH
)
+ (1 + λ) cHg
cap
H
]
Note that ∆B (δ = 0) = 0 because δ = 0 implies gfreeH = g
cap
H . Moreover
∂ (∆B)
∂δ
= pλ (cH − cL)
[
gfreeH − (1− δ)
∂gfreeH
∂δ
]
+(1− p)
[
u′
(
gfreeH
)
− (1 + λ) cH
] ∂gfreeH
∂δ
.
Since
∂gfree
H
∂δ =
−(1+λ)p(cH−cL)
(1−p)u′′
(
gfreeH
) > 0 and u′
(
gfreeH
)
> (1 + λ) cH , a sufficient condi-
tion for ∂(∆B)∂δ > 0 is g
free
H > (1− δ)
∂gfreeH
∂δ , or, which is equivalent, −
gfreeH u
′′
(
gfreeH
)
u′
(
gfreeH
) >
(1−δ)p(cH−cL)
(1−δp)cH−(1−δ)pcL
. 
Proof of proposition 3.2: Assume that ∆P ≥ E¯M . Then, from proposition 3.1,
for n = 1 the media industry is captured by the politician. Suppose that C¯S >
δpE¯M
n¯+1 .
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Then, from proposition 3.1, free entry leads to a captured media industry. There are two
alternative constitutional rules. First, the constitution can try to restrict entry. Since
free entry is not enough to induce a free media industry, any restriction to entry will also
induce a captured industry. Thus, the best possible restriction is to allow only one firm.
Under such rule, by lemma 4 the expected welfare is W (1) = BC − C¯S . Second, the
constitution can try to induce more entry. Any extra entry on top of the number of firms
under free entry that is not enough to make the media industry free is useless. The reason
is that, any new firm increases the cost of the industry in C¯S , but it does not make any
difference in the voter’s behavior. Thus, any subsidy to entry must be generous enough
to transform the media industry into a free one. Moreover, there is no good reason to
induce more entry that the strictly necessary to make the industry free. Thus, the best
possible option is to set a subsidy to entry S such that the number of firms that enter the
market is just enough to have a free media industry. Formally, the optimal S is given by
S = C¯S − pδE¯Mn¯+1 , which induces n¯ + 1 media companies. Therefore, by lemma 4, expected
welfare is W (n¯+ 1) = BF − (n¯+ 1)
(
C¯S + λS
)
. Therefore
W (n¯+ 1) ≥W (1)⇔ δpE¯M
n¯ + 1
< C¯S ≤ ∆B + λpδE¯M
(1 + λ) n¯+ λ
Note that ∆B ≥ pδE¯M n¯n¯+1 assures that ∆B+λpδE¯M(1+λ)n¯+λ ≥ δpE¯Mn¯+1 , which completes the proof of
parts 1.a and 1.b. of the proposition.
Suppose that C¯S ≤ δpE¯Mn¯+1 . Then, from proposition 3.1, free entry leads to a free media
industry. And again, there are two alternative constitutional rules. First, the constitution
can try to avoid the excessive number of firms without changing the nature of the industry.
That is, the constitution can promote a moderate entry limitation that just keeps the
media industry free. Formally, the constitution only allows n¯+ 1 media companies, which
implies, by lemma 3.4, that the expected welfare is W (n¯+ 1) = BF − (n¯+ 1) C¯S . Note
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that subsidies are not necessary in this case because under free entry there are more media
companies than n¯ + 1, the number necessary to have a free media industry. Second, the
constitution can try a more radical approach and extend the limitation below n¯ + 1. In
such a case, the media will be captured by the politician, which implies that it is better
to go all the way down till the industry becomes a monopoly. Formally, the constitution
only allows one firm and the expected aggregate welfare is W (1) = BC − C¯S . Comparing
W (n¯+ 1) and W (1), it is easy to prove that ∆B ≥ pδE¯M n¯n¯+1 implies that it is always the
case that W (n¯+ 1) ≥W (1), which completes the proof of part 1.c of the proposition.
Suppose that ∆P < E¯M . Then, from proposition 1, for n = 1 the media industry is
free. Then, the optimal media industry is a monopoly. 
Appendix 3.1.3: Proof of Proposition 3.3
Let’s begin studying a constitutional environment in which entry restrictions are not
allowed. From proposition 3.1, if C¯S ≤ pδE¯Mn¯+1 , then free entry will lead to a free media
industry with nˆ = int
(
pδE¯M
C¯S
)
companies, while if C¯S >
pδE¯M
n¯+1 , then free entry will lead
to a captured media industry with n¯ companies. Since entry restriction is not an option,
when C¯S ≤ pδE¯Mn¯+1 , there will be free press. On the other hand, when C¯S > pδE¯Mn¯+1 , the
constitution might consider a subsidy to entry that makes the media free. Thus, the
welfare comparison at the constitutional stage is as follows. Under no subsidy, the expected
aggregate welfare is W (n¯) = BC − n¯C¯S , while under a subsidy S, the expected aggregate
welfare is W (n¯+ 1) = BF − (n¯+ 1)
(
C¯S + λS
)
. The optimal subsidy is the lowest possible
S that induces n¯+ 1 companies to enter into the market. That is, S = C¯S − pδE¯Mn¯+1 , which
implies that W (n¯) = BF − (n¯+ 1) (1 + λ) C¯S + λpδE¯M . Thus,
W (n¯+ 1) ≥W (n¯)⇔ C¯S ≤ ∆B + λpδE¯M
1 + λ+ λn¯
.
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This completes the proof of the first part of proposition 3.3.
Next, consider the opposite constitutional environment, in which entry promoting is
not allowed. Then, the constitution has two possible alternatives: either to restrict entry
to only one firm and induce the best possible captured media structure, or to restrict entry
to n¯+1 and try to induce the best possible free media structure. However, the last option
would be effective only if free entry would lead to the entry of at least n¯+1 firms, i.e., when
C¯S ≤ pδE¯Mn¯+1 . When only one company is allowed to operate, expected aggregate welfare is
W (1) = BC − C¯S. When C¯S ≤ pδE¯Mn¯+1 and entry is restricted to n¯+ 1, expected aggregate
welfare is W (n¯+ 1) = BF − (n¯+ 1) C¯S . Thus,
W (n¯+ 1) ≥W (1)⇔ C¯S ≤ ∆B
n¯
.
Note that pδE¯Mn¯+1 ≤ ∆Bn¯ , which completes the proof of the second part of proposition 3.3. 
Appendix 3.1.4: Proof of Proposition 3.4
Since a monopoly is always captured by the politician, the expected aggregate welfare
under monopoly is W (1) = BC − C¯S. From proposition 3.1, free entry leads to a free
media industry if and only if C¯S ≤ pδE¯Mn¯+1 . Moreover, when C¯S ≤ pδE¯Mn¯+1 , the equilibrium
number of firms nˆ = int
(
pδE¯M
C¯S
)
, while when C¯S >
pδE¯M
n¯+1 , the equilibrium number of
firms is n¯. Thus, the expected aggregate welfare under free entry is W (nˆ) = BF − nˆC¯S
when free entry leads to a free media industry and it is W (n¯) = BC − n¯C¯S when free
entry leads to a captured media industry. From simple inspection W (1) > W (n¯). Thus,
when C¯S >
pδE¯M
n¯+1 , monopoly dominates free entry. When C¯S ≤ pδE¯Mn¯+1 we have that
W (1) > W (nˆ) if and only if C¯S >
∆BF
(nˆ−1) . Therefore, monopoly dominates free entry
if and only if C¯S > min
{
pδE¯M
n¯+1 ,
∆BF
(nˆ−1)
}
. 
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Appendix 3.1.5: Proof of Proposition 3.5
From lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 (which do not depend on assumptions 3.1 and 3.2), it is
always the case that the media industry is free if nE¯M > ∆P , while it is captured by the
politician if nE¯M ≤ ∆P . A simple variation of lemma 3 implies that under free entry
the media industry is free if and only if C¯S ≤ nminpδE¯Mn¯+1 . In order to prove this, note that
under free entry the equilibrium number of firms is implicitly given by pδE¯M ≥ nCS (n) and
pδE¯M < (n+ 1)CS (n+ 1). Due to assumption 1bis nCS (n) is decreasing in n for n ≤ nmin
and increasing for n ≥ nmin. Due to assumption 2bis pδE¯M ≥ nminCS (nmin) = C¯S and
nmin is finite. Thus, the number of media firms under free entry must be greater than
nmin. Specifically, the number of media firms under free entry is n˜ = int
(
nminpδE¯M
C¯S
)
,
which implies, due to lemmas 1 and 2, that the media industry is free if and only if n˜ > n¯
or, which is equivalent, if and only if C¯S ≤ nminpδE¯Mn¯+1 . The rest of the proof follows analogous
steps to the proof of proposition 3.2.
Assume that n¯ ≥ nmin. Then, a natural oligopoly with n ≤ nmin companies is always
captured by the politicians. Suppose that C¯S >
nminpδE¯M
n¯+1 . Then, free entry leads to
a captured media industry. There are two alternative constitutional rules. First, the
constitution can try to restrict entry. Since free entry is not enough to induce a free media
industry, any restriction to entry will also induce a captured industry. Thus, the best
possible restriction is to allow nmin firms. Under such rule, the expected aggregate welfare
is W (nmin) = BC − C¯S . Second, the constitution can try to induce more entry. Any
extra entry on top of the number of firms under free entry that is not enough to make
the media industry free is useless. The reason is that, any new firm increases the cost of
the industry in C¯Snmin , but it does not make any difference in the voter’s behavior. Thus,
any subsidy to entry must be generous enough to transform the media industry into a free
one. Moreover, there is no good reason to induce more entry that the strictly necessary
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to make the industry free. Thus, the best possible option is to set a subsidy to entry S
such that the number of firms that enter the market is just enough to have a free media
industry. Formally, the optimal S is given by S = C¯Snmin −
pδE¯M
n¯+1 , which induces n¯+1 media
companies. Therefore, expected welfare isW (n¯+ 1) = BF −(n¯+ 1) (1 + λ) C¯Snmin +λpδE¯M .
Thus, W (1) > W (n¯+ 1) if C¯S >
nmin(∆B+λpδE¯M)
(1+λ)n¯+1+λ−nmin
and W (1) ≤ W (n¯+ 1) if nminpδE¯Mn¯+1 <
C¯S ≤ nmin(∆B+λpδE¯M)(1+λ)n¯+1+λ−nmin , which completes the proof of parts 1.a and 1.b of the proposition.
Note that ∆B >
(
n¯+1−nmin
n¯+1
)
pδE¯M assures that these two regions are not empty.
Suppose that C¯S ≤ nminpδE¯Mn¯+1 . Then, free entry leads to a free media industry. And
again, there are two alternative constitutional rules. First, the constitution can try to avoid
the excessive number of firms without changing the nature of the industry. That is, the
constitution can promote a moderate entry limitation that just keeps the media industry
free. Formally, the constitution only allows n¯ + 1 media companies, which implies that
the expected aggregate welfare is W (n¯+ 1) = BF − (n¯+ 1) C¯Snmin . Second, the constitution
can try a more radical approach and extend the limitation below n¯ + 1. In such a case,
the media will be captured by the politician, which implies that it is better to go all the
way down till nmin (assumption 2bis assures that with nmin the industry is captured).
Formally, the constitution only allows nmin firms and the expected aggregate welfare is
W (nmin) = BC − C¯S . Since ∆B >
(
n¯+1−nmin
n¯+1
)
pδE¯M and
nminpδE¯M
n¯+1 ≥ C¯S , it is always the
case that W (n¯+ 1) > W (nmin), which completes the proof of part 1.c of proposition 3.5.
Assume that n¯ < nmin. Then an oligopoly with n ≤ nmin induces a free media industry.
Therefore, the optimal media industry is an oligopoly with nmin companies. 
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PART III
COMMITMENT AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
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Chapter 4: Making Rules Credible: Divided Government and Political
Budget Cycles71
Abstract
Political budget cycles (PBCs) can result from the credibility problems office-motivated
incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal
policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit public
debt, because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate PBCs. Since the legislature
must typically authorize new debt, divided government can make these fiscal rules credible.
Commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the
budget law, which can help explain why PBCs are stronger in developing countries and
in new democracies. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off
electoral distortions and government competence.
4.1 Introduction
Political budget cycles (PBCs) are controversial. Early work by Tufte (1978) and Frey
and Schneider (1978a,b) was motivated by the experience of OECD countries, but recently
some noteworthy empirical work contends they are only significant in developing countries
(e.g., Shi and Svensson 2006) or in new democracies (e.g., Brender and Drazen 2005). In
our view, a shortcoming of these works is that they are based on models with a single
policy maker and hence they implicitly assume that the executive has full discretion over
fiscal policy. We provide a different perspective. Motivated by Schuknecht (1996), who
71This essay is a joint work with Jorge Streb. A version of the essay is accepted for publication in Public
Choice and available online in Public Choice’s web-side.
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suggests that stronger PBCs in developing countries are due to weaker checks and balances,
we explore the role of the legislature in the budget process.
In the rational choice approach to electoral cycles, asymmetric information allows the
incumbent to exploit budgetary discretion for electoral purposes. When the incumbent
cannot credibly commit not to use this power, Lohmann (1998a) shows how this leads to
stimulative monetary policy in the framework of political business cycles, while Shi and
Svensson (2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006a) show how the use of debt for electoral purposes
causes aggregate PBCs.
The solution to the credibility problems caused by time consistency has often been
cast in terms of the “rules versus discretion” debate (Kydland and Prescott 1977). For
fiscal policy, von Hagen (2006) characterizes ex ante fiscal rules as numerical constraints on
certain budgetary aggregates, like ceilings on borrowing. He concludes that the empirical
evidence on ex ante rules on debt and deficits for US states shows they are ineffective, be-
cause they can be circumvented. Besides requiring rules to be clear-cut and comprehensive,
Strauch and von Hagen (2001) stress that enforcement of rules should rely on independent
agents and restraints should be hard to evade or amend.
This paper focuses on making rules credible through institutional arrangements that
limit discretion in changing rules. Since the budget process in constitutional democracies
requires the participation of the legislature, we specifically consider a budget rule that
prohibits the executive from issuing new debt –the channel for aggregate PBCs in Shi and
Svensson (2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006a)– unless authorized by the legislature. Once
the assumption of a single fiscal authority is dropped, the possibility of PBCs will depend
on the leeway that the legislature allows the executive in pursuing electoral destabilization
(Saporiti and Streb 2008).
Drawing on the insight of Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) about the moderating influence
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of an opposition legislature in presidential systems with partisan political parties, our first
contribution is to show that divided government can solve the credibility problem behind
electoral cycles in fiscal policy in an opportunistic framework with office-motivated parties,
turning the budget rule into a credible commitment.72 We rely on the Romer and Rosenthal
(1978, 1979) agenda-setter model, which allows one to treat divided government as creating
a legislative veto player. This insight applies not only to divided government in presidential
systems, but also to coalition governments in parliamentary systems where the veto players
are inside the governing coalition (Tsebelis 2002).
Our second contribution is to model how effective checks and balances depend endoge-
nously on the people’s vote, who may chose unified rather than divided government. If
divided government reduces government efficiency, voters face a trade-off between what
Umeno and Bugarin (2008) call the “control” and “selection” motives: voters can control
the moral hazard problem that leads to PBCs, electing a divided government so as to en-
sure the credibility of budget rules, at the cost of introducing an adverse selection effect,
namely, forcing the most competent party to share power with less competent parties. De-
pending on candidates’ expected competence differential, voters can either lean towards
unified government to avoid the adverse selection costs, or towards divided government to
avoid the distortionary effects of PBCs. However, control is ineffective if compliance with
the budget law already is weak.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the setup. Section
4.3 computes the equilibria when divided government has no costs for voters, and when
it induces an efficiency loss. Section 4.4 explores the empirical implications of the model,
which allows one to formalize the Schuknecht (1996) conjecture on the moderating role of
72While our focus is on the credibility of rules, Lohmann (1998b) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) make
a related point on the credibility of delegation: an independent central bank, the Rogoff (1985) solution to
the time consistency problem of monetary policy, is not credible unless there are political veto players that
can block executive action.
205
checks and balances. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The Model
We develop a PBC model with two office seeking parties. Following Shi and Svensson
(2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006a,b), debt financing is distortionary, so expansionary fiscal
policies are reversed after elections. We first assume that government competence depends
on the leader of the executive branch, either the president in a presidential system or the
prime minister in a parliamentary one. We then allow for costs of divided government,
especially as Election Day nears, which we use to depict the case of an opposition party
controlling the national legislature in a presidential system or of a coalition government in
a parliamentary system.
4.2.1 Citizens
Consider an infinite-horizon society. Let t denote time, where odd positive integers are
electoral periods and even positive integers are non-electoral periods.
The society comprises a continuum of individuals, labeled by i ∈ [0, 1], that play roles
both as consumers and as citizens. Income yi,t is exogenous, with yi,t = y for all consumers.
By the consumer’s budget constraint, consumption ct equals disposable income, namely, y
net of the tax burden pt:
ct = y − pt. (56)
The citizens share the same preferences for a public good gt and a private good ct, with
a quasi-linear per-period payoff. Voters differ only in their ideological bias, an idiosyncratic
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preference shock for each party. The per period payoff of citizen i is given by73
ui(ct, gt) = ct + α ln(gt) + σit, (57)
where α ∈ (0, 1), and σit is the idiosyncratic ideological shock of citizen i, symmetrically
distributed around zero and independent over time. Let M = 1/2 be the median citizen,
with σMt = 0, while the citizens to the left have an ideological preference for party B
(σit < 0) and those to the right for party A (σit > 0).
The intertemporal utility function of citizen i has the standard form
Ui = Et
∞∑
j=t
β(j−t)ui(cj , gj), (58)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and Et is the expected value operator at time t.
4.2.2 Government Performance
Unlike Rogoff (1990) and the subsequent literature, we distinguish strictly between the
production technology and the budget items, to avoid confounding the provision of public
goods gt with the expenditure on public goods γt, which is what the government in fact
decides in the budget.74 Each period t, the government is subject to the budget constraint
γt = πt + dt − (1 + r(dt−1))dt−1, (59)
73Though we could employ a general strictly concave function, this specification generates a closed form
solution for the benchmark model, and simplifies the evaluation of expectations.
74In Rogoff (1990) there is no debt, but the incumbent can reduce capital expenditures, not visible to
voters at election time, to boost consumption expenditures and reduce taxes. Though there is no explicit
restriction on how shocks affect the different components of the budget, there is no distinction between
the tax burden and tax collection, and the expenditures on public consumption goods are equal to their
provision. Hence, in the final analysis the implicit restriction is that competence shocks determine how
government expenditures are transformed into the provision of capital goods.
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where γt denotes budget expenditures on public goods, πt are tax revenues or receipts, dt
is public debt and r(dt−1) is the interest rate on debt, where as in Shi and Svensson (2006)
the interest rate is increasing in the level of debt: r(0) > 0, r′(0) ≥ 0, and r′′(0) > 0.
Public resources γt are transformed into the public good gt according to the competence
θt of the government. Similarly, the competence of the government affects how the tax
burden pt translates into government tax receipts πt, reflecting, among other things, the
use of more or less distortionary taxes and the quality of tax administration:
gt = θtγt, (60)
pt =
πt
θt
. (61)
By (60), to provide a given level of public goods, expenditure must be greater with
less competent governments. By (61), to generate a given level of tax receipts, the tax
burden must be greater with less competent governments. Our technological assumptions
lead the provision of the public good and the tax burden to vary with the competence of
the government.
The only potential motive for optimal borrowing is during periods in which the govern-
ment is more distortionary, or inefficient, in raising taxes. This is distinct from the Barro
(1979) tax-smoothing hypothesis under distortionary taxation, where the tax distortion
does not vary over time; hence, only extraordinary expenditures, like wars, are financed
with debt. The following condition assures that, absent electoral concerns, debt will not
be optimal:
Et
[
1
θt
]
≤ β(1 + r(0))Et
[
1
θt+1
]
. (62)
We discuss the no optimal borrowing condition in the Appendix (we also rule out
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optimal lending).75 If competence did not affect the collection of taxes in (61), the no
optimal borrowing condition (62) would become 1 ≤ β(1 + r(0)) as in Shi and Svensson
(2006), where this is satisfied even if r(0) = 0 because they assume that β = 1. In the
current model, r(0) must be large enough to satisfy condition (62).
In Section 3.2, we show how in electoral periods the government faces a consistency
requirement to replicate the behavior of competence shocks that will lead it to distribute
debt between tax reductions and expenditure hikes in specified proportions. This is con-
sistent with the empirical evidence in Frey and Schneider (1978a) and Tufte (1978) on how
governments lower taxes and increase expenditure in electoral years. However, if compe-
tence affected only the production of public goods in (60) –not revenues in (61)–, then the
model would instead behave like Shi and Svensson (2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006a,b),
where the incumbent has an incentive in election years to distort only expenditures on
public goods. This alternative formulation may be more appropriate in an institutional
setup where the executive has more say over expenditure decisions than over taxes.
The standard assumption is that government competence is identified with the party in
control of the executive branch, and party competence follows a first-order moving average
process, as in Rogoff and Sibert (1988), making retrospective voting rational:
θjt = θ¯ + ε
j
t−1 + ε
j
t . (63)
The incumbent does not know the current competence shock when budget decisions
are taken. Each competence shock ε (the party superscript j is omitted here) is uniformly
distributed over the interval
[
− 12ξ , 12ξ
]
, with expected value E [ε] = 0 and density function
ξ > 0. A higher value of ε corresponds to a more competent politician. The probability
distribution of competence θt conditional on εt−1, F(θt|εt−1), is also uniform, with support
75The Appendix is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1972999.
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[
θ¯ + εt−1 − 12ξ , θ¯ + εt−1 + 12ξ
]
, and E [θt|εt−1] = θ¯ + εt−1. Henceforth, θ¯ > 2/ξ, so θt > 0
and (60) and (61) are well-defined.
As an alternative to assumption (63) that government competence reflects the compe-
tence of the party in control of the executive, we allow a more general formulation where
performance depends on all parties in power. We additionally assume that because of
coordination problems performance is particularly worse in electoral periods if there is di-
vided government instead of unified government. More specifically, the competence of the
government θt is a weighted average of the competence of E, the leader of the executive
branch, and V , either the leader of the legislature –in a presidential system– or of the
minor coalition party –in a parliamentary system. Given θEt and θ
V
t , overall government
competence is determined by weights ρ and (1− ρ), with ρ ∈ (1/2, 1]:
θt = ρθ
E
t + (1− ρ)θVt . (64)
The leaders of the two political parties, A and B, can play roles as E and V ; the leader
of each party changes before each election.76 Besides the utility from the consumption
of private and public goods, the party leaders receive an exogenous rent χE (χV ) at the
beginning of the term if they are elected to E (V ), where χV < χE . These rents reflect the
strengths of the candidates’ electoral goals (Lohmann 1998a) and are the source of conflict
between political parties and the electorate.
The terms in office in roles E and V last two periods. Every other period, the electorate
removes or confirms the incumbent party in an explicit electoral contest; if confirmed in
its role, it continues for another term; otherwise, the opposition party takes that office. At
the time of the election, party leaders do not know the ideological shocks σi, but they form
76This assumption rules out end-period problems, since parties will always be interested in winning the
upcoming election. This is consistent with Aldrich (1995) and the literature on how parties solve collective
action problems.
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a correct conjecture about their distribution in the population.
In non-electoral periods (t even) the competence of E equals the competence of the
party j ∈ {A,B} in charge of E, and the competence of V equals that of the party
k ∈ {A,B} in charge of V :
For t even,
 θ
E
t = θ
j
t ,
θVt = θ
k
t .
(65)
In electoral periods (t odd), while the competence of the E equals the competence of
the incumbent party j ∈ {A,B}, the competence of V either equals the competence of
the incumbent party, when k = j (unified government), or zero, when k 6= j (divided
government):
For t odd,
 θ
E
t = θ
j
t ,
θVt = θ
j
t if k = j, θ
V
t = 0 otherwise.
(66)
We characterize unified government as the case where the same party controls E and
V , while there is divided government otherwise. By (64-66) divided government affects
efficiency, particularly so in electoral periods when fiscal outcomes reflect only a fraction
of the competence of the party that leads the executive branch.
Specification (66) is used mainly for tractability, to simplify the voter’s inference prob-
lem, so in electoral years fiscal outcomes under divided government reflect only the compe-
tence of the party that leads the executive branch. The inference problem under divided
government has been used by Powell and Whitten (1993) to explain why economic vot-
ing is less important when responsibility is less clear, e.g., with a bicameral opposition,
minority governments, or coalition governments. However, there is a political rationale
for assumption (66). Roubini and Sachs (1989) point out that coordination problems in
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divided government can impose significant costs on government performance. Indeed, both
hypotheses are observationally equivalent: voters may be less likely to punish the executive
leader for poor performance of the economy not because of lack of clarity of responsibility,
as Powell and Whitten (1993) suggest, but rather because political parties find it partic-
ularly hard to work together when the members of the coalition start campaigning and
competing for votes. If voters discount worse performance close to elections under divided
government, they should not punish the party in the role of E for that. Though empirically
we expect both information and coordination problems to be at work in divided govern-
ment, Section 3.4 discusses why this analytical simplification does not affect the strategic
incentives of the coalition members.
4.2.3 The Budget Process
The agenda setter model of Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979) allows modeling the
budget process as the interaction of two players, an agenda setter E and a veto player V ,
who must reach an agreement for there to be a change in the status quo. The idea of veto
players applies to both presidential and parliamentary systems (Tsebelis 2002).
We begin assuming the agenda setter E is the head of the executive branch, making
a budget allocation proposal that must be accepted by the legislature to become law; no
amendment rights exist, so the legislature faces a take-it-or-leave-it proposal where the
reversion outcome (the status quo) in case of rejection is specified below.77
Our focus is on whether there is an actual veto player to check PBCs caused by office-
motivated incumbents. In a presidential system, E is the president, and V the legislative
77This perspective is applied more often to European, Asian and Latin American democracies, where the
executive can issue decrees unilaterally, than to the United States (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 2007:
1680). The case of presidential systems wherein the legislature can amend the executive’s proposal, so the
legislature has the agenda setting power, is reviewed later.
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leader. In a parliamentary system, a legislative majority must be mustered to form a gov-
ernment; if a party is forced to form a coalition to control a majority of seats in parliament,
the leader of the major coalition party plays the role of E, as prime minister, while the
leader of the minority party plays V and can bring the government down with a negative
vote. There is no veto player when E and V are controlled by the same party, which in a
parliamentary system is also referred to as single-party rule. On the other hand, there is a
veto player when different parties control E and V .
Furthermore, what matters for PBCs is not a nominal veto player, but rather an effec-
tive one. Since a potential veto player may not be capable of monitoring and controlling
the budget in the implementation stage, we distinguish between two polar cases, perfect
and null compliance with the budget law.
The budget proposals are in terms of budget revenue and debt, because the budget
restriction determines budget expenditure (only two of these three variables can be chosen
freely). The timing of the budget process in period t is as follows:
1. E proposes π˜Et , d˜
E
t to V .
2. Since V has no amendment rights, V chooses whether to accept the proposal or not.
If the proposal is not accepted, the budget is given by status quo π¯t, d¯t. This will
determine the approved budget π˜t, d˜t.
3. E implements πt, dt, which equals the approved budget if there is perfect compliance.
4. εt is realized and gt and pt are determined according to (60) and (61).
5. Voters know the structure of the budget process, and observe gt and pt, but neither
εt nor (γt, πt, dt), forming a belief θˆt about E’s competence.
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6. Without loss of generality, party A controls E. If t is an odd positive integer, i.e., an
electoral period, the median voter M decides whether to reelect party A in E, and
whether to vote party A or B for V .
7. Individuals observe past competence shocks εt, as well as (γt, πt, dt), and period t
ends.
If the executive’s budget proposal is rejected, the status quo for taxation is given by
an arbitrary reversion point πt. Expenditure must be authorized by the legislature. Since
the chief executive cannot spend more than tax receipts plus new debt, expenditure can
equivalently be controlled through borrowing limits. We focus on this indirect control. We
assume that new debt must be approved by the legislature, something typical of many
budget processes:
dt = dt−1. (67)
E does not observe εt before making budget decisions, operating under uncertainty
about the effect of policy actions, but it has a temporary information advantage concerning
the actual budget allocation.
4.2.4 Median Voter
With ideological preferences that are symmetrically distributed around zero, and voters
that share the same preferences for public and private goods, the choice of the median voter
is representative of the majority vote.
Take a presidential system. If the median voter M prefers unified government and
votes for party A in the presidential and congressional elections, it will be backed by all
voters to the right, forming a majority. Since some voters to the left of M may also favor
214
party A (particularly those voters with a small ideological preference for party B), this
will produce a clear majority.78 Since each voter has separate choices for the executive and
legislative branches under separation of powers, divided government can come about by
splitting votes. Say the median voter M prefers A,B for roles E,V , respectively. Voters
to the right of M will vote either A,A, if they are very extremist, or A,B, if they are more
moderate. The reason is simple: their vote entails an economic cost already considered by
the median voter, plus an ideological cost that the median voter does not face, so voters
to the right of M will be less likely than M to vote for party B in the legislative election.
Similar arguments apply to voters to the left of M , who will vote either B,B or A,B.
Therefore, the outcome of the election will be A,B.
In a parliamentary system, single-party rule comes about if the median voter favors
either A or B, because a majority will emerge with the support of those either to the right
or to the left of M . Again, since economic considerations prevail for voters with a small
ideological preference, this majority will typically exceed 50% by more than one vote. A
coalition government is also simple to produce if, to abstract from coordination problems
of voters (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995), we assume that all voters follow their ideological
leanings, except for the median voter, who abstains. The major and minor members of a
coalition government, e.g., A,B rather than B,A, can be determined by a simple rule: the
party in charge of E continues in its role if its competence shock is non-negative, otherwise
the opposition party takes that role.79
In what follows, the exposition is in terms of the median voter, because its prefer-
ences for either divided or unified government reflect the preferences of a majority of the
78As in the reasoning of Kayser and Wlezien (2005) on how economic voting is more important when
political polarization is low, this requires some voters with a degree of ideological polarization small enough
to assure that the economic vote predominates.
79Another possibility in a parliamentary setting is to introduce a small third party, C, that is favored by
the median voter. This party will be needed by either major party A or B to form a coalition government.
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electorate.
4.3 Equilibrium
To focus on the credibility problems of economic policy in electoral periods, we use
the Lohmann (1998a) timing, i.e., policy makers do not know their current competence
shock when selecting policy instruments; the interpretation is that policy is decided under
uncertainty.80 Voters decide without observing the choice of fiscal policy instruments, but
after observing fiscal policy outcomes.
We use perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. We first deduce
the equilibrium under a benevolent ruler as a benchmark. We then turn to policy in an
electoral setting, replicating the results of Shi and Svensson (2006) and Alt and Lassen
(2006a) in the standard setup of concentration of powers where the incumbent executive
has full discretion over fiscal policy. We then consider a constitutional democracy where the
budget has to be approved by the legislature, and government competence is determined
by the party that heads the executive. Finally, we consider what happens when divided
government affects performance negatively, making voters face a trade-off between control
and selection.
4.3.1 Benevolent Ruler
Consider a randomly selected candidate in period t = 0 who remains in office forever.
The no optimal borrowing condition (62) allows abstracting from any optimal borrowing
80Persson and Tabellini (2000: 420-425) characterize models such as Lohmann’s (1998a) as moral hazard
models of electoral cycles, in contrast to the adverse selection models developed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988),
Rogoff (1990), and Persson and Tabellini (1990) where electoral cycles are a signal of the competence of the
incumbent. If the incumbent does not have private information about its own competence, but asymmetric
information on the choice of policy instruments remains, the moral hazard problem discussed in the text
comes to the forefront.
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motive (see the Appendix for a formal proof), and concentrate exclusively on electoral
incentives to issue debt. Thus, assumption (62) assures that dt = 0 for t = 0, 1, ..., allowing
the intertemporal problem to be broken down into a sequence of simpler problems:
max
{γt,πt}
Et[ct + α ln(gt)], s.t. (56), and (59)–(61).
The solution, using the properties of the uniform distribution and integrating, is:
Proposition 4.1: Benevolent Ruler. Suppose that a ruler is randomly selected in
period t = 0 and remains in office forever. If the condition on no optimal borrowing (62)
holds, the ruler chooses optimal expenditure and tax collection each period as follows:
γ∗t = π
∗
t =
α
Et
[
1
θt
] = α
ξ ln
(θ¯+εt−1+ 12ξ
θ¯+εt−1−
1
2ξ
) , t = 0, 1, . . . (68)
Since the budget is decided ex ante, it cannot be conditioned on the current competence
shock εt. As to the ex post outcomes, a more competent incumbent provides more of the
public good and imposes a lighter burden on taxpayers, so disposable income increases and
there is a consumption boom.
4.3.2 Concentration of Powers
Consider next regular elections every other period. There is only one policy-maker,
the chief executive. The players are the incumbent party A, the opposition party B, the
median voter M , and Nature. From the viewpoint of the median voter M , the two parties
differ only in competence. Because the competence shocks are transitory, each election can
be treated separately, so the infinite-horizon model can be broken down into a series of
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separate problems. The solution can be found via backwards induction in a sequence of
steps.
First, in non-electoral period t+ 1, the incumbent has no incentive to manipulate the
voters’ perception of its competence. Since the optimal strategies of all incumbents in the
post-electoral period are the same, the distinction between the original and the potential
incumbents is omitted, and the superscript u refers to an unchecked executive:
γut+1 = γ
∗
t+1 =
α
Et+1
[
1
θt+1
] , πut+1 = γ∗t+1 + (1 + r(dt))dt. (69)
4.3.2.1 The Inference Problem of Voters
At election time t, the voter’s problem is to estimate the competence shock εt. Voters
do not observe dt, γt and πt, but they observe the indices gt and pt, which give them two
sources of information for inferring competence θt.
81 If the incumbent uses debt only to
reduce taxes, not to increase expenditures (the least distortionary use of debt), by (60)
and (61) voters have a simple way of inferring competence:
θˆt = min
{
gt
γ∗t
,
π∗t
pt
}
. (70)
Whenever voters have two conflicting pieces of information on government competence,
they can always play it safe by picking the lowest estimate of competence. This gives the
incumbent an incentive to obey the following consistency condition:
γt = ωtγ
∗
t , πt =
π∗t
ωt
, (71)
81The term “indices” is used in semiotics for signs that are the consequence of some cause. In our setting,
the provision of public goods and the tax burden are indices of government competence.
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where the actual budget choices γt and πt are determined by the scale factor ωt, so
gt = ωtγ
∗
t θt, pt =
π∗t
θtωt
, (72)
by (60) and (61). The consistency condition (71) assures that both indices, gt and pt,
provide the same information.82 The incumbent uses debt in a way that mimics the
characteristics of the original distribution of competence shocks, with the expected value
of the distribution shifted to the right by ωt ≥ 1.
If there is no previous debt, so π∗t = γ
∗
t , the consistency condition (71) implies that,
beyond identity (59), debt must satisfy:
dt = γt − πt =
(
ωt − 1
ωt
)
π∗t . (73)
Call ωˆt the voters’ estimate of ωt.
83 The voters’ estimate of θt is given by the ratio of
both fiscal outcomes (either one could also be used to make the inference, see 72):
θˆt =
√
gt/pt
ωˆt
. (74)
Using (74), voters can estimate the incumbent’s current competence shock εt:
εˆt = θˆt − θ¯ − εt−1 =
√
gt/pt
ωˆt
− θ¯ − εt−1. (75)
82Our timing a` la Lohmann (1998a) differs from the Rogoff (1990) timing where the incumbent decides
the budget allocation after observing its competence shock, not before. Rogoff has a signaling model, where
the competence shock affects the optimal choice of taxes and public consumption spending.
83A more precise, but tedious, notation would define a probability measure over ω that represents voters’
beliefs, and then apply Bayes’ rule to update them. However, in equilibrium this probability measure will
be degenerate, with all the mass in the true ω, which justifies the notation in the text. The same applies
to θˆ and εˆ.
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4.3.2.2 The Median Citizen’s Vote
The median voter compares the expected utility next period with either the incumbent
or the challenger. In regard to the opposition, the median voter knows only the distribution
of εt and hence that Et[εt] = 0. Hence, expected utility from a vote for the opposition is
not conditional on the current competence shock:
Et [ct+1 + α ln(gt+1)] = Et
[
y − π
u
t+1
θt+1
+ α ln(θt+1γ
u
t+1)
]
. (76)
On the other hand, expected utility from a vote for the incumbent can be conditioned
on the current competence shock, which can be estimated from policy outcomes:
Et [ct+1 + α ln(gt+1) | εˆt] = Et
[
y − π
u
t+1
θt+1
+ α ln(θt+1γ
u
t+1) | εˆt
]
. (77)
The expression ct+1+α ln(gt+1) is a function of the two independent stochastic variables
εt and εt+1. In the Appendix 4.1, Lemma 4.1 proves that if Z = h(X,Y ) is a function
of two independent stochastic variables X and Y and E [Z | x], the expected value of
Z conditional on x, is a strictly increasing and concave function of x, then there exists
xˆ ≤ E [X] such that E [Z | x)] ≥ E [Z] if and only if x ≥ xˆ; Lemma 4.2 establishes that
Et [ct+1 + α ln(gt+1) | εt] is strictly increasing and concave. Hence,
Corollary 4.1: There exists εˆ ≤ 0 such that Et [ct+1 + α ln(gt+1) | εˆt] ≥
Et [ct+1 + α ln(gt+1)] if and only if εˆt ≥ εˆ. The ruling party thus enjoys an incumbency
advantage in elections. Proof: The proof of Corollary 1 follows from Lemma 4.2 and
an application of Lemma 4.1. The vector of information variables to estimate εˆt is given
by gt, pt, εt−1, and ωˆt. Since the median voter M maximizes expected utility, M votes
for the incumbent if and only if εˆt ≥ εˆ. Given that competence shocks are symmetrically
distributed around 0 and εˆ ≤ 0, the incumbent wins elections half the time or more. 
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Corollary 4.1 can be used to compute the probability µt = Pr(εˆt ≥ εˆ) that the incum-
bent wins the election. First, replace εˆt by
√
gt/pt
ωˆt
−θ¯−εt−1. Since εt equals
√
gt/pt
ωt
−θ¯−εt−1,
adding these terms to each side and simplifying, µt = Pr
[
εt ≥ εˆ+
√
gt/pt
ωt
(
1− ωtωˆt
)]
. Given
that εt follows a uniform distribution and θt =
√
gt/pt
ωt
,
µt =
(
1
2
− ξεˆ
)
+ ξθt
(
ωt
ωˆt
− 1
)
, (78)
where εˆ ≤ 0. If voters are surprised (ωt > ωˆt), the incumbent has a higher probability of
winning.
4.3.2.3 The Incumbent’s Decision in an Electoral Period
From the incumbent’s viewpoint, the electoral outcome is uncertain, and depends on
µt. The incumbent’s objective function is:
max
{γt,πt,dt}
Et
[
ct + α ln(gt) + β (ct+1 + α ln(gt+1)) + βµt χ
E
]
, s.t.(56), (59)–(61), (71)–(73) and (78).
Incorporating these restrictions, the government’s problem can be reframed in terms of
the choice of ωt. The first-order condition, after replacing π
∗
t by (68), is:
dEt [·]
dωt
= α
(
1
ωt
+
1
ω2t
)
− αβ
Et
[
1
θt+1
] (
1 + 1
ω2t
)
Et
[
1
θt
]
(1 + r) + r′α
(
ωt − 1ωt
)
Et
[
1
θt
]
+
+βξ
θ¯ + εt−1
ωˆt
χE ≤ 0,with strict equality if ωt > 1. (79)
The derivative
d2tE[.]
dω2t
is strictly negative for ωt ≥ 1 if the following second-order condition
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is satisfied:
ωt + 2
2
>
β Et
[
1
θt+1
]
Et
[
1
θt
]
(1 + r)− r′α
(
ω3t + ωt +
2
ωt
)
Et
[
1
θt
] − r′′α2
(
ωt +
1
ωt
)2 (
ω2t − 1
)
2
(
Et
[
1
θt
])2
 .
(80)
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, beliefs on the equilibrium path are determined by
equilibrium strategies (i.e., expectations are rational), so ωˆt = ωt = ω
u
t . The value of
opportunism χ¯t for which (79) becomes zero at ω
u
t = 1 is
χ¯t =
2α
βξ(θ¯ + εt−1)
βEt
[
1
θt+1
]
Et
[
1
θt
] (1 + r(0))− 1
 , (81)
which is positive by (62). If χE ≤ χ¯t, expression dEt[·]dωt is non-negative at ωut = 1, so
incumbents have no incentive to distort the budget. For χE > χ¯t,
dEt[·]
dωt
becomes positive
at that point, which implies that in equilibrium the incumbent prefers ωut > 1.
Proposition 4.2: Concentration of Powers. Suppose there are elections in odd
periods and the incumbent E faces no checks and balances. By (81), χ¯t is the highest
level of opportunism χE for which an incumbent is not willing to generate a PBC. If the
condition on no optimal borrowing (62) and the second-order condition (80) hold, then:
1. In a non-electoral period t + 1, the incumbent chooses optimal expenditure and tax
collection.
2. In an electoral period t:
(a) If opportunism is low (χE ≤ χ¯t), the incumbent does not generate PBCs (ωut =
1), so γut = γ
∗
t and π
u
t = π
∗
t .
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(b) If opportunism is high (χE > χ¯t), the incumbent generates PBCs (ω
u
t > 1),
hence γut = ω
u
t γ
∗
t and π
u
t =
π∗t
ωut
.
In an opportunistic framework the overriding concern of politicians is to be reelected,
so the natural scenario is χE > χ¯t where the executive is indeed willing to distort fiscal
outcomes to be reelected.
4.3.2.4 Time Consistency and Budget Rules
Suppose that an unconstrained executive E formulates plans in non-electoral period
t − 1. Viewed at t − 1, when the incumbent sets policy in advance, the probabilities of
reelection µt are exogenous. Therefore, the incumbent’s best policy is to plan to pick
γ∗t and π
∗
t , which are socially optimal. The problem with this optimal plan is that it is
not time-consistent: when an electoral period arrives, the incumbent has an incentive to
increase expenditure and reduce taxes. This credibility problem underlies Proposition 2
under an unchecked executive.
What happens if the status quo is set according to rule (67)? Well, if the rule were
binding, this would effectively curb the credibility problem: in an electoral period the
executive would prefer to use debt to increase expenditures and reduce taxes in order to
look more competent, but the status quo rules out more public indebtedness. However, it
does not make sense to assume that the executive is constrained to follow any rule unless it
has to share the power to change rules with somebody else. If the executive is vested with
legislative power, it can do and undo any rule it likes. The natural environment where the
executive shares rule-making power is a constitutional democracy, where an agreement has
to be reached with the legislature for there to be changes in the budget.
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4.3.3 Constitutional Democracies
In constitutional democracies, the budget must be approved by the legislature, which
depends on an agreement between E and V . For both presidential and parliamentary
systems, divided government is described in terms of E being in the hands of one party and
V in the hands of the other, while the same party controls both under unified government.
In what follows, we assume that both the condition on no optimal borrowing (62) and
the second-order condition (80) hold, and opportunism is high (χE > χ¯t) so the executive
has an incentive to distort fiscal outcomes for electoral reasons. We first consider the
special case where government competence depends only on E (i.e., θt = θ
E
t ), so divided
government imposes no efficiency costs.
First consider the case of perfect compliance with the budget law. At election time
t, voters will want the incumbent party in E if competence shocks are not too negative.
At the same time, they will want divided government, since the legislature can block the
executive’s attempts to distort the budget in period t + 2, without affecting government
performance.
Does what actually happens under divided government, in periods t + 1 and t + 2,
conform to voter’s expectations? Let A control E and B, V . In electoral period t + 2, A
would like to increase its electoral chances by using debt to select πut+2 and γ
u
t+2. However,
party B can veto any attempt of A to employ debt to increase expenditures and reduce
taxes, since the status quo restriction (67) introduces a binding constraint on the executive.
Party B has the motivation and the power to veto any attempt of party A to use debt: if
this authorization of new debt were unexpected for voters, this would increase the electoral
chances of party A at the expense of B; if expected, it would reduce the welfare of party B
because of the electoral distortion of fiscal variables. On the other hand, B does not have
an incentive to veto the optimal level of taxes and expenditures, because this would not
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affect the voters’ perception of party A’s competence. What voters use in their inference
problem is the status quo restriction on new debt, which implies that γt+2 = πt+2, so
ωt+2 = 1. Hence, the ratio gt+2/pt+2 can be used to infer competence, whatever the level
of taxation. Given that it cannot affect its perceived competence, the best party A can do
is to select the optimal level of taxes and expenditures.
In non-electoral period t + 1, E chooses optimal expenditure and repays past debt, if
any. V does not veto this proposal, because it does not affect future reelection prospects
of either party and leads to the optimal outcome.
The degree of compliance with the authorized budget describes the effective limits V
imposes on E. Under null compliance with the balanced budget rule (the extreme case
of imperfect compliance), V is not capable of effectively monitoring fiscal policy. The
environment then reverts to an unchecked executive. Hence,
Proposition 4.3: Constitutional Democracy. Suppose there are elections in odd
periods, and the legislature must authorize new debt. Let opportunism be high (χE > χ¯t).
If the condition on no optimal borrowing (62) and the second-order condition (80) hold,
then:
1. In a non-electoral period E, with the agreement of V , will set taxes and expenditures
at the optimal level.
2. In an electoral period:
(a) Under perfect compliance with the budget law, divided government will set taxes
and expenditures at the optimal level, while unified government will generate
PBCs. The median voter strictly prefers divided government.
(b) Under null compliance with the budget law, E will generate PBCs. The median
voter will be indifferent between divided and unified government.
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The results in Proposition 3 assume that E is the agenda setter. What happens in pres-
idential systems where the legislature has amendment powers? The results are unchanged.
Since V can prevent new indebtedness, an unaligned legislature would not be willing to
authorize the use of debt for electoral purposes, so dt = dt−1. At the same time, V would
be willing to authorize the optimal level of expenditure γ∗t = π
∗
t , because a lower level of
expenditures and taxes does not reduce E’s reelection chances, given that voters can use
the gt/pt ratio to infer competence.
4.3.4 Trade-off between Control and Selection
To provide a more balanced view of the costs and benefits of divided government,
competence now depends on both E and V (i.e., θt = ρθ
E
t + (1− ρ)θVt , with ρ ∈ (1/2, 1]),
and on whether or not it is an electoral period.
Since government competence in electoral periods reflects only the competence of the
party that heads E, in our setup that party is the only one with an incentive to engender
PBCs. If we were to allow for government competence in electoral periods to depend on
both parties that share power, Hanusch (2010) demonstrates that the larger party in a
coalition government has a preference for increasing debt, while the smaller party has an
incentive for reducing debt.84 The intuition is straightforward in our setup: the larger
party with ρ > 1/2 gets more credit for positive competence shocks than the smaller party,
so it is the one that has incentives to engineer PBCs. Though Hanusch (2010) stops short
of analyzing equilibrium policy, it is pretty straightforward to do so in our setup: since the
smaller party has veto power, it can block the attempts of the larger party to issue new
debt. Hence, even if we switched from our simple specification (66), where we assume that
84See equation (39) in Hanusch (2010). We take the case q = 0, since this fits our framework with two
parties, where the major party may win votes only at the expense of the smaller coalition party. Hanusch
also has a case q = 1 where the major party may also win votes at the expense of a third party outside the
governing coalition.
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poorer pre-election performance is due to coordination problems of divided government, to
a more complicated specification where competence depends on both parties in power, the
strategic incentives of the larger party to issue debt, and of the smaller party to block it,
would not change.
In a non-electoral period t + 1, the arguments of Propositions 2 and 3 apply, with
competence being a weighted average of the competence of E and V , so optimal expenditure
is:
γ∗t+1 =
α
Et+1
[
1
θt+1
] = α
Et
[
1
ρθEt+1+(1−ρ)θ
V
t+1
] .
In electoral periods, the argument behind Proposition 3 also applies, so an opposition
legislature will not approve new debt, nor will it object to the optimal level of taxes and
expenditures. Though divided government eliminates budget cycles, it does so at a cost,
due to the efficiency losses generated by power-sharing, plus the breakdown of coordination
between both parties in electoral periods. This is the fundamental trade-off that the median
voter faces.
4.3.4.1 The Median Citizen’s Vote
The voter estimates the competence shocks of E as follows (call these beliefs εˆit). With
unified government, estimated government competence is formed as in equation (75), with
an estimated distortion ωˆt = ω
u
t . With divided government, estimated government compe-
tence is a proportion ρ of the competence of the party in charge of the executive branch,
and the estimated distortion is ωˆt = 1.
The voter’s decision is a dynamic programming problem whose solution is a cut-point
strategy, as proven in the Appendix. Conceptually, three factors are at play. First, ab-
stracting from second-order effects linked to variance, expected welfare in period t + 1 is
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larger if the party that is most competent in expected value has unified power. Second,
expected welfare in period t+2 is also larger if there is unified government, since there are
no efficiency costs from the breakdown of cooperation between the parties in office, plus
the fact that the expectation of PBCs raises both private consumption and the provision
of public goods. The downside of unified government appears in period t + 3, when ex-
pected welfare is lower because the “party” is over and electoral debt has to be payed off.
While the welfare effects in periods t+ 2 and t+ 3 are fixed benefits and costs of unified
government, the positive effects of unified government in period t+1 are increasing in the
current competence shock εˆit.
The standard assumption is that opportunism is high, so χE > χ¯t and politicians are
willing to engineer a cycle. We now consider how the choice is influenced by ρ, where
(1 − ρ) reflects the efficiency costs of divided government, which are null for ρ = 1 and
reach a maximum for ρ = 1/2. By Proposition 3, for ρ = 1 and χE > χ¯t the median
voter strictly prefers divided government, since there are no efficiency costs and electoral
cycles are avoided. Given the limited magnitude of electoral cycles, since the efficiency
costs of divided government increase as ρ falls, there is a point where voters eventually
prefer unified government. When the starting point is a unified government, with party A
leading E, there will be a ρ < 1 for which there are high (H) and low (L) cutoff values
εA,AH , ε
A,A
L such that if εˆ
A
t > ε
A,A
H , then the median voter prefers unified government (A,A)
to divided government (A,B), and if εˆAt < −εA,AL , then the median voter prefers unified
government (B,B) to divided government (B,A). A similar argument applies when the
starting point is divided government. Moreover, as ρ keeps falling, the efficiency costs of
divided government will eventually outweigh its moderating effects, so the median voter
always prefers unified government. Hence,
Proposition 4.4: Constitutional Democracy with Efficiency Costs of Divided
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Government. Suppose there are elections in odd periods, and the legislature must autho-
rize new debt. Furthermore, in non-electoral periods government competence is a weighted
average of the competence of the parties that share power, and in electoral periods a frac-
tion of the competence of the leading party. Let opportunism be high (χE > χ¯t). If the
condition on no optimal borrowing (62) and the second-order condition (80) hold, then:
1. In a non-electoral period E, with the agreement of V , will set taxes and expenditures
at the optimal level.
2. In an electoral period:
(a) Under perfect compliance with the budget law, divided government will set taxes
and expenditures at the optimal level, while unified government will generate
PBCs. The median voter is more likely to pick unified government either when
the current government is very competent (and hence reelected) or very incom-
petent (and hence replaced by the opposition).
(b) Under null compliance with the budget law, E will generate PBCs. The median
voter favors unified government.
The important message of Proposition 4.4 is that under compliance with the budget
law, voters have the ability to select the appropriate institutional arrangement, namely,
divided government, to moderate PBCs.
4.4 Empirical Implications
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997: chaps. 4 and 6) link the lack of recent evidence
of PBCs for the United States to the fact that after 1980 many federal transfer programs
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became mandatory by acts of Congress, so they cannot be easily manipulated for short
run purposes by the president.85 According to the logic of our model, these developments
could be due in turn to the fact that in the postwar period US voters have favored divided
government (cf. Alesina and Rosenthal 1995), because Propositions 3 and 4 imply that
divided government can prevent PBCs. The role of Congress is key not only because the
amount of money the federal government is allowed to borrow is subject constitutionally to
a statutory limit that can only be raised by Congress (Heniff 2004), but also because there
is a government shutdown if expenditures are not authorized by Congress (Keith 1999).
The moderating influence of divided government in Propositions 3 and 4 assumes that
compliance with the budget law is perfect, but not all legislatures actually have the capa-
bility to assure such compliance. If not, the budget rule is not credible. The US Congress
has an uncommon capability of monitoring and enforcing the budget. Nordhaus (1989)
traces the roots of this back to the Nixon administration, whose dissembling prompted the
US Congress to establish in 1974 the Congressional Budget Office to have an independent
control of the budget.86
A sharp empirical implication can be derived from Propositions 3 and 4, namely, that
aggregate PBCs should be larger either in countries with few checks and balances, or
with weak compliance with the budget law. Streb, Lema, and Torrens (2009) study this
implication empirically with the Brender and Drazen (2005) panel of 67 democracies over
the 1960-2001 period. Just as in our theoretical model, their data do not reject the null
hypothesis that the budget surplus deteriorates significantly before elections and improves
85Though Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) state there are no opportunistic cycles in the United States,
Grier (2008) finds instead clear evidence of opportunistic political business cycles by using a wider range of
control variables. Furthermore, he is able to link these cycles to monetary policy, but not to fiscal policy.
86In our framework, the credit for good performance in election years accrues to the president. Even if
performance reflected the competence of both branches of government, the results in Hanusch (2010) imply
that most of the credit would still go to the president. Hence, Congress has no incentive to engage on its
own in PBCs.
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thereafter by the same magnitude, a feature that can be represented by a dummy variable
pbc that equals 1 the election year, -1 the following year, and 0 otherwise. To capture
legislative checks and balances in countries with strong compliance with the law, they
construct a variable checks that is the product of vetoplayer –which measures the presence
of a legislative veto player, equal to 1 (full veto player) if the Henisz (2002) political
constraints index POLCON3 ≥ 2/3, 3/2*POLCON3 otherwise– and compliance dummy
–which measures the degree of compliance with the law, equal to 1 (strong) if the ICRG law
and order index ≥ 4 in all years, 0 (weak) otherwise. The variable pbc checks –the product
of pbc and checks– shows that checks indeed has a moderating effect on cycles, providing
an empirical counterpart of Propositions 3 and 4 above. Since the effect of pbc checks is
of similar magnitude but opposite sign to pbc, the variable pbc (1-checks) –the product
of pbc and (1-checks)– can replace them. The variable pbc (1-checks) implies that under
strong compliance with the law, which is the typical situation in OECD countries, the
discretionary power of the executive depends on the veto players in the legislature, and no
PBCs will be observed with a full veto player. Table 1 employs the coefficient of pbc (1-
checks) in their full sample of countries (namely 0.47) to measure the mean impact of
elections on the budget surplus in different subgroups.
Table 4.1. Impact of Effective Checks and Balances on Aggregate PBCs
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vetoplayer
compliance
dummy
checks
Mean impact of elections
on budget surplus
All 0.62 0.55 0.37 -0.29
(0.19) (0.50) (0.35)
Non-OECD 0.56 0.17 0.11 -0.42
countries (0.22) (0.38) (0.25)
OECD 0.67 0.93 0.63 -0.17
countries (0.12) (0.26) (0.21)
Presidential 0.55 0.30 0.12 -0.41
systems (0.21) (0.40) (0.25)
Parliamentary 0.65 0.74 0.52 -0.22
systems (0.16) (0.44) (0.32)
New 0.57 0.24 0.16 -0.39
democracies (0.22) (0.42) (0.30)
Established 0.64 0.70 0.48 -0.24
democracies (0.16) (0.46) (0.33)
Sources: vetoplayer, compliancedummy, and checks are from Table 1 in Streb, Lema, and
Torrens (2009), except for systems of government, where the DPI classification (0 and 1 for presidential, 2
for parliamentary) is used to construct these variables; mean values (in parenthesis, the standard deviations)
are reported. The mean impact on the budget surplus, as a percentage of GDP, is calculated multiplying
(1− checks) by the coefficient -0.47 from column (3) of Table 3 in Streb, Lema, and Torrens (2009).
These estimates confirm the Schuknecht (1996) conjecture that stronger PBCs in de-
veloping countries are due to weaker checks and balances, since the budget surplus falls
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0.4% of GDP in election years in non-OECD countries, while the effect in OECD coun-
tries is less than half of that. Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) contrast separation
of powers in a presidential-congressional regime to legislative cohesion in a parliamentary
regime. If we were to take this literally, it would lead to expect stronger PBCs in par-
liamentary countries, something exactly counter to the empirical evidence in Persson and
Tabellini (2003) on PBCs being stronger in presidential countries. This can be explained
in our framework in terms of fewer effective checks and balances in presidential countries
compared to parliamentary countries (0.12 versus 0.52, see Table 1). New democracies also
exhibit fewer effective checks and balances than established democracies (0.16 versus 0.48,
see Table 1), helping to explain the results of Brender and Drazen (2005) on PBCs being
stronger in new democracies.
The implications of our framework differ from Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997:
1165), which analyzes separation of powers in presidential systems, because they explicitly
leave out the issue of unified government brought up by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995)
that is the key force behind PBCs in Propositions 3 and 4 of our model.87 Proposition
3 has a counterfactual implication, that voters will always choose divided government.
Instead, Proposition 4 implies that divided government is more likely when the differences
in expected competence between both parties are not too large. On the other hand, if
a legislature is not capable of assuring compliance with the budget law, then divided
government is useless to moderate the executive and only the efficiency costs are left. This
outcome seems more likely to befall an opposition legislature in presidential systems, since
minor coalition members in parliamentary systems can bring the government down with a
simple no-confidence vote.
87Saporiti and Streb (2008) look at how separation of powers in presidential systems moderates PBCs,
but the legislature is never aligned with the executive because it acts benevolently as a representative of
the people. This assumption rules out by construction the possibility of unified government.
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Alt and Lassen (2006b) also provide cross-country evidence that there are PBCs in es-
tablished democracies of OECD countries, when there is a lack fiscal transparency. There
is also evidence from subnational political jurisdictions. Rose (2006) finds there are sig-
nificant PBCs in US states without balanced budget rules, or with weak balanced budget
rules that allow borrowing. However, when stringent balanced budget rules –i.e., those
that prohibit to issue public debt or require a popular referendum to authorize debt– are
in place, she has the nice result that PBCs are eliminated. Rose (2006) also finds that
“when Republicans control both branches, the election-year increase in spending is twice
as large as when the government is under divided partisan control”, although the effect is
not statistically significant. From the point of view of the present framework, the question
is how divided government impacts on the budget surplus, and government expenditures,
in states where legislative authorization is required to issue debt.
4.5 Conclusions
The inability of the incumbent chief executive credibly to commit not to use debt for
electoral purposes has been pointed out as being at the heart of aggregate PBCs (Shi and
Svensson 2006, Alt and Lassen 2006a,b). Since this credibility problem is generated by the
discretionary power of the executive, this paper models the role of legislative veto players
as a possible solution to PBCs, formalizing Shucknecht’s (1996) conjecture that PBCs are
stronger when there are no checks and balances. Streb, Lema and Torrens (2009) provide
empirical evidence that checks and balances indeed moderate PBCs in countries where
compliance with the law exists.
In relation to the debate on rules versus discretion, our results are that rules are not
enough to avoid PBCs. Rather, appropriate checks and balances are required in consti-
tutional democracies as a commitment device. Under divided government in presidential
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systems or coalition governments in parliamentary systems, an unaligned legislature will
veto electoral changes in the budget; for this veto power to be effective, the legislature
needs the oversight and enforcement capacity to insure that the head of the executive
branch complies with the approved budget law. Under unified government in presiden-
tial systems or single party rule in parliamentary systems, the legislature shares the same
electoral objectives as the chief executive, so it will not curb aggregate cycles in spending,
taxes and debt. Actual checks and balances are endogenous and depend on voters’ choices.
If there is compliance with the budget law, voters may find this commitment device useful
or not depending on its benefits (eliminating PBCs) and costs (less competence).
Divided government is beneficial in this setup with opportunistic political parties be-
cause it enhances the credibility of commitments. With partisan political parties, divided
government has an additional role, namely to reduce potentially large policy swings from
having alternating unified governments in office. The current framework could be extended
to allow for parties with policy preferences, to capture the incentive of voters to favor di-
vided government in order to have more stable policies.
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Appendix 4.1
No Optimal Borrowing Condition. The no optimal borrowing condition in Section
4.2 is given by:
Et
[
1
θt
]
≤ β(1 + r(0))Et
[
1
θt+1
]
.
We now show this condition implies that borrowing is never optimal for a benevolent ruler.
Consider a randomly selected candidate in period t = 0 who remains in office forever.
By quasi-linear preferences, the marginal utility of consumption is equal to one. If, in
expected value, the marginal utility of the public good is equal to the marginal utility of
consumption, any extra resources will be optimally used to reduce taxes.
Suppose the government resorts to one extra unit of debt in period t to re-
duce taxes. Expected utility increases by Et
[
1
θt
]
in period t, while utility falls by
[r′ (dt) dt + 1 + r (dt)]Et
[
1
θt+1
]
in period t+1, when the debt is repaid. Thus, the first-order
condition at an optimum is:
Et
[
1
θt
]
− β [r′ (dt) dt + 1 + r (dt)]Et [ 1
θt+1
]
≤ 0,
with strict equality if dt > 0. By the no optimal borrowing condition, this first-order
condition is only satisfied for dt = 0.
The second-order condition at an optimum is:
−β [r′′ (dt) dt + 2r′ (dt)]Et [ 1
θt+1
]
≤ 0,
which is satisfied for all dt.
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The no optimal borrowing condition is relevant for very negative competence shocks.
While Et
[
1
θt+1
]
is an unconditional expectation of the reciprocal of government compe-
tence, Et
[
1
θt
]
is strictly decreasing and convex in εt−1. Hence, −Et
[
1
θt
]
is strictly in-
creasing and concave in εt−1. By Lemma 1 below, −Et
[
1
θt
]
≥ −Et
[
1
θt+1
]
if and only if
εt−1 ≥ ε̂, for ε̂ < 0 = E[ε]. Therefore, Et
[
1
θt
]
≤ Et
[
1
θt+1
]
if and only if εt−1 ≥ ε̂, so
Et
[
1
θt
]
> Et
[
1
θt+1
]
if and only if εt−1 < ε̂. Hence, condition (7) rules out that debt is
optimal even in the bad states of the world, including the worst possible scenario, namely
εt−1 = −1/2ξ.
Lemma 4.1: Let Z = h(X,Y ) be a function of two independent stochastic variables
X and Y . Let E [Z | x] be the expected value of Z conditional on x, and suppose that it
is a strictly increasing and concave function of x. Then, there exists xˆ ≤ E [X] such that
E [Z | x)] ≥ E [Z] if and only if x ≥ xˆ.
Proof: Since E [Z | x] is concave, by Jensen’s inequality it follows that E [Z | E [X]] ≥
E[E [Z | X]]. By the law of iterated expectations, E [Z] = E[E [Z | X]]. Hence,
E [Z | E [X]] ≥ E [Z] . (A1)
Since E [Z | x] is strictly increasing, from simple inspection of (A1) it follows that there
exists xˆ ≤ E [X] such that E [Z | xˆ] = E [Z], E [Z | x] > E [Z] if x > xˆ, and E [Z | x] <
E [Z] if x < xˆ. 
Lemma 4.2: Et[ct+1 + α ln(gt+1) | εt] is a strictly increasing and concave function of
εt.
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Proof: Use the definitions of ct+1 and gt+1, then replace γ
u
t+1 and π
u
t+1, apply the
(conditional) expected value operator, and use Et
[
1
θt+1
| εt
]
= Et+1
[
1
θt+1
]
:
Et [ct+1 + α ln(gt+1)] = y − α− (1 + rt) dtEt
[
1
θt+1
]
+ αEt
Et+1
ln
 αθt+1
Et+1
[
1
θt+1
]
 ,
Et [ct+1 + α ln(gt+1) | εt] = y−α−(1 + rt) dtEt
[
1
θt+1
| εt
]
+αEt
ln
 αθt+1
Et+1
[
1
θt+1
]
 | εt
 .
Conditional expected utility in t + 1 is increasing in εt because of a lower expected
burden of outstanding debt, a higher expected competence in the provision of the public
good, and a higher expenditure on the public good:
∂Et [ct+1 + α ln(gt+1) | εt]
∂εt
= (1 + rt) dtEt
[
1
θ2t+1
| εt
]
+
+α
Et [ 1
θt+1
| εt
]
+
Et+1
[
1
θ2t+1
]
Et+1
[
1
θt+1
]
 > 0.
As to the second derivative of Et[ct+1 + α ln(gt+1) | εt], first
∂2Et [ct+1 | εt]
∂ε2t
= −2 (1 + rt) dtEt
[
1
θ3t+1
| εt
]
=
−2 (1 + rt) dt
(
θ¯ + εt
)((
θ¯ + εt
)2 − ( 12ξ)2)2
≤ 0.
Note that ∂
2Et[ct+1|εt]
∂ε2t
= 0 only when dt = 0.
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Second, using Et
[
1
θ2t+1
| εt
]
= Et+1
[
1
θ2t+1
]
,
∂2Et[ln(gt+1) | εt]
∂ε2t
=
Et+1
[
1
θ2t+1
](
Et+1
[
1
θ2t+1
]
−
(
Et+1
[
1
θt+1
])2)− 2Et+1 [ 1θ3t+1 ]Et+1 [ 1θt+1](
Et+1
[
1
θt+1
])2 .
Since
(
Et+1
[
1
θ2t+1
]
−
(
Et+1
[
1
θt+1
])2)
is second order in relation to the following term,
this derivative is negative. 
The Voter’s Decision when there is a Trade-off between Control and Selec-
tion. In a constitutional democracy, a trade-off may arise between controlling PBCs and
selecting the most competent incumbents for offices E and V . We concentrate on the me-
dian voter’s decision, which can be cast as a dynamic programming problem. Let W (i, j)
be the expected utility of the median voter in electoral period t given that currently (that
is, before elections) party i leads E, and party j, V . The voter’s problem has a recursive
structure which leads to the following Bellman equation, where εˆit is estimated using infor-
mation set ℑt =
(
gt, pt, ε
E
t−1, ε
V
t−1, ωˆt
)
and the control variables are i′, j′ ∈ {A,B}, which
refer to the voter’s choice of parties to play roles E and V :
W (i, j | εˆt) = max
i′, j′∈{A,B}
{
βtEt
[
ct+1(i, j, i′, j′) + α ln gt+1(i, j, i′, j′) | εˆit
]
+β2tEt
[
ct+2(i′, j′) + α ln gt+2(i′, j′) +W
(
i′, j′
)]}
,
where
ct+1(i, j, i′, j′) = y −
α
Et+1
[
1
ρθi
′
t+1+(1−ρ)θ
j′
t+1
] + (1 + r)α
(
ωˆt(i,j)−
1
ωˆt(i,j)
)
Et
[
1
θit
]
ρθi
′
t+1 + (1− ρ)θj
′
t+1
,
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ln gt+1(i, j, i′, j′) = ln
 ρθi′t+1 + (1− ρ)θj
′
t+1
Et+1
[
1
ρθi
′
t+1+(1−ρ)θ
j′
t+1
]
+ lnα,
ct+2(i′, j′) = y − α
ωˆt+2 (i′, j′) θi
′
t+2Et+2
[
1
θi
′
t+2
] ,
ln gt+2(i′, j′) = ln
 ωˆt+2 (i′, j′) θi′t+2α
Et+2
[
1
θi
′
t+2
]
+ ϕ (i′, j′)α ln ρ2,
ωˆt (i, j) =
 1 if i 6= jωut otherwise , ϕ
(
i′, j′
)
=
 1 if i
′ 6= j′
0 otherwise
.
Let Φ
(
i, j, εˆit
)
denote the policy function that solves the voter’s decision problem. We
make the following conjecture, where i is the party currently in charge of E, and j is in
charge of V :
Φ
(
i, j, εˆit
)
=

(i, i) if εi,jH ≤ εˆit ≤ 12ξ ,
(i,∼ i) if εˆ ≤ εˆit < εi,jH ,
(∼ i, i) if − εi,jL < εˆit < εˆ,
(∼ i,∼ i) if − 12ξ ≤ εˆit ≤ −εi,jL .
(A5)
The symbol ∼ i indicates the opposition (there are only two parties). The higher and lower
limits that separate the regions of divided and unified government (i.e., εi,jH and ε
i,j
L ) are
not symmetrical, and they also depend on whether the starting point is unified government
(i = j) or divided government (i 6= j).88 The limit value εˆ that separates the region of
divided government (i,∼ i) from divided government (∼ i, i) is not necessarily zero, as we
88The difference of starting with either unified or divided government is the burden of the debt in
t + 1. Divided government imposes an expected loss in competence, and reduces the expected variance in
competence. The two factors have opposite effects on the expected burden of the debt. When the expected
loss in competence prevails, unified government becomes more attractive.
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comment below. We now verify this cut-point strategy.
As to the choice between divided government (A,B), or (B,A), the only potential
difference is in period t+ 1, where expected utility can be expressed as follows:
Et
[
ct+1(i, j, i′, j′) + α ln gt+1(i, j, i′, j′) | εˆit
]
= y − α− (1 + r)dtEt
[
1
ρθi
′
t+1 + (1− ρ)θj
′
t+1
]
+ αEt
ln
 ρθi′t+1 + (1− ρ)θj
′
t+1
Et+1
[
1
ρθi
′
t+1+(1−ρ)θ
j′
t+1
]

+ α lnα
Let party A control E in period t. The difference in expected utility in period t + 1
between having divided government (A,B), where A controls E and B, V , and divided
government (B,A), where the roles are reversed, is:
D (AB,BA) = (1 + r)dtEt
[
1
ρθBt+1 + (1− ρ)θAt+1
− 1
ρθAt+1 + (1− ρ)θBt+1
]
+ αEt
ln

[
ρθAt+1 + (1− ρ)θBt+1
]
Et+1
[
1
ρθBt+1+(1−ρ)θ
A
t+1
]
[
ρθBt+1 + (1− ρ)θAt+1
]
Et+1
[
1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
]


If ρ = 12 , then D (AB,BA) = 0 for all εt, so it does not matter whether the incumbent
is elected to E or V . However, the relevant range is 12 < ρ ≤ 1. When ρ = 1, Corollary
1 applies, so the median voter prefers to reelect the party i ∈ {A,B} that controls the
executive office if and only if εˆit ≥ εˆ, where εˆ ≤ 0 because of the concavity of the objective
function. Hence, there is an incumbency advantage for the party that controls the chief
executive under divided government (better the devil you know than the devil you don’t).
When 12 < ρ < 1, E is still more important than V for government competence. Since
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it might be useful for the voter to know something about the incumbent’s competence in
order to elect it to E, this might also generate an incumbency advantage in this range. At
any rate, there exists an εˆ around the origin such that D (AB,BA) ≥ 0 for εˆAt ≥ εˆ and
D (AB,BA) < 0 for εˆAt < εˆ.
Is there vote splitting when the competence shocks are large? Again, let party A control
E in period t. If εˆAt ≥ εˆ, the median voter picks i′ = A, and in the Bellman equation only
the controls j′ = A,B must be considered (if εˆAt < εˆ, the median voter favors instead party
B for E and similar arguments apply). If the median voter chooses divided government
in period t, the impacts on the Bellman equation can be broken down into three welfare
effects.
The first welfare effect is
Et
[
ct+1(A, j,A,A) + α ln gt+1(A, j,A,A) | εˆAt
]−
Et
[
ct+1(A, j,A,B) + α ln gt+1(A, j,A,B) | εˆAt
]
.
For εˆAt = εˆ, the difference is second order and has to do with the effects on vari-
ance: with unified government, shock εˆAt is known in equilibrium, whereas with divided
government ρεˆAt + (1 − ρ)εBt has a expected value of zero but a positive variance; on
the other hand, in the next period, expected competence is the same, but variance is
lower with divided government, since ρεAt+1 + (1 − ρ)εBt+1 has the same expected value
(zero) but less dispersion than εAt+1. These two risk effects have opposite signs. How-
ever, as εˆAt increases, there is a competence effect that clearly favors unified govern-
ment: Lemma 4.3 shows that, for ρ < 1, Et
[
ct+1(A, j,A,A) + α ln gt+1(A, j,A,A) | εˆAt
]
− Et
[
ct+1(A, j,A,B) + α ln gt+1(A, j,A,B) | εˆAt
]
is increasing in εˆAt .
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Lemma 4.3: Suppose that party A controls E in period t. If A is re-
elected to control E, the difference in expected utility between having A or B
control V , namely D (AA,AB) = Et
[
ct+1(A, j,A,A) + α ln gt+1(A, j,A,A) | εˆAt
] −
Et
[
ct+1(A, j,A,B) + α ln gt+1(A, j,A,B) | εˆAt
]
, is increasing in εˆAt .
Proof: Applying the properties of operator E and the definitions of ct+1 and gt+1,
D (AA,AB) =
(1 + rt)
(
ωˆt (A, j)− 1ωˆt(A,j)
)
Et
[
1
θAt
] Et
[
1
ρθAt+1 + (1− ρ)θBt+1
− 1
θAt+1
| εˆAt
]
+
+ αEt
[
ln
(
θAt+1
ρθAt+1 + (1− ρ)θBt+1
)
| εˆAt
]
+ αEt
ln
Et+1
[
1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
]
Et+1
[
1
θAt+1
]
 | εˆAt
 .
Differentiating D (AA,AB) with respect to εˆAt :
∂D (AA,AB)
∂εˆAt
=
(1 + rt)
(
ωˆt (A, j) − 1ωˆt(A,j)
)
Et
[
1
θAt
] ∂Et
[
1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
− 1
θAt+1
| εˆAt
]
∂εˆAt
+
+ α
∂Et
[
ln
(
θAt+1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
)
| εˆAt
]
∂εˆAt
+ α
∂Et
ln
Et+1
[
1
ρθA
t+1
+(1−ρ)θB
t+1
]
Et+1
[
1
θA
t+1
]
 | εˆAt

∂εˆAt
.
Note that ωˆt (A, j) ≥ 1, because either ωˆt (A, j) > 1 with PBCs, or ωˆt (A, j) = 1 without
PBCs. As to the first term of ∂D(AA,AB)
∂εˆAt
,
∂Et
[
1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
− 1
θAt+1
| εˆAt
]
∂εˆAt
= (1− ρ)Et
[ (
θBt+1
)2 − ρ (θAt+1 − θBt+1)2(
ρθAt+1 + (1− ρ)θBt+1
)2 (
θAt+1
)2 | εˆAt
]
.
For ρ = 1, this is zero, and for ρ = 0, this is positive. When ρ < 1, this is also positive,
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because the second term of the numerator is second order with respect to the first term.
Therefore:
∂Et
[
1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
− 1
θAt+1
| εˆAt
]
∂εˆAt
= 0 if ρ = 1,
> 0 if ρ < 1.
(A2)
As to the second term of ∂D(AA,AB)
∂εˆAt
,
∂Et
[
ln
(
θAt+1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
)
| εˆAt
]
∂εˆAt
= Et
[
(1− ρ)θBt+1
θAt+1
(
ρθAt+1 + (1− ρ)θBt+1
) | εˆAt
]
= 0 if ρ = 1,
> 0 if ρ < 1.
(A3)
As to the third term of ∂D(AA,AB)
∂εˆAt
,
∂Et
ln
Et+1
[
1
ρθA
t+1
+(1−ρ)θB
t+1
]
Et+1
[
1
θA
t+1
]
 | εˆAt

∂εˆAt
= Et
(1− ρ)Et+1
[
1
(θAt+1)
2
]
Et+1
[
1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
]
Et+1
[
1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
]
Et+1
[
1
θAt+1
] +
−ρ
[
Et+1
[
1
(ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θBt+1)
2
]
Et+1
[
1
θAt+1
]
−Et+1
[
1
(θAt+1)
2
]
Et+1
[
1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
]]
Et+1
[
1
ρθAt+1+(1−ρ)θ
B
t+1
]
Et+1
[
1
θAt+1
] | εˆAt
 ,
where the first term in the numerator is positive, and the second term of the numerator is
second order (since it is the difference of two products of similar magnitude). Hence,
∂Et
ln
Et+1
[
1
ρθA
t+1
+(1−ρ)θB
t+1
]
Et+1
[
1
θA
t+1
]
 | εˆAt

∂εˆAt
= 0 if ρ = 1,
> 0 if ρ < 1.
(A4)
Summing up, (A2)-(A4) imply that Lemma 4.3 is satisfied. 
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As to the second welfare effect, expectations about period t+ 2 are not conditional on
the current competence shock, so
Et [ct+2(A,A) + α ln gt+2(A,A)] −Et [ct+2(A,B) + α ln gt+2(A,B)] =
Et
 α
(
1− 1ωut+2
)
θi
′
t+2Et+2
[
1
θi
′
t+2
] + α ln(ωut+2
ρ2
) ,
which is nonnegative because ωut+2 ≥ 1 and ρ ≤ 1. In period t+2 there will be an efficiency
loss with divided government due to the break down in coordination between E and V .
Furthermore, there will be no cycle under divided government. Both effects tends to reduce
utility in period t + 2 compared to a situation with unified government (no PBCs imply
more taxes and less public goods in period t+ 2).
The third welfare effect is:
Et [W (A,A)]−Et [W (A,B)] < 0.
The voter prefers to begin with divided government because there is no debt to repay in
the future. Formally, the result follows from a direct inspection of the Bellman equation.
While the second and third welfare effects are fixed costs and benefits, by Lemma 4.3
the first welfare effect is increasing in εˆAt . Hence, if for some εˆ
A
t ≥ εˆ the median voter
prefers unified government (A,A) to divided government (A,B), then for εˆA′t > εˆ
A
t the
voter will also prefer (A,A) to (A,B); and if for εˆAt ≥ εˆ the median voter prefers (A,B) to
(A,A), then for εˆ ≤ εˆA′t < εˆAt the voter will also prefer (A,B) to (A,A). Thus, the policy
function is a cut-point strategy as conjectured in (A5).
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Chapter 5: The Political Coase Theorem: Experimental Evidence89
Abstract
The Political Coase Theorem (PCT) states that, in the absence of transaction costs,
agents should agree to implement efficient policies regardless of the distribution of bar-
gaining power among them. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to explore how
commitment problems undermine the validity of the PCT. Overall, the results support
theoretical predictions. In particular, commitment issues matter, and the existence of
more commitment possibilities leads to better social outcomes, even when a redistribution
of political power is required to take advantage of those possibilities. However, we also
find that at low levels of commitment there is more cooperation than strictly predicted by
our parameterized model while the opposite is true at high levels of commitment, and only
large improvements in commitment opportunities have a significant effect on the social
surplus, while small changes do not.
5.1 Introduction
The Coase Theorem (Coase 1960), as applied to politics (hereinafter referred to as the
Political Coase Theorem or simply the PCT), states that, in the absence of transaction
costs, agents should agree to implement efficient policies regardless of the distribution of
bargaining power among them, which should only affect the distribution of gains. Since in-
efficient policies are pervasive, a fundamental issue in political economy has been to identify
the crucial transaction costs in the political system (North 1990). Commitment problems
have been considered to be one of the fundamental sources of transaction costs in politics
89This essay is a joint work with Sebastian Galiani and Maria Lucia Yanguas.
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(North and Weingast 1989). This is due to one of the key differences between economic
and political transactions, inasmuch as, in politics, agents cannot rely on contracts being
enforced by a third party, since powerful players are, by definition, the ones who have
the power to enforce agreements. As a consequence, powerful agents face a commitment
problem which may restrict the scope of the agreements that they can reach with other
agents. In this paper, we explore how commitment problems may affect social outcomes
employing a randomized laboratory experiment.
The importance of the PCT cannot be overemphasized. On the substantive front, there
is hardly a more relevant issue in the social sciences than the identification of sources of
inefficient policies and institutions. From a theoretical perspective, most formal political
economy models now simply assume that the PCT is not valid. This is the end result of
a shift in the literature on institutions and institutional change away from a tacit accep-
tance of the PCT and toward a more explicit rejection of this theorem. Early works in
institutional economics suggested that institutional changes were efficient adjustments in
response to innovations, implicitly accepting the PCT. Conversely, the identification of the
specific transaction costs that block efficient outcomes has been a paramount issue in new
institutional economics (North, 1981, 1990). However, only Acemoglu (2003) presents a
formal political economy model in which social conflict and limited commitment are the
factors that undermine the validity of the PCT.
Even though experiments are becoming more common, both in economics and political
science (see, among others, Druckman, Green, Kuklinski and Lupia, 2011; and Gerber and
Green 2012), the range of causes that researchers can manipulate experimentally is still
limited. Thus, laboratory experiments remain the gold standard for research into the causal
relationships existing among a broad set of issues (Friedman and Sunder, 1994). This is
particularly the case when dealing with strategic interactions under different institutional
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arrangements that are unlikely to be easily manipulated by researchers (see, among others,
Camerer 2003 and Palfrey 2009).
Additionally, the experiment can help us to determine where we should focus our at-
tention in order to improve our understanding of institutions and institutional change. For
example, the literature on institutional economics has shown that commitment problems
can be solved by a redistribution of political power. In our laboratory experiment we test
this hypothesis. Indeed, in one of our treatments new commitment possibilities lead to a
higher social surplus only if subjects first agree to a series of moves that can be interpreted
as a reallocation of political power. We also explore the long-standing debate about the
relative virtues of gradual and radical reforms by looking at the effects of small versus
large changes in commitment opportunities (see, among others, Popov 2000 and Roland
2000). Though there are many dimensions to this debate, our evidence suggests that large
changes may be needed to produce measurable results.
To test the validity of the PCT, we begin by adapting the model developed by Acemoglu
(2003) for use in a laboratory environment. The original model is a repeated taxation game
between a ruler and a citizen in which the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of
the stage game leads to a very inefficient outcome. The citizen does not work hard because
he knows that the ruler will tax all his income, and the ruler does not have any way to
credibly commit herself to refraining from expropriating the citizen’s property. Repeated
interactions open the door to some commitment opportunities and, hence, to better social
outcomes. Our adaptation is simpler in the sense that we consider a two-period game in
which promises are only partially binding. Specifically, there is some probability that a
player must keep her promises and some probability that promises are not binding at all.
Clearly, by changing these probabilities we are inducing different levels of commitment.
Subjects in the laboratory were asked to play our simplified version of this model, in which
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there were differing levels of probability that their promises were binding.
We conducted this experiment between August and November 2012 in a computer
laboratory at the Universidad de San Andre´s, Argentina. Participants were graduate and
undergraduate students who had differing fields of study and differing degrees of familiarity
with game theory. In all, we conducted 10 sessions with 16 subjects each, for a total of 160
participants, who were first randomly assigned to one of two roles - player 1 (the ruler) or
player 2 (the citizen)- and then to four different treatments. Each treatment differs only
in terms of commitment opportunities: in Treatment 1, neither player 1 nor player 2 can
credibly commit (promises are not binding at all); in Treatment 2, player 1 has a slight
commitment opportunity (with a probability equal to 0.25 that her promises are binding),
while player 2 has none; in Treatment 3, player 1 has significant commitment opportunities
(with a probability equal to 0.75 that her promises are binding), while player 2 has none;
and, last, in Treatment 4, player 1 has no commitment opportunities while player 2 has full
credibility (her promises are binding). Subjects played 6 rounds of the same game, with
the caveat that they would never play two consecutive rounds with the same subject. The
first two rounds were for practice, while the last four rounds were played for a monetary
reward.
Overall, the results of this experiment support the hypothesis that commitment issues
matter and that the existence of more commitment opportunities leads, on average, to
better social outcomes. Indeed, we find that this link is valid even when a reallocation of
political power is required to take advantage of new commitment opportunities. However,
we also find that at low levels of commitment there is more cooperation than would, strictly
speaking, be predicted by our parameterized model while the opposite is true at high levels
of commitment. Furthermore, only large improvements in commitment opportunities have
a significant effect on the social surplus, while small changes do not.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 summarizes the theoretical
framework, beginning with a general but informal presentation of the PCT. The section
continues with a brief review of a repeated game that formalizes when the PCT applies
and finishes with a description of a simplified version of the model that has been specially
adapted for use in our laboratory experiment. Section 5.3 describes the laboratory exper-
iment. Section 5.4 shows that subjects understood the game and the randomization was
balanced. Section 5.5 presents the main results of the experiment. Section 5.6 discusses
the departures from theoretical predictions. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section we review our theoretical framework. First, we begin with a general
statement about the main link between commitment opportunities and social outcomes.
Second, we briefly summarize an infinite-horizon repeated game developed by Acemoglu
(2003) that captures this link. Finally, we develop a simpler two-period game that adapts
Acemoglu’s model to a laboratory environment and then fully characterize its equilibrium.
5.2.1 The PCT and Commitment
As we mentioned in the introduction, if we apply Coase’s ideas to politics, we must
conclude that, in the absence of transaction costs in political bargaining, society should
reach an agreement that yields an efficient social outcome. Given that inefficient policies
and institutions are pervasive, a fundamental issue in political economy and institutional
economics has been the identification of crucial transaction costs in the political system.
Since the seminal work of North and Weingast (1989), commitment problems have been
considered to be one of the primary transaction costs in politics. There are two reasons
for this. First, political transactions are usually inter-temporal in the sense that one party
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offers something today in exchange for a promise of something in the future. Second and
more fundamentally, in the political arena, parties cannot rely on contracts being enforced
by a third party because powerful agents are, by definition, the ones who wield the power
needed to enforce agreements. Thus, powerful agents face a commitment problem which
may restrict the nature of the agreements they can reach with other agents.
In order to demonstrate the importance of commitment problems and the link between
the ability to commit and social outcomes, let us suppose that powerful agents can somehow
commit to a course of action: say, to repay loans or not expropriate others’ investments.
Then, less powerful agents will be willing to lend to powerful agents and start investment
projects because they know that their property will not be expropriated. When only
agents that actually do not have political power can commit, the situation may become
more complicated, and reaching an efficient outcome will probably require a change in
the distribution of political power. Conversely, when agents cannot commit, it will be very
difficult to reach efficient outcomes that involve inter-temporal transactions. In general, we
can summarize the link between commitment opportunities and social outcomes as follows.
The PCT and Commitment: When parties can make binding promises, i.e.,
when a commitment technology is available, social outcomes will be efficient regardless of
how much bargaining power the parties have or what the original distribution of political
rights was like, since this only affects the distribution of the social surplus. We say that the
PCT applies. When parties cannot make binding promises social outcomes will be
inefficient and the bargaining power of the parties and the original distribution of political
rights will influence the distribution as well as the size of the social surplus. In this case,
we say that the PCT does not apply.
5.2.2 A Formal Model to Test the PCT
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Acemoglu (2003) develops a political economy model that formally illustrates why we
should not expect the Coase Theorem to apply to politics. The model is a game between a
ruler and a citizen. The citizen can work in the formal or the informal sector. In the formal
sector the production function is YF = e
1−α+R, where e is the effort level, 0 < α < 1 and
R > 0 represents an exogenous source of income, such as the rents from natural resources.
In the informal sector the production function is YI = b
αe1−α, where 0 < b < 1. There
are two differences between the formal and informal sectors. Productivity is lower in the
informal sector than it is in the formal sector (b < 1). However, only the income that comes
from the formal sector can be taxed. The utility function for the citizen is Y − (1− α) e,
where Y is the citizen’s income. The timing of events is as follows. First, the ruler decides
to relinquish power (r = 1) or not (r = 0). If the ruler relinquishes, then the citizen selects
a transfer to the ruler S (YF ), and he decides in which sector he is going to work (m = 1
for the formal sector and m = 0 for the informal sector) and how much effort he is going
to put into that work. If the ruler does not relinquish, then the citizen selects the sector
that he is going to work in and decides how much effort he is going to devote to his work;
the ruler then selects a tax schedule T (YF ).
It is not difficult to prove that the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for this
game is r = 0, m = 0, e = b, and T (YF ) = YF , which is an inefficient outcome. But
suppose for a moment that, before any player had made a decision, parties were able to
sign an enforceable contract. In that case, it is not difficult to see that they would reach
an efficient outcome. In other words, the parties would first agree to maximize the total
surplus: the citizen would work in the formal sector (m = 1) and he would devote the
most efficient level of effort (e = 1) to his work, generating a surplus of Y = α+R. Then,
taxes T (YF ) or transfers S (YF ) would be set in order to distribute this surplus between
the ruler and the citizen.
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The problem with this solution is that the contract will not be a credible agreement.
The citizen knows that the ruler will not have any incentive to keep her original promise
once the citizen has set m = e = 1 and the ruler has the chance to set T (YF ). In
fact, the only reasonable expectation is that the ruler will appropriate all the income, i.e.,
T (YF ) = YF , and, hence, the citizen will prefer to work in the informal sector (m = 0
and e = b). Alternatively, the ruler knows that the citizen will not have any incentive to
keep his original promise once she relinquished. In fact, the only reasonable thing for her
to expect is that, after she relinquishes, the citizen will set S (YF ) = 0. Thus, the only
possible equilibrium when the parties cannot commit to their promises is the inefficient
outcome r = 0, m = 0, e = b, which yields a total surplus of αb+R.
In order to escape from this outcome, Acemoglu (2003) considers an infinite-horizon
repeated game whose stage game is the one just described. He finds that repeated interac-
tions open the door to credible agreements and better, although not necessarily efficient,
outcomes. Indeed, for intermediate levels of the common discount factor, he shows that
the size of the equilibrium surplus depends on the bargaining power of the parties. Thus,
in general, the Coase Theorem does not apply to politics because powerful parties can only
partially commit to respect agreements.
Although simple repeated games have been implemented in the laboratory, we believe
that it is better to begin testing the PCT with a simpler model. In the next section,
we consider a two-period model that is designed to capture most of the key issues in
Acemoglu’s infinite-horizon model. The crucial simplification is that promises are only
partially enforceable, in the sense that there is some probability agents can ignore them.
5.2.3 A Simple Model with Limited Commitment
Consider a simple game with only two players: a citizen and a ruler, denoted by C
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and R, respectively. The citizen has an endowment of one unit of effort that he can use to
produce a private good. The production function is given by:
Y =
1
2
+ 2e,
where e ∈ [0, 1] is the effort level. The citizen values the private good and leisure. The
payoff function for the citizen is given by:
vC = Yd +
1− e2
2
, (82)
where Yd is his disposable income, i.e., his income after taxes and/or transfers.
The ruler has the power to tax the citizen but she can relinquish this power in exchange
for a transfer. Thus, the payoff function for the ruler is given by:
vR = rS + (1− r)T, (83)
where T indicates taxes, S indicates the transfer that she gets if she relinquishes and
r ∈ {0, 1} is her relinquish decision. Note that disposable income is gross income minus
taxes or transfers, i.e., Yd = Y − rS− (1− r)T . Moreover, since only the private good can
be taxed and used for transfers, it must be the case that T ≤ Y and S ≤ Y .
The timing of events is as follows.
1. C selects the transfer S.
2. R decides to relinquish (r = 1) or not (r = 0).
(a) If R relinquishes, then nature decides if S is enforceable (with a probability ρ
that it is enforceable).
258
i. If S is enforceable, then C selects e.
ii. If S is not enforceable, then C selects e and has the chance to reset S.
(b) If R does not relinquish, then R selects T . C observes T and decides e. Nature
decides if T is enforceable or not (with a probability π that it is enforceable).
i. If T is not enforceable, then R decides on a new T .
ii. Otherwise, the promised T applies.
This model can be represented as an extensive game with perfect information and ran-
dom moves (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). The appropriate notion of equilibrium for
such games is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The following proposition formally
characterizes the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 5.1: The simple model with limited commitment has a unique sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium which is given by:
1. Suppose that ρ = 0. Then the ruler does not relinquish ( r = 0). Moreover:
(a) If π < 12 , then the ruler promises to levy a tax equal to T =
1
2 + 2π and the
citizen works e = 2π;
(b) If π ≥ 12 , then the ruler promises to levy a tax equal to T = 2.5 − 12π and the
citizen works e = 1.
2. Suppose that ρ = 1. Then the ruler relinquishes ( r = 1) and the citizen works e = 1.
Moreover:
(a) If π < 12 , then the citizen promises S =
1
2 + 4π − 2π2;
(b) If π ≥ 12 , then the citizen promises S = 2.
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Proof : See Appendix 5.1. 
It is easy to see that the first best allocation is e = 1 and Y = 1.5, which yields a total
social surplus equal to TSur = 2.5. The following corollary summarizes the total social
surplus and the division of it for each equilibrium in Proposition 5.1.
Corollary 5.1: Under the assumptions of Proposition 5.1.
1. Suppose that ρ = 0. Then:
(a) If π < 12 , then the equilibrium outcome is Pareto inefficient. Moreover, the
expected payoff for the ruler is E [vR] =
1
2 +4π−2π2; the expected payoff for the
citizen is E [vC ] =
1
2 and the total social surplus is TSur = 1+ 4π− 2π2 < 2.5.
(b) π ≥ 12 , then the equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient. Moreover, the expected
payoffs for the ruler and the citizen are E [vR] = 2 and E [vR] =
1
2 , respectively.
2. Suppose that ρ = 1. Then, the equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient. Moreover,
(a) If π < 12 , then the expected payoffs of the ruler and the citizen are E [vR] =
1
2 + 4π − 2π2 and E [vC ] = 2− 4π + 2π2, respectively.
(b) If π ≥ 12 , then the expected payoffs of the ruler and the citizen are E [vR] = 2
and E [vC ] =
1
2 , respectively.
Proof : Straightforward deduction from Proposition 5.1. 
The key issue in this game is commitment. The citizen would like to put in more effort,
but he knows that the ruler will tax his income. The ruler knows this and she will be
better off if she signs a credible agreement to restrict taxation. But, the problem is that
she is the ruler and, hence, only she has the power to enforce agreements. Thus, her ability
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to make a credible promise to limit taxation depends on her ability to tie her hands and
commit herself to that. The probability π ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of the strength of this
commitment. Another alternative is that she relinquishes her position in exchange for a
payment. The problem. here again, is commitment. Once the citizen has the power, he
will not be willing to keep his promise and the ruler will get nothing. The citizen would
like to commit himself to paying the ruler if she relinquishes, but, here again, his ability
to tie his hands is limited. The probability ρ ∈ {0, 1} is a measure of this ability. When
neither the ruler nor the citizen can find a way to commit the outcome of the game is very
inefficient. However, when either the ruler or the citizen can partially commit, it is possible
to support more cooperative outcomes.
5.3 The Laboratory Experiment
In this section we describe our laboratory experiment. First, we provide a general
description of the experiment, including its monetary payoffs, number of sessions and
rounds, and the matching procedure. Second, we summarize the treatments and compute
the corresponding predicted outcomes of Proposition 5.1 and Corollary 5.1.
5.3.1 General Description of the Experiment
The experiment was conducted between August and November 2012 at the Universidad
de San Andre´s, Argentina. We recruited graduate and undergraduate students from any
field of study and regardless of how familiar they were with game theory. We conducted
10 sessions with 16 subjects each, totalling 160 participants. Subjects were allowed to
participate in only one session.90 Every session included the four treatments. In each
90There was only one case in which a person who already had participated took the place of another
subject who had to leave prior to the end of a session. We control for this case in the regressions.
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treatment, subjects were asked to play a simple game involving limited commitment, as
explained in section 2.3, for a specific value of π and ρ.91 The experiment was programmed
and conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
Before each session began, subjects were randomly assigned to computer terminals.
After the 16 subjects were at their terminals, they received general instructions and, then,
the rules of the game were explained using a PowerPoint presentation. Footnote The
PowerPoint presentation can be found at.... Instructions and explanations were always
presented to the subjects using neutral words. In particular, subjects were never told that
they will be playing a political game and ruler and citizen were always denoted as player
1 and 2, respectively. In order to check whether participants understood the rules of the
game, we asked them to take a five-question quiz. The quiz was administered after we had
given the instructions, but before the rounds began. Subjects were paid approximately
US$ 0.81 per correct answer. Subjects then began playing rounds, during which they
interacted solely through a computer network using z-Tree software. Finally, just before
leaving the laboratory, all the subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire, which was
designed to enable us to test the balance across experimental groups and to control for
their characteristics in the econometric analysis presented below. For more details, please
see Appendix 2, which contains the script of the general instructions, the five questions
included in the quiz, a sample of the first three screens, along with the rules of the game,
and the questionnaire itself.
Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes, and subjects earned, on average. US$
22.50, which included a US$ 2.07 show-up fee, US$ 0.81 per correct answer on the quiz,
and US$ 5.18 for each point they received during the paid rounds of the experiment.92 All
91Information about pi and ρ was provided in the first three screens of each round and in a “ help ” box
that was available at all times. The screen also contained a calculator.
92All payments were made in Argentine currency; at the time, US$22.50 was equivalent to A$ 108.
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subjects were paid privately, in cash, after the experiment.93
In each session, subjects were first randomly assigned to one of two different roles
-player 1 (the ruler) or player 2 (the citizen)- and then to four distinct treatments. All
pairings were done through the computer. After each round, subjects were re-matched with
another partner for the next round. No player knew the identity of the player with whom
she was currently paired or the history of decisions made by any of the other players. Due
to the fact that subjects maintained their treatment and role, there were only two possible
partners for each subject.
Subjects played six rounds of the same game, with the caveat that they would never
play two consecutive rounds with the same subject. The first two rounds were for practice,
and the last four rounds were for pay. Subjects received a summary of the decisions taken
by both themselves and their partners at the end of every round, including payoffs per
round, their own accumulated payoffs for paid rounds, effort level, promises, total income
before taxes, and nature’s decision (when applicable); they were also reminded of the payoff
functions of the game.
5.3.2 Treatments and Predicted Outcomes
The experiment consisted of four different treatments. The first treatment represents
a scenario of no commitment opportunities (π = ρ = 0); the second, a scenario of low
commitment opportunities for the ruler (π = 0.25 and ρ = 0); the third, a scenario of
high (but not full) commitment opportunities for the ruler (π = 0.75 and ρ = 0); and the
fourth, a scenario of full commitment opportunities for the citizen (π = 0 and ρ = 1).
Employing Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, we can compute the outcome predicted by our
parameterized model for all these treatments. Table 1 below depicts our four treatments
93After the experiment was completed, a password appeared on each subject’s screen. The subjects then
had to present this password to the person who was running the experiment in order to receive their payoffs.
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and the corresponding predicted outcomes. (Recall that e is effort, r is the relinquish
decision, E [vC ] is the expected payoff for the citizen, E [vR] is the expected payoff foe the
ruler and TSur is the total social surplus).
Please see Table 5.1: Treatments and Predicted Outcomes
As shown in Table 5.1, we should expect that the social surplus, defined as the sum of
the individual payoffs for the players matched in each session and period, should be 1 for
T1, 1.875 for T2, and 2.5 for T3 and T4. Rulers are expected to relinquish in T4 and do
not to relinquish in the other treatments. Effort should be 0 in T1, 0.5 in T2, and 1 in
T3 and T4. As for the distribution of the surplus, in T1, T2, and T3 the citizen should
obtain an expected payoff of 0.5 and the ruler should receive 0.5, 1.375 and 2, respectively.
Thus, in T1, T2 and T3, the ruler should keep all the increase in the social surplus due
to the rise in commitment opportunities. Conversely, in T4, the ruler should receive an
expected payoff of 0.5 and the citizen should obtain a payoff of 2, collecting all the increase
in surplus due to the rise of commitment opportunities.
Our limited-commitment model is much simpler than the repeated game developed by
Acemoglu (2003). Still, it is a multistage game in which any departure from the equilibrium
path in one node of the game can easily induce changes in predicted outcomes, even if
subjects play rationally in successive nodes. Altruism can also affect equilibrium outcomes,
which are deduced implicitly based on the assumption that agents are selfish. Finally,
subjects may not evaluate risky prospects based on a comparison of the expected utility
of (83) and (82). Therefore, we should not expect that subjects in the laboratory can
perfectly replicate the parameterized model predictions summarized in Table 5.1.94 A less
94For a more detailed methodological discussion of what we can learn from experiments about economic
primitives and theoretical models, see Smith (2010), Friedman (2010) and Levine (2009).
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demanding test for the model would be to check if laboratory results are consistent with
the comparative statics predicted by it. For example, we should expect that the total
surplus in T3 and T4 will be higher than in T1 for a wide range of levels of altruism. In
other words, only extremely altruistic subjects could induce a sharp enough rise in the
total surplus in T1 to make the difference between T3 and T1 negligible.
From Table 5.1 we can easily deduce the following three key comparative static predic-
tions:
1. Total Social Surplus: The social surplus should increase when commitment op-
portunities rise. More precisely TSur(j) indicates the total surplus in treatment
Tj:
TSur(4) = TSur(3) > TSur(2) > TSur(1).
2. Reallocation of Political Power: As the citizen gains access to more commit-
ment opportunities, the ruler should relinquish more. More precisely, (Pr(r = 1)(j)
denotes the proportion of rulers that relinquish):
Pr(r = 1)(4) > Pr(r = 1)(3) = Pr(r = 1)(2) = Pr(r = 1)(1).
3. Distribution of the Surplus: The payoff for a player should increase with his/her
own commitment opportunities and does not vary as a function of the other player’s
commitment opportunities. More precisely, E [vi] (j) denotes the expected payoff for
player i = C,R in treatment Tj):
E [vC ] (4) > E [vC ] (3) = E [vC ] (2) = E [vC ] (1),
265
and
E [vR] (3) > E [vR] (2) > E [vR] (1) = E [vR] (4).
5.4 Understanding of the Game and Randomization Balance
Table 5.2 shows that on average subjects understood the rules of the game. Indeed,
from a maximum in the quiz grade of 12 points, subjects scored on average 10.91 points.
89% of the subjects correctly answered question 1, 81% question 2, 89% question 3, and
78% question 4. It seems that subjects found that question 5 was more complicated and
only 28% of them correctly answered it.
Table 5.2 also shows the randomization balance across player roles (citizen vs. ruler).
Note that all characteristics and understanding of the rules of the game are perfectly
balanced across roles, as the mean difference between citizens and rulers is not significantly
different from zero either for subject characteristics or for their understanding of the game.
Please see Table 5.2: Balance Across Players (Rulers vs. Citizens)
Tables 5.3 and 5.4, show that in the comparisons among the four treatments, all char-
acteristics and levels of understanding of the game were perfectly balanced between T1
and T2 and between T3 and T4. In some of the other cases, there is a slight imbalance in
gender and nationality, mostly at a 10% significance level. Nevertheless, it was only in less
than 10% of the tests that we rejected the null hypothesis at the 10% level of statistical
significance. Moreover, the imbalance in nationality is probably due to the fact that there
were very few foreigners in the sample (92.5% of the subjects were Argentines).
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Please see Table 5.3: Balance Across Treatments I
Please see Table 5.4: Balance Across Treatments II
5.5 Main Results: Comparative Statics
In this section we present the main results of the experiment. Overall, we find support
for the hypothesis that greater commitment opportunities lead, on average, to better social
outcomes. We first provide a descriptive analysis of the decisions taken by the subjects,
and then present the econometric results obtained when testing the comparative statics.
5.5.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 5.5 shows descriptive statistics for the main decisions taken by the subjects.
These include effort (e), relinquish decision (r), promises about T and S, selected T and S
in the event of no enforcement (decided values), and the final values actually charged and
transferred. We also present the payoffs for the ruler (vR) and the citizen (vC), as well as
the total combined surplus (TSur).
Please see Table 5.5: Decisions Across Treatments (Descriptive Statistics)
Total Social Surplus: Figure 5.1 shows the mean social surplus and its standard
deviation across treatments. As predicted by the model, the mean surpluses for T3 and
T4 are greater than for T1 and T2. Though the mean surplus in T4 is slightly larger than
in T3, the difference is very small. Even though the exact magnitudes of the surpluses
are not replicated empirically, the relative magnitudes tend to support the predictions of
the model. Since the social surplus is an increasing function of effort, essentially the same
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pattern can be seen in the effort decisions. Indeed, the average effort level is 0.32 in T1,
0.33 in T2, 0.62 in T3 and 0.66 in T4. Thus, as predicted by the model, effort is higher in
T3 and T4 than in T1 and T2. However, average effort levels are lower than theoretical
predictions for all treatments except T1.
Note that the mean surplus is concentrated at two points (around 1.5 and around 2).
Subjects appear to act similarly when the probability of enforcement is zero or very close
to zero (namely, 25%). In these situations, the social surplus is rather small, as citizens
decide to reduce their effort in the hope of preventing the ruler from confiscating their
income. As the probability of enforcement rises to 75%, the results begin to cluster around
a total surplus of about 2 points, as commitment opportunities now allow for more socially
efficient results. Figure 5.2 shows that the mean social surplus fluctuates considerably
across rounds of the experiment, especially for T1 and T3, but there is no clear pattern.
Please see Figure 5.1: Total Social Surplus, by Treatment
Please see Figure 5.2: Total Social Surplus, by Experimental Round
Reallocation of Political Power: Regarding the decision to relinquish power or not,
approximately 10% of rulers relinquished power in T1, 3.7% in T2, 2.5% in T3, and 51%
in T4. As predicted by the model, the percentage increases considerably from T1, T2,
and from T3 to T4; nonetheless, the difference is not as large as theoretical predictions
suggested (rulers should never relinquish in T1, T2 or T3 and always relinquish in T4).
Distribution of the Surplus: As predicted by the model, the payoff for citizens is, on
average, higher in T4 (0.903) than in T1 (0.573), T2 (0.494), or T3 (0.722), while the payoff
for rulers is, on average, higher in T3 (1.236) than in T2 (1.037) and higher in T2 than in
T1 (0.94). However, the distribution of the social surplus between rulers and citizens does
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not exactly coincide with theoretical predictions. In T1, citizens earned an average of 0.573
points and rulers an average of 0.903. Thus, approximately 80% of the 0.513 extra points
with respect to theoretical predictions went to rulers. In T2, rulers earned an average
of 1.037 points and citizens an average of 0.494. Thus, on average, citizens obtained the
payoff predicted by the model, while rulers obtained 0.3 points less. In T3, rulers earned
an average of 1.236 points and citizens an average of 0.722, rather than the 2 and 0.5 points
predicted by the model, respectively. Last, in T4, rulers earned an average of 1.109 points
rather than the 0.5 points predicted by the model, while citizens received only 0.903 points
rather than the 2 points predicted by the model.
5.5.2 Regression Analysis
We now formally test our three comparative static results using regression analysis.
Total Social Surplus: In order to formally test the hypotheses that more commitment
opportunities lead to better social outcomes (a larger social surplus) we use the following
regression model:
TSurgps = α+ β1DT+ β2Xgps +
9∑
s=1
β3sθs + β4sQgps + ǫgps, (84)
where g indexes a particular pairing of subject partners, p = 1, 2, ..., 4 indexes experimental
rounds, and s = 1, 2, ..., 10 indexes experimental sessions. There are 32 pairings of subject
partners in the data set, but only 16 of them will figure in each estimated regression.
Total surplus per group, session and round (TSur) is the dependent variable. TSur
is computed as the sum of the payoffs for the citizen and the ruler in each group, session
and paid round. Therefore, each observation corresponds to a given pair of subjects in
a particular session and round. The explanatory variable of interest is DT, a dummy
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variable indicating treatment status (T2, T3 or T4). In some specifications we also include
control variables. We control for individual characteristics Xgps (for both subjects in group
g we control for gender, age, nationality, whether s/he is a native English speaker, for
racial group, for whether s/he has ever taken a course in game theory, for whether s/he
is a graduate or a junior or senior undergraduate student),95 for the subjects’ level of
understanding of the game as measured by their answers to the quiz questions Qgps (mean
quiz-mark per group and quiz-mark of the citizen in each group), and for fixed effects by
session (θs).
According to our theoretical predictions, we should expect β1 to be positive when
comparing T2 to T1, T3 to T2, T3 to T1 and T4 to T1, while we should expect β1 to be
zero when contrasting T4 with T3.
Table 5.6 summarizes the results of regressing the total surplus in each of the treatments
separately without controls. Clustered standard errors at the corresponding unit of analysis
are shown in parentheses. Each unit of analysis is a given pair of subjects in a certain
session and in all the rounds they participate in, while each observation in the regression
corresponds to a given pair of subjects in a certain session and round. The total surplus
in T2 is not significantly different from the total surplus in T2, though the coefficient
associated with the treatment is indeed positive, in keeping with the model prediction.
Operating under the parameters in T3 (or T4) rather than under T2 (or T1) induces a
significant rise in the total surplus which ranches from 0.426 to 0.499 points, which is an
increase of approximately 30% over the counterfactual. Thus, as predicted by our model,
higher commitment opportunities tend to lead to better social outcomes. Finally, total
surpluses in T3 and T4 are not significantly different, which suggests that the subjects
understood that, in order to take advantage of the citizen’s commitment opportunities, in
95For a more detailed description of the questionnaire used to collect information about individual char-
acteristics, see Appendix 2
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T4 the ruler must relinquish.
Please see Table 5.6: Regression Analysis (Without Controls): Total Surplus
In Table 5.7, we report the results when the same analysis is performed once the entire
set of controls, as described above, was included. As the reader will see, the results did
not change in any meaningful way.96
Please see Table 5.7: Regression Analysis (Including Controls): Total Surplus
To sum up: Large improvements in commitment opportunities (from T1 to T3 or T4)
have a significant positive effect on the social surplus, while a small change (from T1 to
T2) has no more than a small positive (and statistically non-significant) effect.
Reallocation of Political Power: In order to formally test the hypothesis that
the probability of a reallocation of political power is higher when the citizen has more
commitment opportunities, we use the following regression model:
rgps = α+ β1DT+ β2Xgps +
9∑
s=1
β3sθs + β4sQgps + ǫgps, (85)
where g indexes a particular pairing of subject partners, p = 1, 2, ..., 4 indexes experimental
rounds, and s = 1, 2, ..., 10 indexes experimental sessions. Relinquish (r) is the dependent
variable. Explanatory and control variables are the same as in the regression model (84).
According to our theoretical predictions, we should expect β1 to be positive when
comparing T4 to T1, T2 or T3, while we should expect β1 to be zero when contrasting T1
with T2, or T3 and T1 with T2.
96Including the controls by round within each session does not alter the results either.
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Table 5.8 summarizes the results of a regression analysis of the decision to relinquish
power in each of the treatments separately. Clustered standard errors at the corresponding
unit of analysis are shown in parentheses. As predicted by our model, operating under the
parameters in T4 rather than in T1, T2 or T3 induces a positive and statistically significant
increase in the decision to relinquish power. The proportions of rulers that relinquish power
is not significantly different in T1 than in T2, or in T2 than in T3. Although the proportion
of rulers who relinquish power is significantly higher in T1 than in T3, the magnitude of
the difference is very low.
Please see Table 5.8: Regression Analysis: Reallocation of Political Power
Distribution of the Surplus: In order to formally test the hypotheses that the payoff
for a player increases with his/her own commitment opportunities and does not vary or
decrease in line with the other player’s commitment opportunities, we use the following
regression model:
vigps = α+ β1DT + β2Xgps +
9∑
s=1
β3sθs + β4sQgps + ǫgpsi, (86)
where g indexes a particular pairing of subject partners, p = 1, 2, ..., 4 indexes experimental
rounds, s = 1, 2, ..., 10 indexes experimental sessions. The payoff for player i (vi) is the
dependent variable. Explanatory and control variables are the same as in the regression
model (84).
According to our theoretical predictions for the ruler, we should expect β1 to be positive
when comparing T3 to T1, T2 or T4 and when comparing T2 to T1 or T4, while we should
expect β1 to be zero when contrasting T1 with T4. For the citizen, we should expect β1
to be positive when comparing T4 to T1, T2 or T3, while we should expect β1 to be zero
when contrasting T1 with T2 or T3.
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Tables 5.9 and 5.10 summarize the results of regressing the payoffs for rulers and cit-
izens, respectively, in each of the different treatments. Clustered standard errors for the
corresponding unit of analysis are shown in parentheses. As predicted by our model, op-
erating under the parameters in T3 rather than in T1, T2 or T4 induces a positive and
statistically significant effect on the payoff for rulers (one-tailed test). Contrary to what
is suggested by our model, however, operating under the parameters in T4 rather under
T1 or T2 induces a positive and statistically significant effect on the payoff for rulers. As
predicted by our model theory, operating under the parameters in T4 rather than in T1,
T2 or T3 also induces a positive and statistically significant rise in the payoff for citizens,
while operating under the parameters in T1 rather than in T2 has no effect on citizens’
payoff. Contrary to our model, operating under the parameters of T3 induces a positive
and statistically significant increase in the payoff for citizens.
Please see Table 5.9: Regression Analysis: Payoff of the Ruler
Please see Table 5.10: Regression Analysis: Payoff of the Citizen
5.6 Beyond Comparative Statics
As mentioned in section 5.3, we should not expect subjects in the laboratory to ex-
actly replicate equilibrium outcomes. It is very interesting to identify departures from the
benchmark provided by our model and to explore how and why they occur.
A comparison of Tables 5.1 and 5.5 clearly shows that, for low levels of commitment
(T1), there is more cooperation than predicted by our calibrated model, while the opposite
is true for high levels of commitment (T2, T3 and T4). Big improvements in commitment
opportunities (from T1 to T3 or T4) have a significant effect on the social surplus, while
smaller changes (from T1 to T2) do not. It is also evident that rulers do not always
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relinquish in T1, T2, and T3 and only 51% of the rulers relinquish in T4. Nor is the
distribution of the surplus exactly as predicted. Sometimes one of the players systematically
obtained more or less than theoretical predictions would indicate.
Next, we can take an even closer look at the study of subjects’ behavior by exploring
their decisions at key nodes of the game. Table 5.11 breaks down the results shown in
Table 5.5 into the relevant nodes. When the ruler relinquishes, there are no promises made
or decisions taken about tax T , and therefore no observations appear in those columns.
Similarly, when the ruler does not relinquish, decisions about S are left blank.
Please see Table 5.11: Beyond Comparative Statics
Under T1, the total surplus is, on average, larger than the amount predicted by the
theory (1.513 points versus 1 point). In part, this difference is accounted for by a small
fraction of rulers who wrongly selected r = 1. As Table 5.11 shows, in T1 rulers relinquished
8 times, which accounts for 10% of the observations. Note that, conditional on r = 1, it is
optimal for the citizens to select the maximum possible level of effort, i.e., e = 1, inducing a
total surplus of 2.5 points. Indeed, we can observe from Table 5.11 that, within this group,
the average level of effort was 0.95 and the average surplus was 2.445 points. However,
contrary to theoretical predictions, citizens did not keep all the surplus for themselves.
The average payoff for the rulers was 0.594 points. Thus, it seems that citizens are being
altruists in their dealings with the rulers.97
Not all of the difference between the predicted and actual total surpluses under T1
can be attributed to rulers who wrongly selected r = 1. Indeed, as Table 5.11 shows, the
average total surplus for the 72 observations in which rulers selected r = 0 is 1.409 points,
97Note that this is not an ultimatum game. The citizen can appropriate the entire surplus or can share a
portion of it with the ruler, but the ruler does not have the opportunity to accept or reject the distribution
selected by the citizen.
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while the average level of effort is 0.257. Thus, citizens are putting in more effort than
they should (0.257 versus 0) and, as a consequence, they are losing on average 0.069 points
since they achieved an average of 0.431 points, whereas they could have obtained 0.5 points
by selecting e = 0. This generates an average extra payoff of 0.478 points for the rulers.
On average, they received 0.978 points when they could have obtained 0.5 points if e = 0.
Summing up, on average, citizens are giving up 0.069 points and rewarding the rulers with
0.478 points. Again, it seems that citizens are being altruists.
Similar effects have been found to exist in previous laboratory experiments. Andreoni
and Miller (1993) find stable levels of cooperation of around 10%-15% when the model
predicted no cooperation and they attribute this to altruism. Camerer and Weigelt (1988)
estimate that the subjective prior that an opponent would play cooperatively is about 17%
and McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) estimate that the proportion of altruists is between 5%
and 10%. Keeneth and Martin (2001) investigate how fairness concerns influence individual
behavior in social dilemmas using a sequential prisoner’s dilemma experiment. They also
find that the proportion of altruists is between 12.5% and 26%.98
Finally, it is important to note that rulers who selected r = 1 obtained, on average, a
lower payoff (0.594 points) than those that selected r = 0 (0.978 points). However, wrongly
relinquishing does not appear to be the result of comprehension problems. (Actually, the
average quiz grade is higher for those who selected r = 1). Rather, we posit that such
behavior could be explained by the fact that some rulers were acting out of a desire to see
how altruistically their citizens would behave.
Under T2, the total surplus is, on average, lower than predicted (1.531 versus 1.875
points). As in the case of T1, there are some rulers who wrongly selected r = 1 (only
98More generally, Andreoni and Miller 2002 find that subjects exhibit a consistent preference for altruism,
while Charness and Haruvy (2002) test competing theories of non-pecuniary motives. They find that
reciprocity, fairness, and altruism all play an important role in subjects’ decisions.
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3 observations, in this case), which marginally increases the average total surplus. If we
focus on the 77 observations in which rulers selected r = 0, the average total surplus is
1.508 points. Why was the total surplus lower than predicted (1.508 versus 1.875 points)?
The answer is that citizens put in less effort than they should have. The average e was
0.322, whereas it should have been 0.5. As a consequence, citizens lost an average of 0.053
points while rulers had an average of 1.061 when they could have obtained 1.375 points.
But the real problem is the fact that some of the rulers promised too high a tax. As Table
5.11 shows, the average Tpromised was 1.128 points, when it should have been 1.
As in the case of T2, under T3 the average surplus is also lower than predicted. On
average, the total surplus was 1.957 points for all the observations and 1.943 points when
rulers selected r = 0, versus a prediction of 2.5 points.99 Why is the total surplus lower
than predicted? As in the case of T2, under T3 citizens also put in less effort than they
should have. The average e was 0.618 but should have been 1. However, this time the
problem is not that the rulers promised too high a tax. On the contrary, they promised
a tax that was lower than predicted. As Table 5.11 shows, on average Tpromised is 1.424
versus a prediction of 1.83. The key problem is that citizens put in too little effort. As
a consequence, rulers obtained less than predicted (an average of 1.267 points versus a
prediction of 2 points), and citizens obtained more (an average of 0.678 points versus a
prediction of 0.5 points).
Under T4, the total surplus is, on average, lower than predicted (2.012 points versus
2.5). Most of the difference is accounted for by rulers that took the wrong relinquish
decision. Indeed, if we focus on the 51% (41 observations) of the rulers who selected the
right relinquish decision, i.e., r = 1, then the total surplus is, on average, 2.480 points and
the average e is 0.99. Rulers that selected r = 1 obtained, on average, more than predicted
99Under T3 there are only two observations in which the rulers wrongly selected r = 1
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(1.191 points versus 0.5 points), while citizens obtained less (1.298 points versus 2 points).
The only possible explanation for this outcome is that citizens are altruistic.
If the ruler wrongly decided that r = 0 (this happened in 39 observations, i.e., 49%
of the time), then the subsequent game is as in T1 when r = 0. If subjects believe that
the game will be played as in T1, then rulers and citizens should expect to obtain an
average of 0.978 and 0.431 points, respectively. In reality, they obtained an average of
1.023 and 0.487 points, respectively. Thus, it seems that rulers realized that citizens were
being altruistic and internalized this preference in their relinquish decision. Indeed, when
rulers selected r = 1, citizens offered an average of 1.191 points, whereas, when rulers
selected r = 0, citizens offered an average of 0.732 points. In other words, this suggests
that rulers relinquished only when citizens offered a transfer S that takes into account the
fact that citizens will behave altruistically. Note that it is also possible that the logic of
the ultimatum game applies here.100 If a citizen shows that s/he is too greedy by offering a
very low S, then the ruler will punish her or him by selecting r = 0 which will significantly
reduce the payoff for the citizen. Indeed, rulers are not losing a great deal when they
take the wrong relinquish decision, while citizens are paying the total cost when rulers
relinquish.
5.7 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a simple model with limited commitment and have
tested it by means of a laboratory experiment. Overall, the experiment provides support for
the hypothesis that more commitment opportunities lead to better social outcomes. Indeed,
we find that this link is valid even when a reallocation of political power is required to take
100There are numerous papers that report results from ultimatum games. See, for example, Forsythe,
Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994); Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, Smith (1994); Hoffman, McCabe and
Smith (1996); and Slonim and Roth (1998).
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advantage of new commitment opportunities. However, we also find that, at low levels of
commitment, there is more cooperation than strictly predicted by our model, while the
opposite is true at high levels of commitment. We also find that only large improvements
in commitment opportunities have a significant effect on the social surplus, while small
changes do not. It seems that the presence of altruism accounts for a great deal, but not
all, of these differences.
Although further research is needed, our results have very interesting implications for
the political economy of reforms. Indeed, if a society begins with low levels of commitment,
we should not expect to see major gains in the social surplus as commitment opportuni-
ties gradually expand (as a result of, for example, gradual institutional improvements).
Instead, only a large change in commitment opportunities will significantly influence the
social surplus. This suggests that gradual reforms may not be very effective and that
only more radical reforms (or possibly a progressive accumulation of institutional improve-
ments) will bring about an observable social change. The good news is that we find that
subjects understand that in some cases, in order to take advantage of new commitment
opportunities, political power must be reallocated to the agents who can credibly commit.
This suggests that, under the right circumstances, the identity of the agents who develop
new commitment opportunities is not an overwhelmingly crucial factor.
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Tables and Figures
Table 5.1: Treatments and Predicted Outcomes
Treatment (π, ρ) e r vR vC Sprom Tprom Y E [vR] E [vC ] TSur
T1 (0,0) 0.00 0 0.50 0.50 - 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000
T2 (0.25,0) 0.50 0 vR(T2) vC(T2) - 1.000 1.500 1.375 0.500 1.875
T3 (0.75,0) 1.00 0 vR(T3) vC(T3) - 1.830 2.500 2.000 0.500 2.500
T4 (0,1) 1.00 1 0.50 2.00 0.500 - 2.500 0.500 2.000 2.500
where:
vR(T2) =
1.000 Pr = 0.25
1.500 Pr = 0.75

vC(T2) =
0.875 Pr = 0.25
0.375 Pr = 0.75

vR(T3) =
1.833 Pr = 0.75
2.500 Pr = 0.25

vC(T2) =
0.667 Pr = 0.75
0.000 Pr = 0.25

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Table 5.2: Balance Across Players (Rulers vs. Citizens)
Complete Sample Ruler Citizen
N Mean S.d N Mean S.d N Mean S.d Mean p
Characteristics
Gender (male=1) 160 0.61 0.49 80 0.66 0.48 80 0.56 0.50 0.10 0.197
Age 160 20.53 2.43 80 20.44 2.49 80 20.61 2.37 -0.17 0.650
Nationality (Argentine=1) 160 0.93 0.26 80 0.93 0.27 80 0.93 0.27 0.00 1.000
Fluent in English (=1) 160 0.99 0.08 80 1.00 0.00 80 0.99 0.11 0.01 0.319
Race (White=1) 160 0.75 0.43 80 0.73 0.45 80 0.78 0.42 -0.05 0.468
Studied Game Theory (=1) 160 0.51 0.50 80 0.48 0.50 80 0.55 0.50 -0.07 0.346
Undergraduate Studies (=1) 160 0.47 0.50 80 0.51 0.50 80 0.43 0.50 0.08 0.270
Graduate Studies (=1) 160 0.01 0.11 80 0.03 0.16 80 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.157
Understanding
Quiz-Mark 160 10.91 2.96 80 11.06 2.97 80 10.76 2.97 0.30 0.523
Answered correctly: question 1 160 0.89 0.31 80 0.90 0.30 80 0.89 0.32 0.01 0.799
Answered correctly: question 2 160 0.81 0.40 80 0.84 0.37 80 0.78 0.42 0.06 0.320
Answered correctly: question 3 160 0.89 0.31 80 0.89 0.32 80 0.90 0.30 -0.01 0.799
Answered correctly: question 4 160 0.78 0.42 80 0.81 0.39 80 0.74 0.44 0.07 0.259
Answered correctly: question 5 160 0.27 0.44 80 0.25 0.44 80 0.29 0.46 -0.04 0.595
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 5.3: Balance Across Treatments I
Complete Sample T1 T2 T3 T4
N Mean S.d Mean S.d Mean S.d Mean S.d Mean S.d
Characteristics
Gender (male=1) 160 0.61 0.49 0.73 0.45 0.70 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.51
Age 160 20.53 2.43 20.90 2.77 20.20 1.99 20.63 2.68 20.38 2.22
Nationality (Argentine=1) 160 0.93 0.26 0.88 0.33 0.88 0.33 0.98 0.16 0.98 0.16
Fluent in English (=1) 160 0.99 0.08 0.98 0.16 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Race (White=1) 160 0.75 0.43 0.68 0.47 0.80 0.41 0.83 0.38 0.70 0.46
Studied Game Theory (=1) 160 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.40 0.50 0.57 0.50
Undergraduate Studies (=1) 160 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.51
Graduate Studies (=1) 160 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00
Understanding
Quiz-Mark 160 10.91 2.96 10.5 2.88 10.80 3.52 11.18 2.72 11.18 2.72
Answered correctly: question 1 160 0.89 0.31 0.93 0.27 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.30 0.85 0.36
Answered correctly: question 2 160 0.81 0.40 0.75 0.44 0.88 0.33 0.78 0.42 0.83 0.38
Answered correctly: question 3 160 0.89 0.31 0.88 0.33 0.85 0.36 0.93 0.27 0.93 0.27
Answered correctly: question 4 160 0.78 0.42 0.70 0.46 0.73 0.45 0.85 0.36 0.83 0.38
Answered correctly: question 5 160 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.46
There were 40 observations of each of these characteristics in all treatments.
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Table 5.4: Balance Across Treatments II
T1/T2 T2/T3 T3/T4 T1/T3 T1/T4 T2/T4
Characteristics
Gender (male=1) 0.808 0.069* 0.826 0.039** 0.066* 0.111
Age 0.198 0.423 0.650 0.653 0.352 0.711
Nationality (Argentine=1) 1.000 0.092* 1.000 0.092* 0.092* 0.092*
Fluent in English (=1) 0.320 1.000 1.000 0.320 0.320 1.000
Race (White=1) 0.209 0.778 0.194 0.124 0.812 0.308
Studied Game Theory (=1) 0.507 0.375 0.120 0.120 1.000 0.507
Undergraduate Studies (=1) 0.148 0.269 0.507 0.823 0.375 0.659
Graduate Studies (=1) 0.320 0.320 0.320 1.000 0.320 1.000
Understanding
Quiz-Mark 0.678 0.595 1.000 0.284 0.284 0.595
Answered correctly: question 1 0.697 1.000 0.505 0.697 0.294 0.505
Answered correctly: question 2 0.156 0.245 0.582 0.796 0.419 0.537
Answered correctly: question 3 0.749 0.294 1.000 0.462 0.462 0.294
Answered correctly: question 4 0.808 0.176 0.765 0.111 0.194 0.290
Answered correctly: question 5 1.000 0.802 0.808 0.802 0.622 0.622
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 5.5: Decisions Across Treatments (Descriptive Statistics)
e r T S T S T S vR vC TSur
Prom. Prom. Decid. Decid.
T1 80 80 72 80 72 8 72 8 80 80 80
0.326 0.100 0.887 7.650 1.771 0.594 1.771 0.594 0.940 0.573 1.513
0.420 0.302 0.736 28.797 1.992 0.696 1.992 0.696 0.735 0.532 0.642
T2 80 80 77 80 58 3 77 3 80 80 80
0.338 0.038 1.128 1.625 1.835 0.417 1.658 0.417 1.037 0.494 1.531
0.421 0.191 0.630 0.737 1.274 0.722 1.168 0.722 0.794 0.410 0.639
T3 80 80 78 80 24 2 78 2 80 80 80
0.628 0.025 1.424 1.561 2.138 0.000 1.656 0.000 1.236 0.722 1.957
0.453 0.157 0.389 0.730 0.646 0.000 0.595 0.000 0.731 0.550 0.679
T4 80 80 39 80 39 0 39 41 80 80 80
0.664 0.513 1.367 0.970 1.612 - 1.612 1.191 1.109 0.903 2.012
0.440 0.503 3.918 0.404 1.110 - 1.110 0.302 0.545 0.496 0.657
Missing values appear in SDecided for T4 because promises of citizens are enforceable with certainty.
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Figure 5.1: Total Social Surplus, by Treatment
Figure 5.2: Total Social Surplus, by Experimental Round
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Table 5.6: Regression Analysis (Without Controls): Total Surplus
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 2 (=1) 0.018a
(0.114)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) 0.444***
(0.124)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.499***
(0.109)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) 0.426***
(0.123)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.481***
(0.107)
Treatment 3 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.054
(0.118)
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO
N 160 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.000 0.103 0.130 0.096 0.122 0.002
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
a Not significant in a one-sided test either.
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Table 5.7: Regression Analysis (Including Controls): Total Surplus
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 2 (=1) 0.012a
(0.127)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) 0.473***
(0.160)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.530***
(0.127)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) 0.402***
(0.143)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.636***
(0.131)
Treatment 3 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.105
(0.127)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 160 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.130 0.201 0.292 0.282 0.291 0.136
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
a Not significant in a one-sided test either.
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Table 5.8: Regression Analysis: Reallocation of Political Power
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 2 (=1) -0.037
(0.0452)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) -0.097**
(0.0447)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.425***
(0.0738)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) -0.0250
(0.0226)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.520***
(0.0790)
Treatment 3 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.571***
(0.0495)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 160 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.142 0.229 0.318 0.295 0.366 0.434
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 5.9: Regression Analysis: Payoff of the Ruler
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 2 (=1) 0.088
(0.152)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) 0.295*a
(0.174)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.187b
(0.138)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) 0.195b
(0.141)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.218b
(0.142)
Treatment 3 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) -0.152b
(0.116)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 160 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.157 0.211 0.211 0.247 0.176 0.184
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
a Significant at the 0.05 level in a one-sided test.
b Significant at the 0.1 level in a one-sided test.
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Table 5.10: Regression Analysis: Payoff of the Citizen
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 2 (=1) -0.076
(0.0682)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) 0.178**
(0.0850)
Treatment 1 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.343***
(0.0920)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 3 (=1) 0.207***
(0.0676)
Treatment 2 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.418***
(0.0919)
Treatment 3 (=0) vs Treatment 4 (=1) 0.258***
(0.0746)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 160 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.144 0.153 0.216 0.240 0.204 0.124
Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
a Not significant in a one-sided test either.
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Table 5.11: Beyond Comparative Statics (T1 and T2)
e SP TP SD TD S T vR vC TSur Y QC QR
T1
All 80 80 80 80 72 80 80 80 80 80 1.153 80 80
0.326 7.649 0.798 0.798 1.770 0.059 1.593 0.94 0.572 1.512 11.55 9.45
0.419 28.797 0.747 0.747 1.992 0.273 1.963 0.734 0.532 0.642 2.574 2.746
r = 0 72 72 72 - 72 - 72 72 72 72 1.014 72 72
0.257 8.320 0.887 - 1.771 - 1.771 0.978 0.431 1.409 9.375 11.375
0.383 30.301 0.736 - 1.992 - 1.992 0.734 0.236 0.591 2.801 2.564
r = 1 8 8 - 8 - 8 - 8 8 8 2.400 8 8
0.950 1.616 - 0.594 - 0.594 - 0.594 1.851 2.445 10.125 13.125
0.093 0.397 - 0.696 - 0.696 - 0.696 0.749 0.102 2.232 2.232
T2
All 80 80 80 80 58 80 80 80 80 80 1.175 80 80
0.337 1.625 1.087 1.086 1.835 0.015 1.596 1.036 0.494 1.531 10.8 10.8
0.420 0.736 0.654 0.654 1.273 0.139 1.188 0.794 0.410 0.638 3.622 3.361
r = 0 77 77 77 - 58 - 77 77 77 77 1.144 77 77
0.322 1.607 1.128 - 1.835 - 1.658 1.061 0.447 1.508 10.831 10.831
0.415 0.736 0.630 - 1.274 - 1.168 0.792 0.319 0.631 3.412 3.679
r = 1 3 3 - 3 - 3 - 3 3 3 1.967 3 3
0.733 2.083 - 0.417 - 0.417 - 0.417 1.710 2.127 10.000 10.000
0.462 0.722 - 0.722 - 0.722 - 0.722 0.687 0.647 1.732 1.732
Where there are no observations for a specific variable, no value is given.
In T3 and T4, S is never enforceable.
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Table 5.11: Beyond Comparative Statics (T3 and T4)
e SP TP SD TD S T vR vC TSur Y QC QR
T3
All 80 80 80 80 24 80 80 80 80 80 1.755 80 80
0.627 1.560 1.388 1.388 2.137 0 1.614 1.23 0.721 1.957 10.65 11.7
0.453 0.730 0.444 0.444 0.645 0 0.642 0.730 0.550 0.679 3.089 2.113
r = 0 78 78 78 - 24 - 78 78 78 78 1.736 78 78
0.618 1.524 1.424 - 2.138 - 1.656 1.267 0.676 1.943 11.769 10.846
0.455 0.702 0.389 - 0.646 - 0.595 0.712 0.476 0.682 2.095 2.870
r = 1 2 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 2 2 2.500 2 2
1.000 3.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 2.500 2.500 9.000 3.000
0.000 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T4
All 80 80 80 80 39 80 80 80 80 80 1.8275 80 80
0.663 0.970 0.666 0.666 1.612 0.610 0.786 1.109 0.902 2.011 11.25 11.1
0.440 0.403 2.802 2.802 1.109 0.636 1.118 0.544 0.495 0.657 2.313 3.033
r = 1 41 41 - - - 41 - 41 41 41 2.480 41 41
0.990 1.191 - - - 1.191 - 1.191 1.298 2.489 11.415 10.756
0.044 0.302 - - - 0.302 - 0.302 0.273 0.048 2.863 2.596
r = 0 39 39 39 - 39 - 39 39 39 39 1.141 39 39
0.321 0.738 1.367 - 1.612 - 1.612 1.023 0.487 1.510 10.769 11.769
0.407 0.368 3.918 - 1.110 - 1.110 0.712 0.293 0.625 3.207 1.870
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Appendix 5.1: Proof of Proposition 5.1
Suppose that r = 1. Then, the citizens optimal choice is e = 1 and, therefore, the
payoffs of the citizen and the ruler will be vC = 2.5 − ρS and vR = ρS, respectively.
Suppose that r = 0. In that case, we have to distinguish between two possible situations.
If π < 12 , then the optimal choice for the citizen is e = 2π. The expected payoffs for the
citizen and for the ruler, as a function of the T promised by the ruler, are therefore given
by:
E [vC ] =
 π
(
1
2 + 4π − T
)
+ 1−4π
2
2 if T ≤ 12 + 2π,
1
2 if T >
1
2 + 2π,
and
E [vR] =
 πT + (1− π)
(
1
2 + 4π
)
if T ≤ 12 + 2π,
1
2 if T >
1
2 + 2π,
respectively. Hence, the ruler prefers to promise T = 12 + 2π, and we therefore have
E [vR] =
1
2 + 4π − 2π2 and E [vC ] = 12 . If π ≥ 12 . In this case, the optimal choice for the
citizen is e = 1. The expected payoff for the citizen and for the ruler -as a function of the
T promised by the ruler- are therefore given by:
E [vC ] =
 π (2.5 − T ) if T ≤ 2.5−
1
2π ,
1
2 if T > 2.5− 12π ,
and
E [vR] =
 Tπ + (1− π) 2.5 T ≤ 2.5−
1
2π ,
1
2 if T > 2.5 − 12π ,
respectively, Hence, the ruler prefers to promise T = 2.5 − 12π and, therefore, E [vR] = 2.0
and E [vC ] =
1
2 .
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Finally, we must consider the ruler’s relinquish decision. If π < 12 , the ruler prefers to
relinquish if and only if ρS > E [vR] =
1
2 + 4π − 2π2. Therefore, if ρ = 0, then r = 0,
T = 12 + 2π, e = 2π, E [vR] =
1
2 + 4π − 2π2 and E [vR] = 12 ; while if ρ = 1, then r = 1,
S = 12 + 4π − 2π2, e = 1, vR = 12 + 4π − 2π2 and vC = 2 − 4π + 2π2. If π ≥ 12 , the
ruler prefers to relinquish if and only if ρS > E [vR] = 2. Therefore, if ρ = 0, then r = 0,
T = 2.5 − 12π , e = 1, E [vR] = 2 and E [vR] = 12 ; while if ρ = 1, then r = 1, S = 2, e = 1,
vR =
1
2 and vC = 2. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.1. 
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Appendix 5.2: Script, Quiz, and Screens101
In this appendix we present the script for the general instructions, the quiz, and a
sample of the rules of the game as observed by the subjects.
Script for General Instructions
We would like to welcome everyone to this experiment. This is an experiment in decision
making, and you will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Different subjects may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your
decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will be conducted through computer terminals, and all inter-
action between participants will take place through the computers. Partitions between
workstations ensure your anonymity. It is important for you not to talk or to try in any
way to communicate with other subjects during the experiments.
In your workstation you will find a pencil, a paper with equations, a paper with a
decision tree, and scratch paper. During the experiment you can use the scratch paper to
make calculations. You will also find a receipt that we will use to pay you at the end of
the experiment.
We will now start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you
will be given a complete description of the experiment. If you have any questions during the
instruction period, please raise your hand and your question will be answered so everyone
can hear. If any difficulties arise after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an
one of the persons conducting the experiment will come and assist you.
You are one of 16 students who have been randomly assigned to one of two groups. As
you can see, all students have been assigned a computer. Each member of Group 1 will be
randomly matched with a member of Group 2.
101Translated from Spanish.
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In each round, each pair of students will play the computer game that will appear on
the screen, with the member of Group 1 playing the role of player 1 and the member of
Group 2 playing the role of player 2. You will be told what your player number is, as it
will appear on the screen at the beginning of the game. The matching-up of partners will
be repeated after each game is played, so that you will play every round with a different
person. At the beginning of each round, the rules of the game will appear on the screen,
as well as the timing and payoffs.
The experiment you are participating in is broken down into two unpaid practice rounds
and four separate paid rounds. At the end of the last round, you will be paid the total
amount you have accumulated during the course of the last four rounds. Everyone will be
paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your
earnings are denominated in POINTS. Your PESO earnings are determined by multiplying
your earnings in points by a conversion rate. In this experiment, the conversion rate is 25
to 1.102
Please turn your attention to the screen at the front of the room. We will explain the
rules of the game.
10225 Argentine pesos were equivalent to approximately 5.18 U.S dollars at the time.
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The Quiz
After a general explanation of the rules of the game provided with the help of a Pow-
erPoint presentation, subjects take the following quiz in order to make it possible to judge
their understanding of the rules of the game.
1. Player 2’s [citizen] income (Y ) before taxes is at least: [5 options]
2. Which of the following levels of effort maximizes player 2’s payoff? (not to be confused
with income) [5 options]
3. What is the maximum possible payoff for player 1 [ruler]? [5 options]
4. Suppose player 1 has not relinquished her right to impose a tax T and has decided
to impose T = min{3, Y }. Which of the following levels of effort maximizes player
2’s payoff? [5 options]
5. Suppose player 1 has not relinquished and has pledged to charge a tax T =
min{0.4, Y }. This promise must be fulfilled with a probability equal to 1/4 = 0.25.
Which of the following maximizes player 2’s payoff? [5 options]
On-Screen Sample of the Rules of the Game
Once they finish the quiz, the subjects direct their attention to their computers and
proceed to play the first round of the session. The first three screens present the rules of
the game. Similar prompts appear on-screen before every round. The following depiction
provides a sample of the rules as seen by a subject in the role of the ruler (first practice
round, treatment 1).
SCREEN 1
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You are about to play a game with another player. Player 1 (yourself) has the power
to select taxes, and Player 2 (your partner) decides what level of effort to put into his or
her work.
Player 2’s monetary income is given by: Y = 0.5 + 2e,
where e is the effort level chosen.
Effort can take any of the following values: 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 or 1.
The game also has another important feature: players are able to make promises about
taxes and/or transfers.
SCREEN 2
The game has four stages:
Stage 1: Promise about S.
Your partner (Player 2) selects and promises to set a value of S (transfer). This promise
will be relevant in the last stage of the round in case you have decided to give up your
power in order to impose a tax T . In this case, your partner decides what amount to
transfer in the last stage. Her promise is not enforceable.
Stage 2: Relinquish Decision.
You decide whether to relinquish (r = 1) or not (r = 0) your power to impose a tax T .
If you relinquish, your partner will make you a transfer S at the end of the round. Other-
wise, your partner will pay tax T .
If you do not relinquish, you also select and promise to set a value of T (tax). This promise
will be relevant in the last stage of the round.
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In this situation, two things can happen:
i) with a probability = 1/4 = 0.25, your partner will be charged the amount T that
you have promised, or
ii) with a probability = 3/4 = 0.75, you will be asked to select a new tax T to charge
your partner in the last stage.
Stage 3: Working Decision.
If you decide to relinquish (r = 1), then your partner will select a level of effort (e) and a
new transfer S = min{S0, Y } which will be issued in the last stage.
If you decide not to relinquish (r = 0), then your partner will select a level of effort (e).
Then we will let you know whether your promise is enforceable or you will be asked to
select a new tax T = min{T0, Y } that will be charged to your partner.
Stage 4: Payments.
Player 1: rS + (1− r)T
Player 2: Y − rS − (1− r)T + 1−e22
SCREEN 3
You are about to play practice round 1 of 2 (unpaid)
PROBABILITY OF ENFORCEMENT:
Promises about T : 0.25
Promises about S: 0
The Questionnaire
Thank you for participating in this experiment! Please complete the following ques-
tionnaire before leaving.
301
Gender (male/female)
Age (in years)
Nationality
Native English-Speaker (Yes/No)
Racial Group (White/Black/White (Hispanic)/Asian)
Have you ever taken a course in game theory / microeconomics? (Yes/No)
Current Studies (Graduate/Undergraduate)
Current Studies (Junior/Senior)
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